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What is it that confers the noblest delight? What is that which swells a man's breast with pride above
that which any other experience can bring to him? Discovery! [...] To give birth to an idea - to discover
a great thought - an intellectual nugget, right under the dust of a ﬁeld that many a brain-plow had gone
over before.
Mark Twain (2012)
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Introduction
This thesis sets out to provide new insights into three particular aspects of modern-day migration and
national security. In the course of this dissertation I will deal with tax competition with mobile altruis-
tic taxpayers, with the inﬂuence of immigration on attitudes towards a particular aspect of the welfare
state, namely day care for school children, and ﬁnally with the antagonistic behaviour of terrorist organi-
zations and governments. The analysis of these issues is motivated by the economic importance and the
wide-ranging implications of the vast current migratory ﬂows, and by the persistent threat domestic and
international terrorist groups pose to the security of Western societies.
Cheap international transport, European integration and the move towards a globalized economy have led
to a massive increase in cross-border movements and ethnic heterogeneity in the last decades. Particularly
the recent economic turmoil in Europe has led to a surge in migration within the European Union (EU),
from struggling countries such as Greece and Spain towards pillars of stability such as Germany. In the
ﬁrst half of 2012, immigration into Germany increased by 15% in comparison with the ﬁrst half of 2011, in
which in turn immigration was already 20 % higher than in the ﬁrst half of 2010 (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2012).
Even in normal times, mobility between open countries is high. In 2008, more than 6 million people
either permanently left or entered a country of the EU, which amounts to roughly one percent of the
total population of about 500 million of the EU at the time. In the same year, the EU's country average
of non-native citizens was about six percent (Eurostat, 2012b). Diﬀerences between European countries
are vast, of course. While Germany's share of foreign-born citizens was about 13 % in 2008, less than one
percent of the Polish population consisted of non-natives (OECD, 2011b). Figure 1 shows the development
of the foreign-born population in selected countries in the decade following 2000. It becomes visible that in
this period, the foreign-born population share, and thus ethnic heterogeneity, increased in most countries,
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Figure 1  Share of foreign-born population in selected countries, 2000 and 2009
Adapted from OECD (2011b)
including many of the big developed economies.
The phenomena of increasing mobility, more heterogeneous populations and associated issues have long
been the topic of economic research. These issues range from the relationship of migration with the
provision of particular kinds of education (Poutvaara, 2008), to the viability of welfare states in the face
of migrating net-recipients and net-contributors (Weichenrieder and Busch, 2007), to the economic impact
of border security measures put in place to tackle transnational terrorism (Mirza and Verdier, 2008).
As early as 1885 E. G. Ravenstein formulated his laws of migration which, amongst other claims, propose
that migrants are attracted by great centres of commerce or industry (a summary and discussion of
Ravenstein's laws is given in Grigg (1977)). One of the ﬁrst economic treatments of the private and
social costs and beneﬁts connected with migration has been attempted by Sjaastad (1962), who pointed
out taxation issues and externalities arising from the migration decision of individuals. About three decades
later, Borjas (1989) has identiﬁed three main topics of economic interest with regard to immigration: The
drivers of the direction, size and composition of the immigrant ﬂow, the impact of immigration on the
economies of the sending and receiving countries, and the adaption of immigrants to their host country.
The ﬁrst two chapters of this thesis, which deal with tax competition and support for the welfare state, aim
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to provide new insights into particular aspects of the drivers and the impact of immigration. The ﬁrst
chapter is also related to Sjaastad's (1962) idea that tax diﬀerentials between jurisdictions may give rise to
ineﬃciencies, while the second chapter is connected with his notion that publicly funded services might be
aﬀected by migration. Implicitly related to the adaption of immigrants to their host country is the topic
of the third chapter which ventures into the ﬁeld of security economics by modeling a competitive game
between a terrorist organization and a government. The threat to security depicted in this chapter might
stem from the free movement and settlement decision of potentially dangerous groups and individuals,
as for instance the 9/11 attacks in the US by predominantly Saudi-Arab terrorists and the creation of
terrorist cells in Germany and the UK by citizens with a migration background show.
The role of the government is also of particular interest in the treatment of the three topics of this
dissertation. In the ﬁrst chapter, the government chooses its tax rate so as to maximize the transfer towards
poor citizens. In the third chapter, the government's problem is to ﬁnd the optimal combination between
own consumption and counter-terrorism spending which reduces the threat from terrorism. Chapter two
takes a more indirect approach to the role of the government by illuminating individual attitudes which
may constitute a political constraint for governments and which might be shaped by immigration. After
this general introduction, I will now brieﬂy motivate the individual chapters of this thesis.
In the ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation, I will apply diﬀerent concepts of altruism to a model of tax
competition between states with mobile taxpayers. Tax competition in the absence of any barrier to
migration and any incentive to pay taxes should drastically reduce the tax levied on mobile populations.
Common tax competition models even suggest that, in the case of perfectly mobile populations, welfare
states will undercut each other's tax rate to attract taxpayers and keep welfare recipients at bay to the
point where tax rates are zero. However, as Figure 2 shows, the tax burden for the average worker in
many OECD countries stayed roughly the same over the last decade, and there still remains a huge scope
for taxation given that Germany and France taxed about 14 % above the OECD average in 2010.1
Motivated by these ﬁndings, the ﬁrst chapter develops a two-country framework with mobile altruistic
1The tax burden is calculated as the sum of personal income tax, payroll tax and employees' and employers' social security
contributions, divided by the sum of gross wage, employers' social security contributions and payroll tax (i.e. the labour
cost) times 100. The average worker is single and earns the average income of full-time workers in the respective countries.
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Figure 2  Tax burden in percent for the average worker in selected OECD coun-
tries, 2000-2010
Source: OECD (2012)
taxpayers and immobile welfare recipients. It is shown that unique pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) in
taxation exist which are diﬀerent from zero given suﬃciently strong altruistic preferences. In the related
literature, this amelioration of the Race to the Bottom of tax rates is usually achieved by introducing
barriers to migration such as migration costs, home country attachment (cf. Konrad, 2008) or even
patriotism (cf. Qari et al., 2012).
Without doubt, it is well-nigh impossible to explain many actions such as giving to charities or volunteering
by taking recourse to the original strict notion of the homo oeconomicus, a coldly calculating human being
who is only concerned about his own welfare, even if one is willing to acknowledge that, as H. L. Mencken
(1982, p. 17) put it, a large part of altruism, even when it is perfectly honest, is grounded upon the
fact that it is uncomfortable to have unhappy people about one. Concepts of altruism can be used to
account for these deviations from what seems to be the proper economic rationale, and chapter one applies
concepts which have been examined and conﬁrmed in laboratory experiments to motivate redistributive
taxation.
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Figure 3  Share of people with migration background in the total population of
Germany by age cohort, 2005 and 2011
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2005, 2011)
The model in chapter 1 also shows that, if countries are asymmetric with respect to the number of welfare
recipients, speciﬁc kinds of altruistic motivations may support pure strategy NE in which the country with
the fewer poor attracts more taxpayers and sets higher taxes. This implies that rich countries with a small
number of welfare recipients may actually beneﬁt from tax competition.
The second chapter, which is based on joint work with Dr. Salmai Qari (MPI, Munich and WZB, Berlin),
sallies forth into the ﬁeld of econometrics and contributes to the long-standing debate whether immigration
poses a threat to the welfare state. As pointed out above, immigration and thus ethnic heterogeneity in
developed countries have been increasing over the last decades, which has been argued to reduce the
generosity of the welfare state and the support for redistributive taxation (for an overview see Stichnoth
and Straeten, 2011). Immigration also poses a challenge to the educational system as immigrant pupils
tend to perform worse than their native peers (OECD, 2006). As Figure 3 shows, the share of pupils in
Germany with a migration background, that is, with at least one non-native parent, has been increasing
between 2005 and 2011. The age structure indicates that the share of pupils with a migration background
will rise further as the 0− 5 age cohort is larger than the 5− 20 age cohorts.
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For the case of Germany, we examine how the support for the public provision of day care, a particular
aspect of the educational system, is associated with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. To this end,
we employ mixed eﬀects models to analyse individual-level data from the 1997 and 2002 waves of the
German Socio-Economic Panel and data from oﬃcial sources. Public day care, just as a publicly funded
educational system, is clearly redistributive from families with high incomes and without children towards
families with low incomes and oﬀspring, and thus a part of the welfare state. In contrast to the typical
result that support for the welfare state is eroded if ethnic heterogeneity increases (cf. Dahlberg et al.,
2012), we ﬁnd no evidence that the preferences for public provision of day care are negatively connected
with the share of foreign pupils. We ﬁnd weak evidence that a larger share of non-German pupils may
actually be associated with an increase in the support for the public provision of day care.
Chapter three deals with terrorism, one of the prominent threats to security many countries face today. A
recent daily chart by the Economist, shown in Figure 4, illustrates that the number of terrorist attacks has
strongly risen since 2004, and that terrorism is truly a global phenomenon.2 The US Department of State
(2010) reported that almost 58, 000 people were injured or killed by terrorist attacks in 2009 worldwide.
In the same year, about 300 terrorist attacks (according to the deﬁnition of Europol) were perpetrated in
the EU (Europol, 2010).
Terrorism is of interest to economists because most aspects of terrorism can be subjected to economic
analysis. Furthermore, the economic impact of terrorist activities can be severe. The US spent almost
$US 1.3 trillion on the War on Terror between 2001 and 2011 (Belasco, 2010), while the direct economic
costs of the 9/11 attacks are estimated to be $US 31 billion (Krugman, 2004). In addition to the direct
destruction of physical capital and human lives, the threat of terrorism can alter voting behaviour (cf.
Gould and Klor, 2010), reduce individual happiness (cf. Frey et al., 2007), distort trade ﬂows (cf. Mirza
and Verdier, 2008) and hamper growth and investment (cf. Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008).
The third chapter proposes a simple game theoretic model in which a government tries to infer the size,
and therefore the threat from, a terrorist organization by its actions. It turns out that large terrorist
groups, if they are interested in increasing their manpower, have an incentive to appear weaker than they
2The military endeavours of the US and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan and subsequent inter-ethnic conﬂict and attacks
against the occupying forces in these countries are primarily to blame for the increase in terrorist attacks, of course.
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Figure 4  Global terrorism index, 2002-2011
Source: Economist (2012)
are. Furthermore, the government may want to invest more into counter-terrorism measures if it observes
no terrorist activities. These results indicate that it matters for the optimal government strategy whether
the government is facing a terrorist group of the commonly assumed political or military type (cf. Arce
and Sandler, 2007), or whether it is confronted by a terrorist organization that wants to achieve growth
(cf. Feinstein and Kaplan, 2010). The behaviour of contemporary terrorist groups gives some evidence for
the existence of such a growth motive and the resulting terrorist and government strategies.
The main part of this dissertation is structured as follows: chapter one will create a framework in which the
eﬀect of altruistic preferences on the outcome of tax competition between two welfare states is examined.
This chapter is based on Hendel (2012a). The second chapter consists of an empirical study of the
relationship between immigration and the attitudes towards the public provision of school children day
care. The third chapter develops a game theoretic model of interaction between a terrorist organization
and a government and characterizes their optimal strategies and the outcome of the game. This chapter is
7
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based on Hendel (2012b). The thesis is concluded by an outlook which brieﬂy illustrates why the economic
treatment of migration and national security will be of enduring importance in the foreseeable future.
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Chapter 1
The Inﬂuence of Altruistic Preferences on the
Race to the Bottom of Welfare States
1.1 Introduction
Most taxation, be it income tax, property tax, compulsory health or unemployment insurance, constitutes
a form of wealth transfer from taxpayers in the higher income brackets to those with low or no income.
Therefore, the tax competition literature argues that regions and countries compete for a mobile tax base
consisting of redistribution-averse taxpayers which leads to a destructive Race to the Bottom in taxes.
This in turn makes the provision of tax-ﬁnanced public goods and welfare transfers all but impossible in
the worst case.1 However, the empirical evidence for this phenomenon is rather mixed.2
In contrast to what the Race to the Bottom theory suggests, some countries with high tax rates seem to
have a high appeal for taxpaying migrants, as can be seen from European migration patterns of highly
qualiﬁed personnel (see Figure 1.1). For example, Norway with a tax wedge of 43 %, Sweden with 50.9%
and Belgium with 60.5% (OECD, 2010) for high-earning singles are able to sustain tax rates above the
OECD average of 41.1% and are still attractive for European migrants.3 One could argue that in the case
of Norway low unemployment rates and high net incomes are the dominant reasons for the net inﬂux of
40, 000 migrants in 2009 (Statistics Norway, 2009). But Sweden and particularly Belgium did not display
low levels of unemployment and high net incomes between 2005 and 2009 as can be seen from Table 1.1.
Furthermore, while Denmark and the Netherlands (which are countries characterized by high net wages
1Of course, tax competition can also have beneﬁcial eﬀects such as ﬁscal restraint and eﬃciency gains. For an overview,
see Wilson (1999).
2Among the proponents of a Race to the Bottom are Brueckner (2000), Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) and Kleven et al.
(2010). Other motivations for migration and tax competition prevail in research by Volden (2002), Bakija and Slemrod (2004)
and Dalen and Henkens (2007).
3The OECD deﬁnes the tax wedge as the ratio between income tax, employer and employee social contributions minus
cash transfers to labour costs. The tax wedge does not include additional compulsory contributions to privately managed
pension funds or insurances.
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Figure 1.1  Emigration, immigration and net migration of scientists and execu-
tives between EU-15 countries, averaged over 2005 to 2009
Scientists (ISCO 2) and executives (ISCO 1) are classiﬁed according to the International Standard of Occupations
(ISCO)
Adapted from Ette and Sauer (2010)
and low unemployment in European comparison) lost highly qualiﬁed taxpayers between 2005 and 2009,
Germany, a country with high taxes and high unemployment in European comparison had a net migration
of about zero. A common feature of Germany, Sweden and Belgium is the high publicly mandated social
expenditure as a share of GDP. Thus, high taxes in combination with generous welfare transfers do not
seem to be a deterrence for many migrants. This is at odds with the notion that taxpayers aim to pay as
little taxes as possible, maximize disposable income and migrate accordingly.
In this chapter, I will show that a full Race to the Bottom in taxes does not need to occur under the
assumptions of immobile poor welfare recipients and perfectly mobile altruistic taxpayers who cannot
decide on their income tax levels. I will further distinguish between three types of altruism which are
discussed in detail in section 2: pure altruism as formulated by Weichenrieder and Busch (2007), inequity
10
The Influence of Altruistic Preferences on the RttB of Welfare States
Table 1.1  Tax wedges and welfare expenditures for selected OECD countries
Country Average net
income for a
single worker, no
kids, earning
170% of the
average wage in
$US (2005-2009)
Tax wedge for a
single worker,no
kids, earning
167% of the
average wage in
% (2009)
Net
publicly
mandated
social ex-
penditure
in % of
GDP
(2007)
Average
indirect
tax rate in
% (2007)
Average
unemploy-
ment rate
in % (2005-
2009)
Austria 53742.82 50.1 24.8 16.4 4.58
Belgium 45383.41 60.5 26.2 15.1 7.84
Denmark 53360.46 48.6 23.9 26.0 4.40
Finland 50644.36 48.2 22.6 19.9 7.50
France 48382.80 53.1 29.9 14.4 8.84
Germany 49352.55 53.0 27.2 14.2 9.10
Luxembourg 67303.30 41.1 19.1 23.7 4.70
Mexico N/A 20.8 9.0 6.0 4.08
Netherlands 55525.10 41.8 20.4 23.5 4.00
Norway 74285.78 43.0 20.0 23.5 3.20
Poland 12867.62 34.9 18.8 17.9 11.34
Spain 38092.14 41.6 21.6 12.5 11.08
Sweden 49578.42 50.9 26.0 20.7 7.08
Switzerland 77866.91 33.6 N/A N/A 3.74
United Kingdom 69274.85 37.0 22.7 12.8 5.74
United States 47441.14 34.6 18.9 4.1 5.88
OECD Average N/A 41.1 20.2 15.1 6.64
Source: OECD (2007, 2010, 2011a)
aversion as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and warm glow as put forward by Andreoni (1990).
Both inequity aversion and warm glow have so far not been used to motivate taxation.
If warm glow preferences are assumed and altruistic sentiments are suﬃciently strong, an asymptotically
stable unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) exists in which taxation occurs. Furthermore, if
countries are asymmetric with respect to the number of poor, it is shown that there are stable pure
strategy NE with pure altruism and inequity aversion preferences. The model also suggests that rich
countries have an advantage in the competition for taxpayers. The aim of this chapter is to highlight a
factor other than migration costs, namely altruistic preferences, which may help to explain why high tax,
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high welfare beneﬁt countries such as Germany do not suﬀer from a signiﬁcant ﬂight of their taxpayers.
The ﬁrst economic models to deal with the tax erosion issue were mainly focussed on tax competition
within federations.4 European integration has then sparked research on the reaction of taxes and welfare
states to a trans-national increase in mobility and free labour market access.5 For a survey of the eﬀects
of factor mobility on redistribution, see Cremer and Pestieau (2004).
Directly related to this chapter is the contribution by Weichenrieder and Busch (2007). They present
a framework in which zero taxation is the outcome in a federation with perfectly mobile, non-altruistic
taxpayers and immobile poor who decide on the level of taxation. The same result is achieved under the
assumption of immobile homogenous taxpayers with pure altruism preferences who can also decide on the
tax rates, and perfectly mobile poor. Altruism is modeled such that the amount of money transferred to
each individual poor person enters the utility function of the taxpayers. Imposing further restrictions on
the relative numbers of poor and rich citizens, the authors predict a full Race to the Bottom in taxes in the
absence of a mechanism such as delayed integration under both mobility assumptions.6 Weichenrieder
and Busch (2007) do not consider the case in which taxpayers are mobile, altruistic and heterogeneous with
respect to the strength of their altruistic sentiment and welfare recipients are immobile. But this setting
is interesting as, given the formulation of altruistic preferences, the migration decision of the rich now not
only depends on the number of poor, but also on the number of other taxpayers in their jurisdiction. The
altered mobility assumptions are also in line with real world observations, as explained in subsection 1.3.1.
I show that this variation of assumptions is suﬃcient to prevent a full Race to the Bottom with a warm
glow formulation of altruism, even in the absence of the delayed integration mechanism. The public
good character of redistribution introduces enough stickiness into migration decisions to allow for non-
zero taxation. Furthermore, introducing asymmetry with respect to the number of immobile poor allows
for stable NE with inequity aversion and pure altruism preferences. Here, the heterogeneity of taxpayers'
4The analysis was centered on externalities from taxation and migration, possible tax and transfer mechanisms to account
for these externalities and general equilibrium eﬀects from tax competition. See, for instance, Pauly (1973), Wildasin (1991),
Crane (1992) and Mansoorian and Myers (1993). In a world without migration costs, the outcome in these models is generally
zero taxation.
5See, for instance, Cremer and Pestieau (1998), Razin et al. (2002), Sinn (2003) and Egger and Radulescu (2009).
6Delayed integration means that a taxpayer has to pay the tax rate of the country he was living in at the start of the
period, even if he migrates during the period. Tax rates are announced at the beginning of a period before migration can
take place. In a tax competition game between two countries with ﬁnite number of periods, this mechanism is suﬃcient to
prevent an outcome of zero taxation.
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redistributive preferences is also crucial.
Several arguments other than altruism have been put forth in the literature to explain why a redistributive
welfare state can survive in the presence of taxpayer mobility.
First, welfare transfers act as an insurance against the sudden loss of one's earning ability through, say,
unemployment, and insurance through redistribution can cover risks for which no private insurance market
exists (Sinn, 1996). But wealthy taxpayers with safe jobs should prefer not to insure at all or to insure
themselves privately to keep out the bad risks as they end up being net contributors in public welfare
and insurance schemes.
Second, migration costs have been put forward as a reason for the possibility of taxation: Citizens can be
taxed simply because leaving the jurisdiction is more costly (in monetary or psychological terms) for them
than paying their taxes (Mansoorian and Myers, 1993). But with increasingly multilingual populations,
fast and cheap means of transport and advanced communication via the internet, these costs should be
falling, especially for young and well educated professionals which constitute the group most likely to
migrate.7
Third, political scientists have argued that tax competition might not take place due to domestic and
transnational political constraints (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2010): On the
one hand, the majority of the electorate could oppose lowering tax rates levied on the rich due to ideological
reasons even if, for instance through a Laﬀer curve eﬀect, this were to increase tax revenues. On the other
hand, governments might adhere to informal, non-enforceable agreements with other countries and do not
deviate unilaterally, so the Prisoner's Dilemma of the Race to the Bottom is solved by simply agreeing to
play the mutually beneﬁcial strategy. These constraints violate rationality assumptions commonly made
in economics and are therefore debatable.
The next section presents diﬀerent concepts of altruism which will be incorporated into a tax competition
model with warm glow in section 1.3 and with pure altruism and inequity aversion in section 1.4. Section
1.5 concludes.
7E.g., Thompson (2009) ﬁnds a high willingness to migrate particularly in this group.
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1.2 Concepts of altruism
The idea that humans are not guided purely by economic considerations, but by a divinely commanded,
innate or acquired concern for their fellow man has been around for millennia.8 However, incorporating
this notion into an economic model requires modiﬁcations to the concept of the self-interested, coldly
calculating homo oeconomicus. This section presents three diﬀerent approaches to the idea of altruism.
A ﬁrst concept is pure altruism. For instance, the formulations of altruism in Wildasin (1991) and We-
ichenrieder and Busch (2007) are in line with this notion. One could imagine that taxpayers receive utility
from the tax-ﬁnanced welfare beneﬁt an individual poor person in their jurisdiction receives. This could
be because they are genuinely good people who feel empathy for the lot of others.9 Or they could just as
well be motivated by purely egoistic reasons: Having beggars oﬀ the streets, reducing poverty-related crime
or, generally speaking, keeping the masses quiet are motivations that can be captured by a preference
for income redistribution. Furthermore, it could be the case that the productivity or income of a rich
taxpayer depends on the human capital of the poor as he might need educated workers for his factories,
as assistants, etc. Income redistribution to pay for the poor's education is therefore rational for taxpayers
even though they do not care about the living conditions of the poor per se.10
But utility from pure altruism does not depend on one's own contribution in large societies and therefore
suﬀers from free-riding issues related to public goods.11 The individual contribution has a minimal eﬀect
on the total provision of welfare beneﬁts, and thus each taxpayer would state zero as his own preferred
tax rate. This implication of the notion of pure altruism has already been noted, albeit not in its negative
implications, by the German moral philosopher J. G. Fichte in the late 18th and early 19th century. Fichte
stated that a good person wants good acts to take place and does not care by whom they are performed
(2012). There is also experimental evidence for this shortcoming of a purely altruistic motivation, e.g.
8Charity is demanded in both the Old and New Testament and the Qu'ran. The causes and eﬀects of charity are an
important issue in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae (Ney, 2006), and Immanuel Kant (1785) deduces the duty of
charity from his notion of the categorical imperative.
9In Germany, wealthy taxpayers like Dietmar Hopp (one of the founders of SAP) and a club of 50 millionaires have
demanded higher income taxation instead of social welfare cuts to overcome the current dire ﬁscal situation (Hamburger
Abendblatt, 2010; ZDFinfokanal, 2010).
10This idea is also found in Alesina and Giuliano (2009), for instance.
11For a discussion of group size eﬀects on public good provision see, for instance, Isaac and Walker (1988).
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by Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) who fail to ﬁnd purely altruistic preferences in a voluntary contributions
experiment.
A second concept is inequity aversion, which has come up in recent research as a possible driving force
behind income redistribution. Here, it is not concern for the income of others, but worries about the
diﬀerence between one's own income and that of others which leads to voluntary giving. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), as well as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) ﬁnd that equity preference can explain a wide range of
experimental outcomes, ranging from completely selﬁsh behavior to full cooperation, in public good and
dictator games. In addition to fairness considerations as expressed in Bolton and Ockenfels' idea of equity
and reciprocity, the same basically egoistic motivations for an aversion to inequity as in the pure altruism
case apply.
Finally, a third approach to motivate altruistic behavior is warm glow altruism which has been put for-
ward by Andreoni (1990) and tested, amongst others, by Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) and Crumpler and
Grossman (2008). According to the warm glow theory, the act of giving generates utility for an individual
as he or she experiences a good feeling from being generous. Neither the utility of the donation recipient
nor the total provision of a good ﬁnanced by donations matters, only the individual contribution. The
opposite eﬀect, a cold chill, analytically works in the same way with an inverted sign and captures the
pangs of conscience generated by not adhering to a social norm, to the direct request of a fund raiser or
similar external demands for charity.
One could argue that warm glow can only be applied to truly voluntary giving, like donations to charities,
but there are reasons why it might also be reasonable to consider warm glow preferences in connection with
taxation. A mobile individual does not have to take the tax rate of a country as given but can migrate to
another country, and hereby choose his or her own preferred contribution to the welfare state. Therefore, in
a setting with competing countries, taxes become, at least to some extent, a choice variable for individuals.
Civic duty, resulting from an upbringing in an environment in which taxation and redistribution is the
acknowledged social norm, might also induce individuals to feel a warm glow (or at least avoid a cold chill)
by paying their taxes as they are fulﬁlling their perceived obligations towards society. In this respect,
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warm glow can be seen as being related to the notion of tax morale.12
Finally, as Schlicht (1998) argues with his self-attribution theory, the mere fact of doing something might
lead one to like it even if another salient reason, such as compulsion, is at hand. Hence, taxpayers might
either try to fulﬁll an obligation by paying taxes or satisfy an acquired taste for redistribution.
It is clear that altruism, if it is only selﬁshness in disguise, should extend to the residents of a country
the altruistic taxpayer lives in, not just to poor of the same nationality. But even if altruism stems from
unselﬁsh motives, it is reasonable to assume that altruistic feelings should be directed ﬁrst and foremost
towards the poor which are visible, close-by and receive local, regional or national news coverage. Thus,
in the remainder of the chapter it is assumed that mobile taxpayers have altruistic sentiments towards the
poor in the jurisdiction they live in.
Having established the applicability of theories of altruism on taxation, I will now turn to a model incor-
porating altruistic preferences in a tax competition framework.
1.3 A model of tax competition with altruistic preferences
1.3.1 General framework
In this section, I will present a model of two countries competing for mobile altruistic taxpayers. In the
related literature, varying mobility assumptions for rich and poor persons have been used. However,
migrants are often restricted from entering a country's social welfare system without ﬁrst contributing
to it.13 Furthermore, auent and well-educated persons usually have more options when considering
employment abroad. Finally, Ette and Sauer (2010) show that the share of highly qualiﬁed personnel
emigrating from Germany is disproportionately high. I therefore consider the case of mobile rich and
immobile poor to be the most interesting one.
12Tax morale can be deﬁned as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes arising from the moral obligation to pay taxes
as a contribution to society (Cummings et al., 2009). Particularly in Germany, a tax morale eﬀect could be at work as
minimizing the personal tax load through the myriads of deductions laid down in the German tax code can be considered
the social norm, so paying the normal amount already amounts to something akin to voluntary giving (cf. Doerrenberg
et al., 2012).
13In Germany,  23 para. 3 Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Security Code) XII states that foreigners entering the country for the
sole purpose of obtaining social security beneﬁts are excluded from said beneﬁts.
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For altruistic taxpayers, income transfers can be seen as a local public good (cf. Pauly, 1973 and Orr,
1976), so they go shopping for their preferred rate of taxation and redistribution (Tiebout, 1956). It is
important to note that altruism can call for very peculiar public goods: With warm glow altruism, only
the own contribution creates utility, while public goods generally create utility through total contributions.
Under the assumption of inequity aversion, the own contribution via its eﬀect on disposable income also
aﬀects the utility from redistribution. Only redistribution motivated by pure altruism is a classic pure
public good.
There are two countries, i and j, which maximize the welfare transfer they can oﬀer to their local, immobile
poor by maximizing tax revenue. The number of welfare recipients is given by ni in country i and nj
in country j. Governments are interested in revenue maximization for redistributive purposes as their
reelection depends on the welfare recipients: If the decisive voter in a country is a poor person, the
government will cater for his redistribution preferences if it is interested in staying in oﬃce. The decisive
role of a poor voter is ensured within the model's framework by assuming that the number of immobile
poor within each country is greater than the total number of mobile taxpayers. Even if all taxpayers
were to migrate to one country they would still be outnumbered and outvoted by the poor, which is an
assumption also made in Weichenrieder and Busch (2007). Given the typical empirical result that the
median of the income distribution is lower than its mean, and that the median voter is thus a beneﬁciary
of a redistributive welfare system, this assumption seems justiﬁable (cf. Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The
transfer constitutes the only income for welfare recipients. By taking into account the migration decisions
of the taxpayers which are determined by their utility functions, governments implicitly also have to
consider the welfare of the rich.
This model setup implies that in autarky, i.e. if taxpayers were not mobile, countries would try to fully
expropriate taxpayers. To prevent full expropriation, one could assume that the possibility of taxation is
restricted by bureaucratic ineﬃciencies so that the highest possible tax rate is smaller than the exogenous
income (Weichenrieder and Busch, 2007). Countries will thus only suﬀer tax revenue reductions with
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mobile taxpayers if tax competition drives equilibrium tax rates below those possible in autarky. 14
Countries i and j collect a lump-sum tax bi, bj with 0 ≤ bi, bj ≤ x from a continuum K with mass 1 of
costlessly mobile taxpayers. These taxpayers earn an exogenously given income x > 0 and incorporate
some form of altruism, to be speciﬁed later, in their utility functions. As stated above, to make the decisive
voter a welfare recipient it is assumed that ni, nj > 1. Taxpayers are heterogeneous with respect to the
strength of their altruistic motivation. It is assumed that each country initially hosts one half of the mass
of taxpayers, and that taxpayers do not have a home country preference, i.e. they do not intrinsically
prefer living in one country over the other. Given the strength of his or her altruistic feeling, the tax rate
and (in the case of inequity aversion and pure altruism) the number of immobile poor in each country, a
taxpayer decides on whether to stay in his home country or migrate. Furthermore, taxpayers are unable
to coordinate their migration decisions even if it were beneﬁcial for them to all settle in the same country,
and they take each others migration decision as given.
Taxpayer k K is assumed to have the following quasi-linear utility function if he settles in country i:15
Uk,i = V (x− bi) + αkW (bi) (1)
V is a concave function of the taxpayer's disposable income with V (0) = 0, ∂V∂x (0) =∞, ∂V∂x > 0, ∂
2V
∂x2 < 0.
W is a linear function and can be speciﬁed to account for diﬀerent types of altruism (see Table 1.2).
14An upper bound on redistribution could also be introduced by shedding the assumption that welfare recipients always
outnumber taxpayers. But this would pose two problems. First, taxpayers would all want to settle within the same country
to maximize their vote share. If the migration decision of a taxpayer depends on that of other taxpayers, a stable pure
strategy NE may no longer exist as will turn out to be the case with pure altruism and inequity aversion preferences. Second,
it would become necessary to calculate the decisive median voter. If he were a taxpayer, his location on the α- continuum
would depend on the number of poor within the jurisdiction as all welfare recipients would prefer full expropriation. In turn,
even with warm glow preferences the amount of redistribution would become dependent on the number of poor.
15As this chapter neither examines distributional questions nor principal-agent problems, the critique of the quasi-linearity
assumption in public ﬁnance and political economy models as put forward in the introduction of Dixit et al. (1997) does not
apply. As Boadway et al. (2002) notice, the quasi-linearity assumption is of course questionable but commonly used. In the
context of this chapter, it makes the most sense to attribute the concave part to disposable income, as this ensures that at
least for small incomes disposable income is preferred to altruistic redistribution.
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Table 1.2  Formal representation of the different types of altruistic preferences
Type of altruistic preference Formal representation
No Altruism W ≡ 0
Warm Glow Wi(bi) = bi
Pure Altruism Wi(bi,mi, ni) = bi × mini
Inequity Aversion Wi(x, bi,mi, ni) = −(x− bi − bi × mini )
αk is the strength of k's altruistic motivation, with 0 < αk ≤ l <∞. The assumption of 0 < αk ≤ l <∞
is needed to ensure the stability of the NE.16 In the following sections, it is assumed that αk is drawn from
a truncated normal distribution between 0 and l with mean=median µ, 0 < µ < l, and standard deviation
σv > 0.17 Note that taxpayers are costlessly mobile, which leads to a zero taxation outcome in the absence
of altruism. Taxpayers also only care about welfare transfers in the country they settle in.18
Given the tax rates bi and bj , it can be determined where each individual taxpayer will settle by calculating
a cutoﬀ level α∗ which corresponds to a taxpayer's α who is just indiﬀerent as to which country he lives in.
This is done by setting the utility a taxpayer would gain in each country (given by (1)) equal and solving
for α∗:
V (x− bi) + α∗W (bi) = V (x− bj) + α∗W (bj)
⇒ α∗ = V (x− bj)− V (x− bi)
W (bi)−W (bj) (2)
Assuming the same number of poor in each country, a taxpayer k with αk > α∗ will settle in the country
16Including the zero bound makes it possible for a country to always attract marginally more taxpayers by marginally
lowering the tax rate. If α were inﬁnite, a country could always attract marginally more taxpayers by setting a higher tax
rate. An unbounded distribution of altruistic preferences is also an unrealistic assumption.
17Experimental evidence (e.g. Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) supports the idea of heterogeneous
individuals with respect to altruistic preferences.
18As Pauly (1973) argues, altruism is motivated by perceiving the plight of others, and dire living conditions close-by are
more likely to be perceived than those far away. As pointed out in section 1.2, altruism that is motivated by a preference for
not being confronted with poverty and its manifestations is also likely to depend on the level of poverty in the vicinity of the
taxpayer.
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with higher welfare transfers, while one with αk < α∗ chooses the country with lower transfer levels.19
Thus, the more altruistic taxpayers choose the country with higher taxation and higher welfare beneﬁts.
Given the taxpayers' migration decision, the model is solvable by backward induction: Each country
non-cooperatively and simultaneously chooses a tax level while taking into account the other country's
possible decision and the resulting taxpayer migration. Taxpayers then choose whether to stay in their
home country or migrate. The optimization problem for country i's tax revenues is thus
max
bi
bi ×mi(x, bi, bj , ni, nj) (3)
where mi is the number of taxpayers who settle in country i.
Several formulations of the altruistic preferences can now be imagined, based on the diﬀerent concepts
of altruism presented in the previous section. These are summarized in Table 1.2. As can be seen from
these formulas, in the warm glow case utility from transfers only depends on the own contribution. In the
pure altruism case, the size of the transfer to each individual poor person matters, while in the inequity
aversion case, the sign of W changes from + to − (as income diﬀerences create disutility) and disutility
depends on the diﬀerence between disposable income and the transfer to each individual welfare recipient.
Given this setup, unique pure strategy NE values for taxation can be found which diﬀer from the Race
to the Bottom result of zero taxation. These equilibria will be derived in the following sections. The
simple intuition for the existence of equilibria with positive taxation is that governments provide a good
which is coveted by mobile taxpayers. The repelling eﬀect of a lower disposable income is countered by
the attraction of the good.
To illustrate the typical results of tax competition models lacking mobility constraints or other competition-
reducing assumptions, I will brieﬂy cover the results of the model in the absence of altruism. In this case,
the utility of a taxpayer will only depend on his or her disposable income in a given country, that is,
Uk,i = V (x − bi). Obviously, all taxpayers will choose to move to the country that levies the lowest tax
19Note that, depending on bi and bj , α∗ can take values greater than l and smaller than 0. But this only means that,
given the distributional boundaries on α, there is no such taxpayer in the population. Therefore, if α∗ is out of bounds, all
taxpayers have either α < α∗ and will move to the low beneﬁt country, or α > α∗, which results in a full relocation to the
high beneﬁt country.
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rate as their preferred tax rate is zero.
The implication for the tax competition between two states is that a country can attract all taxpayers
by marginally undercutting the other's tax rate. This will lead to ever smaller tax rates as countries
continuously undercut each other, resulting in the only stable outcome of zero taxation in both countries.
Any country setting a positive tax rate will not have a tax base to charge taxes from. This is also the
result in the Weichenrieder and Busch (2007) model in the case of perfectly mobile, non-altruistic taxpayers
without delayed integration and in line with the standard non-collusive result of Bertrand competition.
1.3.2 Introducing warm glow preferences
In the warm glow setting, a taxpayer receives utility from his own tax payment, regardless of the resulting
individual transfer to each welfare recipient. Taxpayer k's utility in country i is now given by
Uk,i = V (x− bi) + αkbi (4)
and the indiﬀerent taxpayer's α∗, from (2), is determined by
α∗ =
V (x− bj)− V (x− bi)
bi − bj (5)
The preferred tax rate of taxpayer k, bk, is implicitly given as a function of the strength of his altruistic
sentiment. It is derived by maximizing (4) with respect to bi, denoting ∂V (x− bi)/∂bi as V ′(x− bi), and
replacing bi by bk:
V ′(x− bk) = αk (6)
The number of taxpayers in countries i and j (denoted by mi and mj) given bi and bj is determined by α∗.
Remember that the country setting the lower tax rate will attract all taxpayers with α < α∗ as utility from
transfers is equal to tax payments in this setting. Given the distribution of α it is possible to calculate
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Figure 1.2  Cumulative distribution function of α
µ = 0.4, σ = 0.2, l = 1
the number m of taxpayers with α < α∗ from the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a truncated
normal distribution:
m =
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
(7)
The term on the right-hand side gives the value of the cdf at α∗, with Φ being the cdf of a standard normal
distribution. See Figure 1.2 for a graphical example. As the mass of taxpayers is normalized to 1, (7)
directly gives the number of taxpayers who choose the country with the lower tax rate. The number of
people settling in the higher tax country is thus simply 1−m.
Having determined the migration decision of the taxpayers, it is possible to calculate the tax revenues for
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each country. Tax revenue pii in country i is given by
pii = bi ×mi =

bi ×m if bi < bj
bi × (1−m) if bi > bj
0.5× bi if bi = bj
(8)
Taking the other country's taxation decision as given, country i will decide on a tax revenue maximizing
tax rate.
Now deﬁne b∗ as the tax rate preferred by the taxpayer whose α is equal to the median of the truncated
normal distribution from which α is drawn. One half of the taxpayers will prefer a higher tax rate, one
half a lower tax rate than the median taxpayer. The median of the truncated distribution, denoted as µ∗,
is calculated from the mean and standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution as follows:
µ∗ = Φ−1
(
1
2 × (Φ( l−µsv ) + Φ( 0−µsv ))− µ
σv
)
(9)
From (6), by substituting µ∗ for αk and b∗ for bk, b∗ is implicitly given by
V ′(x− b∗) = µ∗ (10)
The median taxpayer will only favour redistribution if (10) holds for non-negative b∗, which becomes more
likely as x and, by the properties of V , µ∗ increase. Similarly, the desired amount of redistribution increases
in x and µ∗.
I will now show that b∗ (if non-negative) is the tax rate adopted by both countries in the unique pure
strategy NE of this model. The analytical proofs for existence, stability and uniqueness can be found in
the appendix.
If both countries set their tax rates equal to b∗, each country will attract exactly half of the total population
of mobile taxpayers. An unilateral deviation by a country cannot increase its tax revenues: If it sets a
lower tax rate, it loses taxpayers and levies a lower per capita tax rate. If it sets a higher tax rate, the
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negative migratory response outweighs the beneﬁcial eﬀect of having higher per capita tax revenues if the
distribution of α is dense enough around µ∗ (this condition is shown in equation (A.5) in the appendix).
If one country does not set a tax rate of b∗, the other country reacts in the following way: Assume that
country j deviates from b∗. If it sets a lower tax rate, country i can set a higher tax rate than country j
and attract more taxpayers as more than half the number of taxpayers prefers a tax rate higher than the
one set by j. If country j sets a higher tax rate than b∗, country i can marginally undercut this tax rate
and attract more taxpayers at a higher tax rate than b∗. Country i's best-response function thus takes the
form
bi =

bj − ε if bj > b∗
1−m
∂m/∂bi
> bj if bj < b
∗
b∗ if bj = b∗
(11)
An exemplary best-response function is shown in Figure 1.3. If b∗ > 0, a pure strategy NE exists.20
The NE tax rate implicitly given by (10) displays several characteristics: First, a full Race to the Bottom
is avoided as both countries will choose the same positive tax rate if (10) holds for non-negative b∗, which
becomes more probable as µ, l and x increase (from (9), µ∗ is a positive function of µ and l). Second,
an increase in the mean value and the upper limit of the altruistic preferences distribution will increase
the optimal tax rate as can be seen from (10) and (9), while the eﬀect of an increase in σ depends on
whether µ is above (negative eﬀect) or below (positive eﬀect) l/2. The reason for this mechanism is that
if α were uniformly distributed between 0 and l, the optimal tax rate would be the one preferred by the
taxpayer with α = l/2. As the standard deviation of the normal distribution increases, it becomes closer
in form to the uniform distribution, and therefore the equilibrium tax rate with a normal distribution will
20As long as (6) holds for non-negative bi if α = l, zero taxation is still not a possible outcome of tax competition as at
least taxpayers with an α of l will still be in favour of some taxation. The marginal utility from welfare beneﬁts is l for an
individual with α = l, so he or she prefers taxation if the marginal utility from disposable income is smaller than l, which
in the quasi-linear setting is the case if −V ′(x − b) < l. A country will be able to attract the most altruistic taxpayers
and generate tax revenues by setting a tax rate between 0 and the tax rate which makes the most altruistic taxpayer just
indiﬀerent between no taxation and taxation with redistribution. However, this will only be a NE in mixed strategies as a
country slightly undercutting the other's tax rate will be able to attract all taxpayers who would prefer a zero-level of taxation.
But playing a mixed strategy with a positive probability of setting a non-zero tax rate dominates constantly choosing a tax
rate of 0.
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Figure 1.3  Best-response function of country i to country j's tax rate with warm
glow
V (.) ≡√(.), x = 10, µ = 0.4, σ = 0.5, l = 1
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converge towards the one achieved with a uniform distribution. Third, due to the quasi-linear formulation
of preferences, with a suﬃciently large x all further increases in income will be taxed away to provide
welfare transfers. Welfare recipients can thus end up with a higher income than taxpayers. This feature
of the model stems only from the quasi-linear formulation and has no implications for the real world, of
course. By appropriately choosing the parameters of the model, it would be possible to rule out this result.
Proposition 1: Assuming warm glow preferences, if b∗ > 0 a unique and stable pure strategy NE for
taxation exists in which both countries choose the non-zero tax rate that corresponds to the one preferred
by the taxpayer with α = µ∗.
Proof: See the appendix.
This result is not aﬀected in any way by the number of welfare recipients as taxpayers value only the
size of their own contribution, not the impact it has on individual welfare payments.
In the case of warm glow altruism, the NE is robust to the relaxation of the assumption that countries
choose their tax rates simultaneously. Assume that country i moves ﬁrst. As shown in the appendix, the
best tax rate country i can set is b∗. If country i chooses a lower tax rate, country j will be able to attract
more taxpayers than country i at a higher tax rate at the expense of country i. Country i will end up
with less taxpayers and a lower tax rate if it sets bi < b∗ which is clearly not optimal. If country i chooses
a higher tax rate than b∗, country j will ﬁnd it optimal to set a marginally lower tax rate which will lead
to migration towards country j. In the case of bi > bj > b∗, the negative migratory eﬀect oﬀsets country
i's gains from a higher tax rate, and thus setting a higher tax than b∗ cannot be optimal. Therefore, as
country j will never choose bj = bi 6= b∗ because it can do better by setting a higher or lower tax rate, and
as country i's tax revenues will always be non-optimal if it sets bi 6= b∗, the best option country i has is to
choose bi = b∗ as this will induce country j to also select this tax rate. The model thus confers neither a
ﬁrst-mover advantage nor disadvantage.
The results of the warm glow model are neither aﬀected by asymmetry between the two countries with
respect to the number of welfare recipients nor by spatial altruistic preferences (concern for the poor in
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other jurisdictions) as in Pauly (1973). ni and nj do not enter the utility function of taxpayers, and a
taxpayer's own contribution generates utility regardless of the resulting individual transfer to each welfare
recipient and his location.
1.4 Introducing pure altruism and inequity aversion preferences
1.4.1 Symmetric countries
In this section I introduce pure altruism and inequity aversion as two other possible ways to model other-
regarding preferences. I ﬁrst consider the symmetric case, ni = nj = n. It turns out that in this case pure
altruism and inequity aversion only support unstable pure strategy NE.
With pure altruism preferences, transfers made by all taxpayers within a country enter the utility function
of each taxpayer, and so does the number of welfare recipients. Hence, taxpayer k's utility in country i is
now given by
Uk,i = V (x− bi) + αk × bimi
n
(12)
Note that utility now not only depends on the tax rate, but also on the number of poor and the number of
taxpayers within the chosen country. Assuming pure altruism preferences and given a suﬃciently large µ∗
and x, an unstable unique pure strategy NE for taxation exists in which both countries choose the non-zero
tax rate that is preferred by the taxpayer with median altruistic preferences (see the appendix for a proof).
The equilibrium tax rate is decreasing in the number of poor. The instability stems from the fact that
the migratory response induced by a tax rate change will trigger another migratory movement away from
the deviating country. An outﬂow of taxpayers makes the deviating country less attractive for taxpayers,
and emigration continues until all taxpayers are concentrated in the other country. Therefore, if a country
chooses a tax rate that is higher than the equilibrium one, it cannot simply get back into equilibrium by
setting the tax rate at the equilibrium value as it has already lost taxpayers and thus attractiveness for
migrants.
Under the assumption of altruism motivated by inequity aversion, taxpayers care about the diﬀerence
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Figure 1.4  Equilibrium tax levels for symmetric pure altruism, inequity aversion
and warm glow
V (.) ≡√(.), x = 10, σ = 0.1, l = 1
between their disposable income and the income (consisting solely of the transfer) of each individual
welfare recipient. The transfer income in turn depends on the number of taxpayer living within a given
country. The main diﬀerence to pure altruism is that, as can be seen in (13), the tax rate enters the utility
function positively twice. Inequity aversion thus presents a stronger kind of altruism than pure altruism.
Taxpayer k has a utility function of the form
Uk,i = V (x− bi)− αk × (x− bi − bimi
n
) (13)
A unique pure strategy NE exists with inequity aversion preferences but it is also unstable because the
same migratory responses will follow a deviation from the optimal tax rate as in the pure altruism case.
A graphical comparison between the equilibrium tax rates achieved under each preference assumption is
shown in Figure 1.4.
1.4.2 Asymmetric countries
A more interesting case is the outcome of tax competition with asymmetric countries with respect to the
number of welfare recipients. One could expect that countries which have to support a smaller number
of poor people have an advantage in the competition for taxpayers, at least if the transfer per welfare
recipient matters as in the inequity aversion and pure altruism cases. Taxation under the assumption of a
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warm glow feeling from paying taxes is not aﬀected, as a taxpayer's utility depends neither on the number
of other taxpayers in his jurisdiction, nor on the income of the poor. A smaller number of poor indicates
a richer country as the distribution of taxpayers is assumed to be even at the outset.21
Intuitively, introducing asymmetry prevents the poorer country from mimicking the richer country's taxa-
tion choices, while the richer country has no incentive to marginally undercut or exceed the poorer country's
tax rate. Migratory movements are no longer all-or-nothing as in the symmetric case because tax rates
have to be diﬀerent for rich and poor countries in equilibrium. With suﬃciently altruistic taxpayers,
asymmetric countries allow for a stable NE in contrast to the symmetric case.22
An equilibrium in the case of asymmetric countries has to fulﬁll two conditions: First, no taxpayer must
have an incentive to migrate given his altruistic preferences, the distribution of taxpayers and the tax
rates. Second, no country must have an incentive to alter its tax rate and thereby generate higher tax
revenues. It is obvious that in any equilibrium the country with the larger number of poor will set a
lower tax rate than the other one as it has a disadvantage in welfare provision: For a given tax rate, the
individual transfer decreases in the number of poor people. If a poor and a rich country were to set the
same tax rate all taxpayers would locate in the rich country as they could then beneﬁt from higher welfare
provision at the same tax rate. Thus, the rich country could attract all taxpayers by imitating the poor
country's tax rate if it were higher than its own in the ﬁrst place. The rich country will also be able to
provide higher welfare beneﬁts than the poor one which means that mi = 1−m in equilibrium, so the less
altruistic taxpayers will settle in the poor country.
Taking the poor country's taxation decision as given, the rich country faces an outﬂow of taxpayers when
increasing its tax rate which will here be illustrated for the case of pure altruism (inequity aversion is
analytically similar). Assume that ni < nj , i.e. that country i is rich and decides on setting a tax rate
21This is not synonymous with a smaller country size. It has been argued, for instance by Chatelais and Peyrat (2008),
that small countries are drivers of tax competition as their beneﬁts (attracting taxpayers) from lowering the tax rate outweigh
the drawbacks (lower tax rates) in relation to their small GDP. This is not the case for large countries.
22The assumption that taxpayers diﬀer in their valuation of redistribution is crucial here. If all taxpayers were the same
obviously either no or every taxpayer would migrate in reaction to a change in tax rates.
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bi > bj . Country i's tax revenue function is then given by
pii = bi ×mi = bi × (1−
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
) (14)
pii is a function of α∗ which, from (2), is given by
α∗ =
V (x− bj)− V (x− bi)
bimi
ni
− bj(1−mi)nj
(15)
The number of taxpayers in country i falls with bi as the derivative of (15) with respect to bi is positive
(remember that taxpayers with α < α∗ prefer to live in the country with lower welfare provision, i.e. the
poor one):
∂α∗
∂bi
=
V ′(x− bi)
( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)
+
mi × (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
ni × ( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)2
> 0 (16)
So mi falls as α∗ increases, which in turn will again increase α∗:
∂α∗
∂mi
= −bi × (V (x− bj)− V (x− bi))
ni × ( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)2
< 0 (17)
But as the second derivative of (15) with respect to mi is positive and the second derivative of mi with
respect to α∗ may be negative, the migratory response peters out (see appendix). This means that a
marginal change in tax rates will not induce all taxpayers to migrate to the same country. When choosing
bi, country i thus can balance the positive eﬀect of a higher tax rate against the negative eﬀect of a smaller
number of taxpayers. For a given bi, the tax revenue function for country j looks similar; mj is a decreasing
function of bj , and changes in bj will trigger only a limited migratory response.
mj = m (the number of taxpayers settling in the low welfare beneﬁt country) as a function of bi is
exemplarily shown in Figure 1.5. This function is strictly increasing in bi, and thus 1 − m is strictly
decreasing in bi. If pii|bj = bi× (1−m) has a global maximum in bi and pij |bi = bj×m in bj , a NE occurs if
a combination of bi and bj exists for which both tax revenue functions are maximized. As shown in Figure
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Figure 1.5  mj for varying bi with asymmetric pure altruism
V (.) ≡√(.), x = 10, bj = 0.1, µ = 1, σ = 1, l = 3, ni = 1, nj = 2
1.6, the existence of a NE depends on µ and l: As both variables increase, and thus as the taxpayers become
more altruistic, the existence of a NE becomes more likely. Furthermore, the resulting NE does not depend
on the initial distribution of taxpayers, so it is stable because deviations from the equilibrium values of bi
and bj will not lead to an endless cycle of tax adjustments as in the case of symmetric countries. Since
explicitly solving the model if the number of poor diﬀers between countries is impossible as the optimal
tax rates are self-mappings of several nested functions, the proof in the appendix gives general conditions
for the existence and stability of an equilibrium.
The model results for varying nj given ni are shown in Figure 1.7. Starting from an initially given distri-
bution of taxpayers, the values were achieved by letting the countries alternately choose their optimal (tax
revenue maximizing) tax rate while taking into account the migratory responses. Using this mechanism, a
NE is reached if no country has an incentive to deviate from its tax rate and the distribution of taxpayers
between countries remains stable.
Tax rates generally increase in µ, and inequity aversion, the stronger form of altruism, produces higher
equilibrium outcomes. Increasing nj will raise the equilibrium tax rate in both countries. For the poorer
country, this is because higher taxation is required and accepted by the remaining taxpayers to compensate
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Figure 1.6  Existence of NE for pure altruism with asymmetric countries
for the reduced p.c. transfer, while for the richer country the relative advantage in welfare provision p.c.
increases which makes a higher tax rate feasible. It is also important to note that most taxpayer locate
in the high tax/low poverty country, and that the number of taxpayers in the poor country j is falling
in nj , so having to support only few welfare recipients in comparison to other countries confers a twofold
advantage: On the one hand, higher tax rates are sustainable in equilibrium, and on the other hand, most
taxpayers prefer the high tax country.
Proposition 2: If countries diﬀer with respect to the number of welfare recipients and given suﬃciently
high x and µ∗, a unique stable NE exists with pure altruism and inequity aversion preferences in which the
country with the lower number of poor will set higher taxes and attract more taxpayers.
Proof: See the appendix.
In comparison to autarky, the richer country may be able to generate higher tax revenues if the tax
revenue losses from a potentially lower tax rate are oﬀset by the gains from a larger tax base. The poorer
country suﬀers a reduction in tax revenues if taxpayers are mobile as it will lose taxpayers and end up
with a lower tax rate as well.
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Figure 1.7  Equilibrium tax levels with asymmetric countries
V (.) =
√
(.), x = 1,ni = 1
1.5 Conclusion
Existing models of tax competition predict that in the absence of migration costs and other barriers to
migration, countries will be forced to lower taxes and dismantle their welfare states. In contrast, the
model presented in this chapter can explain the stickiness of taxpayers and the absence of a full Race
to the Bottom due to migratory pressures by assuming an altruistic motivation of taxpayers. Warm glow
preferences in general and pure altruism and inequity aversion preferences with countries asymmetric with
respect to the number of poor inhabitants turn out to be suﬃcient to support stable NE.
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The result put forward in Proposition 1 is based on a utility function that is in accordance with the
notion of warm glow. The possibility of a positive welfare transfer depends only on the income and the
distribution of altruistic preferences. If taxpayers are suitably characterized by this utility function, it is
fair to say that the high incomes in Western countries and the degree of social cohesion and identiﬁcation
with the political system, which could be used as a proxy for the strength of altruistic preferences, are
suﬃcient to maintain welfare states.23 A dispersion of preferences is increasing tax rates in the likely case
that a population is on average less altruistic than a uniform distribution would suggest. Heterogeneity of
preferences is experimentally found by Andreoni and Miller (2002), who also state that three quarters of
their test subjects display some form of altruistic behavior.
Pitting poor and rich countries against each other, Proposition 2 is congruent with real-world observations:
Poor countries struggle to keep their taxpaying population and set lower taxes, while rich countries are
attractive as they only have to distribute their tax revenues to a smaller number of welfare recipients.
E.g., the tax wedge was 60.5% in Belgium in 2009 for high-earning singles, but only 20.8% in Mexico and
34.9% in Poland (OECD, 2010). Even between wealthy countries, this eﬀect should be visible, which could
explain some of the pull high tax/low poverty countries such as Sweden with a positive net migration of
about 60, 000 in 2009 and Belgium exert on European migrants (Statistics Sweden, 2010).
Having stated the implications of the propositions, one should be aware that the model in this chapter
is mainly applicable to economically equally developed countries with politically and culturally similar
inhabitants. The distribution of altruistic preferences certainly varies between Western countries, and
even more so between the West and Eastern and Asian countries.24 The altruistic mobile tax base should
be seen, also due to migration costs which are more important for migrants from other cultures and
continents, in a European or at least Western context. Tax adjustments are long-term processes, so under
the assumption of warm glow altruism and asymmetric pure altruism and inequity aversion one should
not expect to see the predicted results at this time in European policy, but rather adjustments towards
equilibrium.
23An economic model dealing with the state-directed strengthening of these factors is put forward by Konrad (2008). In his
model, countries can invest in the loyalty of their taxpayers which alters the outcome of tax competition between countries.
24A recent Eurobarometer poll shows that 53% of all respondents (EU citizens) hold national governments responsible for
reducing poverty (European Commission, 2009). However, on a national level this ﬁgure varies greatly (24% in France, 85%
in Bulgaria).
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Of course, migration decisions and the scope of welfare states do not depend on tax diﬀerentials alone, and
tax competition is not the only problem arising from the free movement of production factors. 25 As various
studies suggest, countries can attract migratory ﬂows through a host of other positive characteristics, and
the generosity of welfare states is also dependent on political and economic factors.26 But the reasonable
assumption of altruistic preferences when it comes to paying taxes can help to explain why the specter of
the Race to the Bottom of welfare states has so far failed to materialize.
25For instance, Holzner et al. (2009) examine the issue of brain drain in Germany.
26See, for instance, Dalen and Henkens (2007).
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Appendix to section 1.3
Proof of the existence of a NE for warm glow
There exists a symmetric NE in tax rates given by
bi = bj = b
∗ (A.1)
Assume that country j sets bj = b∗. The number of taxpayers per country has to be 0.5 in a symmetric
equilibrium, therefore it is necessary that mi → 0.5 as bi → b∗. Utilizing L'Hôpital's rule to determine the
value of (5) as bi → b∗, the limit of mi is given by
lim
bi→b∗
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( 1−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
=
Φ
(
µ∗−µ
sv
)
− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
= 0.5 (A.2)
In equilibrium, pii = pij and therefore it is required that pii → pij as bi → b∗:
lim
bi→b∗
pii = lim
bi→b∗
bi ×
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)-Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
= pij =
b∗
2
(A.3)
What is left to prove is that pii is strictly increasing (decreasing) in bi below (above) b∗. For bi < b∗,
∂pii
∂bi
= bi ×
∂α∗
∂bi
× 1
sv
φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
+
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
> 0 (A.4)
with φ being the probability density function of a standard normal distribution. For bi > b∗,
∂pii
∂bi
= −bi ×
∂α∗
∂bi
× 1
sv
φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
− Φ(
α∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
+ 1 < 0
if b∗ >
σv(Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
))
φ(µ
∗−µ
sv
)× V ′′(x− b∗) (A.5)
The condition on b∗ in (A.5) is obtained by solving ∂pii∂bi for bi and letting bi → b∗. It requires that the
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distribution of taxpayers is dense enough around its median µ∗ (as measured by φ) relative to b∗ so that
the marginal beneﬁt from a higher tax rate is more than oﬀset by the marginal loss of taxpayers. The
condition is suﬃcient and necessary to ensure that ∂pii∂bi < 0.
Hence, as pii strictly increases in bi if bi < b∗ and strictly decreases in bi if bi > b∗ and (A.5) holds, and as
pii converges towards 0.5× b∗, bi = bj = b∗ constitutes a NE. 
Proof of uniqueness of NE bi = bj = b
∗ for warm glow
Asymmetric NE, i.e. bi 6= bj , can be ruled out as a country having a lower tax level than the other can
always increase its tax revenue by increasing its tax level:
∂pii
∂bi
= bi ×
∂α∗
∂bi
× 1
sv
φ(α
∗−m
sv
)
Φ( l−m
sv
)− Φ( 0−m
sv
)
+
Φ(α
∗−m
sv
)− Φ( 0−m
sv
)
Φ( l−m
sv
)− Φ( 0−m
sv
)
> 0 if bi < bj (A.6)
Now assume that bi = bj < b∗. As b∗ is the tax level preferred by the taxpayer with mean altruistic
preferences, one half of the voters prefers less and one half prefers more taxation and redistribution. It
follows that less than half of the taxpayers prefers b < b∗. Thus, if country i marginally increases its tax
level, it can attract all taxpayers with a preferred b larger than bj instead of just 0.5 taxpayers. Therefore,
∂pii
∂bi
> 0, if bi = bj < b
∗ (A.7)
and there are no symmetric NE bi = bj < b∗.
Finally, consider the case of bi = bj > b∗. Country i has an incentive to reduce its tax rate if there exists
a pii, given bi < bj , that is greater than
bj
2 . This condition can be reformulated as
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
>
bj
2bi
(A.8)
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As bi → bj , this inequation becomes
Φ
(
V ′(x−bj)−µ
sv
)
− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
>
1
2
(A.9)
where the left-hand side gives the number of taxpayers settling in country i. Note that the left hand side
converges towards a value greater than 0.5 because
V ′(x− bj) > V ′(x− b∗)
⇒ Φ
(
V ′(x− bi)− µ
σv
)
> Φ
(
V ′(x− b∗)− µ
σv
)
= 0.5 if bj > b
∗ (A.10)
This inequality always holds as the tax rate bj > b∗ is preferred by less than half of the taxpayers, and
thus the number of taxpayers attracted by bj − ε = bi > b∗ is greater than 0.5. Therefore, country i can
always increase its tax revenues by deviating from bi = bj > b∗, and thus there are no symmetric NE with
bi = bj > b
∗. 
Proof of asymptotic stability of NE bi = bj = b
∗ for warm glow
Assume that bj < bi = b∗. Country i may ﬁnd it optimal to increase or decrease its tax level because
bi = b
∗ may not fulﬁll the optimality criterion ∂pii∂bi = 0 if bj < bi = b
∗. If, on the one hand, country i
ﬁnds it optimal to set bi < b∗ and attract more taxpayers at a lower tax level, then country j will ﬁnd it
optimal, as outlined in the proof of uniqueness, to set a tax level of bj = bi + ε and thus have a higher
number of taxpayers at a higher tax rate. As now country i will also set bi = bj + ε, this process continues
and tax levels converge from below towards bi = bj = b∗.
If, on the other hand, country i sets bi > b∗ to increase its tax revenues by charging a higher tax from
a lower number of taxpayers, country j will also increase its tax level as ∂pij∂bj > 0 if bj < bi. By setting
bj = bi − ε, country j will attract more taxpayers at a higher tax rate, which in turn will lead country i
to adjust its tax level to bi = bj − ε. This process continues and tax levels converge from above towards
bi = bj = b
∗. 
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Appendix to section 1.4
Proof of the existence of a NE for pure altruism
There exists a pure strategy NE given by
b∗ = bi = bj (A.11)
where b∗ is implicitly given by V ′(x− b∗) = µ∗/2n.
Assume that country j chooses a tax level of b∗. Tax revenues in country i are
pii = bi ×mi =

0.5× b∗ if bi = bj = b∗
bi × F(
α∗−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
F( l−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
if bimin <
bj(1−mi)
n
bi × (1− F(
α∗−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
F( l−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
) if bimin >
bj(1−mi)
n
(A.12)
α∗, however, is a function of bi with the ﬁrst derivative
∂α∗
∂bi
=
V ′(x− bi)
( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )
+
mi × (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
n× ( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )2
> 0 (A.13)
That ∂α
∗
∂bi
> 0 for bi > bj can be shown by using Bernoulli's inequality. Holding mi constant at 0.5, any
tax rate deviating from b∗ will be preferred by less than half of the taxpayers as b∗ is just the tax rate
which half of the taxpayers consider to be too low and half to be too high. This, in turn, further punishes
a deviation from b∗ as
∂α∗
∂mi
=
( bin +
bj
n )× (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )2
< 0 if bi > bj (A.14)
∂α∗
∂mi
=
( bin +
bj
n )× (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )2
> 0 if bi < bj (A.15)
which means that a loss of taxpayers alters α∗ unfavourably for country i. By positively deviating from b∗,
country i reduces its tax revenues as the outﬂow of taxpayers outweighs the higher tax rate per remaining
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taxpayer. A negative deviation can never be optimal as it attracts less taxpayers at a lower tax rate.
Thus, b∗ is the optimal tax rate for country i given bj = b∗, and this equilibrium is unstable as it will not
be iteratively reached from any combination of bi, bj and mi due to the migratory responses pointed out
above. 
Proof of the existence of a NE for inequity aversion
There exists a pure strategy NE given by
b∗ = bi = bj (A.16)
where b∗ is implicitly given by V ′(x− b∗) = 1 + µ∗/2n.
Assume that country j chooses a tax level of b∗. Tax revenues in country i are
pii = bi ×mi =

0.5× b∗ if bi = bj = b∗
bi × F(
α∗−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
F( l−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
if (x− bi − bimin ) < (x− bj − bj(1−mi)n )
bi × (1− F(
α∗−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
F( l−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
) if (x− bi − bimin ) > (x− bj − bj(1−mi)n )
(A.17)
α∗, however, is a function of bi with the ﬁrst derivative
∂α∗
∂bi
=
V ′(x− bi)
bi +
bimi
n − (bj + bj(1−mi)n )
+ (1 +
mi
n
)× (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
(bi +
bimi
n − (bj + bj(1−mi)n ))2
> 0 (A.18)
That ∂α
∗
∂bi
> 0 for bi > bj can be shown by using Bernoulli's inequality. Holding mi constant at 0.5, any
tax rate deviating from b∗ will be preferred by less than half of the taxpayers as b∗ is just the tax rate
which half of the taxpayers consider to be too low and half to be too high. This, in turn, further punishes
a deviation from b∗ as
∂α∗
∂mi
=
( bin +
bj
n )× (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
(bi +
bimi
n − (bj + bj(1−mi)n ))2
< 0 if bi > bj (A.19)
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∂α∗
∂mi
=
( bin +
bj
n )× (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
(bi +
bimi
n − (bj + bj(1−mi)n ))2
> 0 if bi < bj (A.20)
which means that a loss of taxpayers alters α∗ unfavourably for country i. By positively deviating from b∗,
country i reduces its tax revenues as the outﬂow of taxpayers outweighs the higher tax rate per remaining
taxpayer. A negative deviation can never be optimal as it attracts less taxpayers at a lower tax rate.
Thus, b∗ is the optimal tax rate for country i given bj = b∗, and this equilibrium is unstable as it will not
be iteratively reached from any combination of bi, bj and mi due to the migratory responses pointed out
above. 
Proof of the existence and stability of a NE for asymmetric countries with pure
altruism
As has been discussed in subsection 1.4.2, if ni < nj an equilibrium can only exist with bj < bi, so country
j will attract mi = 1−m taxpayers. The tax revenue function of country i is given by
pii = bi ×mi (A.21)
Deﬁne Pi(z) as the ﬁrst derivative of pii with respect to bi at bi = z:
Pi(bi) ≡ ∂pii
∂bi
= mi + bi × ∂mi
∂bi
(A.22)
mi is a decreasing function of bi,
∂mi
∂bi
= −∂α
∗
∂bi
×
1
sv
φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
< 0 (A.23)
as ∂α∗/∂bi is positive,
∂α∗
∂bi
=
V ′(x− bi)
( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)
+
mi × (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
ni × ( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)2
> 0 (A.24)
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which can be shown by using Bernoulli's inequality. pii is a continuous function on the interval ]bj , x[,
Pi(z) < 0 as z → x and Pi(z) > 0 as z → bj if mi|bi→bj > (|bi × ∂mi∂bi |)|bi→bj , so pii then has a local
maximum on the interval ]bj , x[. Similarly, pij has a local maximum on the interval ]0, bi[ if mj |bj→bi <
(|bj × ∂mj∂bj |)|bj→bi . The conditions on mi|bi→bj and mj |bj→bi hold if nj is suﬃciently larger than ni and µ
and l are suﬃciently high. By these conditions it is ruled out that the richer country will ﬁnd it optimal
to set the same tax rate as the poor one and attract all taxpayers, which would prevent an equilibrium as
the poor country would then again have an incentive to deviate.
Setting (A.22) equal to zero and solving for bi gives the best response function for country i's tax rate
given country j's tax rate. Deﬁne
Qi ≡ − mi∂mi
∂bi
(A.25)
as this best response function. ∂Qi∂bj > 0 as bj → 0 and Qi = bj as bj → x, so Qi is increasing in bj .
Furthermore, Pj(z) < 0 as z → bi and Pj(z) > 0 as z → 0, so the optimal tax rate response of country j
has to lie between 0 and bi. Thus, an equilibrium in tax rates is reached where the positive marginal eﬀect
on Qi (Qj) from an increasing bj (bi) (which is ﬁnite) balances with the negative marginal eﬀect on pii
(pij) from approaching x (bj) (which becomes inﬁnite). I.e., country i will not want to increase its tax rate
any further when the marginal gain in pii from a higher bi after the last increase in bj just balances with
the marginal loss in pii from setting bi closer to x. The same holds for country j after the last increase in
bi and its marginal gain (loss) from a higher bj (from getting closer to bi).
It is also necessary to see whether this equilibrium is stable. Denote by b∗i and b
∗
j an equilibrium in tax
rates as given by the previous paragraphs. The second derivative of mi with respect to α∗ is positive while
the second derivative of (15) with respect to mi is negative, and thus the migratory response to a change in
tax rates peters out, i.e. a deviation from equilibrium does not cause an all-or-nothing migratory response:
∂2mi
∂(α∗)2
> 0 if α∗ < µ (A.26)
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∂2α∗
∂m2i
= 2×
( bini +
bj
nj
)2 × (V (x− bj)− V (x− bi))
( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)3
> 0 (A.27)
Note that the condition in (A.26) is suﬃcient, but not necessary as the reaction of α∗ to a lower mi may
become zero by (15) and (A.27) before mi = 0, which will prevent further changes in mi.
Thus, bi → b∗i and bj → b∗j if one or both countries do not initially choose their equilibrium tax rate. 
Proof of the existence of a NE for asymmetric countries with inequity aversion
The proof for the existence of a pure strategy NE with inequity aversion is similar to the pure altruism
case. The only changes occur in equations (A.24) and (A.27), but the signs of these equations are not
aﬀected and thus the proof remains valid.
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Immigration and Attitudes towards Day Care
2.1 Introduction
We link German household panel data and oﬃcial data covering the population composition to examine the
relationship between attitudes towards public funding of school children day care and the share of foreign
pupils in a jurisdiction. The analysis is motivated by two recent interrelated developments in Germany.
First, similar to other European countries, the fraction of inhabitants having a migration background is
increasing over time and has reached 20% in 2010.1 Relying on city-level data from the U.S, it has been
argued that an ethnically more heterogeneous population in US cities reduces the provision of public goods
as net-payers are loath to see their contributions go to members of other ethnicities (Alesina et al., 1999). 2
Second, while some countries such as France and Sweden have long established almost universal publicly
funded day care options, other countries, including Austria and Germany, are only recently discussing the
implementation of universal children day care. In light of a number of potential beneﬁcial eﬀects of day
care for school children, it is important to understand how the increasing heterogeneity of the German
population aﬀects the current policy debate.
The background for this debate is the fact that education policy is mainly determined and funded by the
states in Germany.3 As a result, day care options vary widely in Germany. Some states, such as Berlin
and Saxony, have already achieved a share of day care providing schools of 80-90 %. But in other states, for
1See Statistisches Bundesamt (2010). Other examples in Europe are Spain where the share of non-nationals increased
from 2.0% to 12.3% between 2000 and 2010 or Italy where the share of non-national population rose from 2.2% to 7.0%
(Eurostat, 2012a).
2Razin et al. (2002) ﬁnd that an inﬂux of immigrants with low levels of education lowers taxation and social transfers.
Roemer and Straeten (2005) estimate that in the French elections of 2002, the voters' choice of public-sector size was
signiﬁcantly reduced by immigration and subsequent xenophobia. Hopkins (2009) argues that it is not racial and ethnic
diversity, but changes in the demographic composition of an area that negatively aﬀect the provision of public goods as these
changes destabilize residents' expectations and inﬂuence local elites. For surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the eﬀects of ethnic diversity on the welfare state, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Stichnoth and Straeten (2011).
3In 2007, 79.4 % of the funding for German primary and secondary schools was provided by the state, 18.8% by the county
and 1.8 % by federal sources (Sekretariat der ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister, 2011).
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instance Hamburg and Baden-Wurttemberg, only every third or fourth school oﬀers some form of pupils'
day care (Sekretariat der ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister, 2012). In light of this dispersion, policy
makers are discussing to what extent the federal level in Germany should take actions with respect to day
care.
As argued above, day care for school children may serve several beneﬁcial purposes and exhibits positive
externalities which makes it a candidate for public provision (cf. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren,
Frauen und Jugend, 2011): First, day care increases labor force participation rates as it frees up parents
from having to attend to their children during work days. Second, it particularly relieves working mothers
who become more ﬂexible in planning their working hours if institutions are available to look after their
children. Third, intensive professional education and care for children from disadvantaged households
(due to low income or low educational level of parents or a migration background) helps bridging the
opportunities gap opened by varying qualities of parental upbringing. Fourth and ﬁnally, additional
afternoon hours for school children allow the teaching staﬀ to focus more on the peculiarities of each child
and to intensively promote children lagging behind due to language problems or special needs.
There are several ways in which preferences towards the public provision of day care could be aﬀected
by immigration: On the one hand, natives could resent establishing publicly funded day care programs
if they do not want to pay for beneﬁts non-natives receive due to social group loyalty (cf. Alesina et al.,
1999).4 At the same time, establishing a privately funded day care system allows an amount of segregation
(by price or formal or informal entry criteria) between natives and foreigners that cannot be achieved
within a publicly run system. Segregation of school children can be desirable for natives due to racism,
concerns about an adverse eﬀect of non-native children on teaching quality, negative peer group eﬀects
and the draining of school resources to provide catch-up lessons for children lacking the necessary language
proﬁciency (Betts and Fairlie, 2003). A recent policy brief by the German Sachverständigenrat deutscher
Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (2012) conﬁrms that, in Berlin, many native German parents
try to send their children to elementary schools with a low share of pupils with a migration background.
4The relationship between social group identity and political and economic preferences has been the subject of work by
Lind (2007) and Shayo (2009). Individual identity and its eﬀect on economic behaviour has been examined by Akerlof and
Kranton (2000).
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On the other hand, it could be the case that natives want to provide more public day care options
if the share of non-native children increases to counter potential disadvantages in parental educational
background, language skills and other characteristics of immigrant children. Tackling these disadvantages
pays oﬀ in the short run as classes are no longer held behind by under-performing non-natives, and also in
the long run as it should bring educational achievements of non-native children in line with those of native
children.5 Also, problems arising from immigration in Germany such as an increase in youth violence
and deteriorating schooling environments are usually met by public and political calls for more day care
programs.6
In order to analyse whether the aforementioned negative or positive factors (or neither) prevail in shaping
the attitudes towards the provision of day care if immigration occurs, we exploit attitudinal data from
the 1997 and 2002 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).7 We merge register data covering
the share of foreign pupils for diﬀerent levels of jurisdictions from the German Gemeinsames Neues
Statistisches Informations-System (GENESIS, Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2012)
database to the SOEP data. Although, to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study analyzing
the link between day care and immigration, there are a number of closely related empirical studies. 8
For example, the SOEP dataset has been used, amongst others, by Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007)
to examine diﬀerent attitudes towards the welfare state in the Eastern and Western part of Germany
after the German reuniﬁcation of 1990. Further, Stichnoth (2012) uses the SOEP dataset to examine
the relationship of the attitude towards state help for the unemployed and the share of non-German
nationals amongst the unemployed. He ﬁnds that there is a statistically signiﬁcant, albeit small, negative
inﬂuence of the share of non-German unemployed on the preference for publicly provided support for the
unemployed. He summarizes that attitudes towards redistribution are driven by self-interest, altruism and
social distance (determined by ethnicity, language, social stratum etc.), and that nationality only plays a
5For a study examining the diﬀerences in educational attainment between natives and immigrants, see, for instance,
OECD (2006). Based on the results of the 2003 PISA assessment, the authors state that [...] immigrant students often
perform at levels signiﬁcantly lower than their native peers.
6See, for instance, Frick and Wagner (2001) and Toprak and Nowacki (2010).
7For a description of the SOEP, see Schupp (2009).
8Theoretical models dealing with the interplay between immigration/ethnic heterogeneity and the welfare
state/redistribution can be found in, for instance, Alesina et al. (1999), Mayr (2007) and Shayo (2009).
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subordinate role.9
Gerdes (2011), however, cannot discern a negative impact of an inﬂux of immigrants on the local provision
of public goods such as social services. He suggests that previous ﬁndings of negative immigration eﬀects
stem from endogeneity problems. I.e., due to the empirical design of previous studies simultaneity issues
may be present as the location decision of migrants may be aﬀected by the generosity of public good
provision, which can lead to biased and inconsistent estimation results. But by utilizing a refugee place-
ment program as instrument to account for potential endogeneity of the location decision of immigrants,
Dahlberg et al. (2012) provide evidence that the preferred social beneﬁt levels in Sweden are negatively
aﬀected by larger immigrant populations, and hence that previous results were not driven by endogeneity
issues.
For the particular case of education to which day care is related, there is also evidence that ethnic hetero-
geneity aﬀects schooling and funding choices. Poterba (1997) ﬁnds evidence that generational competition
for public spending in the form that the elderly resent paying for the education of the young is stronger
(as measured by a decrease in per pupil expenditure) the more the ethnic background of the elderly and
the school-age population diﬀers.10
We ﬁnd that, in contrast to most of the empirical literature discussed above, the share of foreign pupils
is not negatively associated with the preference for publicly funded day care provision. We provide some
evidence that the relationship may actually be the other way round, i.e. that the preference for public
funding becomes stronger if the share of foreign pupils increases. But this positive association turns out to
be not particularly robust when only subsamples are used, and only appears at the state-level, not at the
county-level. Also, as the data availability is limited and the location decisions of foreigners are arguably
endogenous, our study faces the same diﬃculties as, for example, the study by Stichnoth (2012). One
should therefore be careful with causal interpretations of the found associations, although it is important
to note that our ﬁndings diﬀer from the evidence produced by previous studies which face the same data
limitations and potential endogeneity problems. Our contrasting results suggest that diﬀerent aspects of
9Similar negative eﬀects of immigration and ethnic heterogeneity on welfare state generosity are found by Eger (2009)
for Sweden, Senik et al. (2009) for a sample of European countries, and by Luttmer (2001) for the US.
10Also, Gerdes (2010) for Denmark and Betts and Fairlie (2003) for the US ﬁnd that native families are likely to transfer
their children to (private) schools with a lower share of foreign pupils if immigration occurs.
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the welfare state are aﬀected diﬀerently by immigration. It does not seem to be the case that natives
deplore to see publicly funded goods go to members of diﬀerent ethnicities as long as the provision of
these goods to non-natives provides a more or less visible beneﬁt for natives themselves. This applies for
day care due to the beneﬁcial factors mentioned above, even though the public provision of day care also
represents redistribution from the rich to the poor and from childless families to families with oﬀspring,
but possibly not for income transfers in the form of social security.
As a further contribution, our analysis shows the advantage of employing mixed eﬀects models to study
questions of this type. As the individual attitudes are aﬀected on diﬀerent levels of jurisdictions, e.g. states
and counties, mixed eﬀects models are useful to account for this data structure and to provide information
about the extent of variation on the diﬀerent levels.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the dataset and the empirical
strategy we will use to examine the relationship between support for public provision of day care and the
share of foreign pupils. Section 2.3 presents the results for state- and county-level regressions, while section
2.4 discusses various robustness checks to section 2.3's ﬁndings. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and empirical strategy
The SOEP panel survey is a representative household survey for Germany and started in 1984 with an
initial sample of 4, 528 households. We use the release v27 covering the years 1984-2010. The SOEP survey
poses a range of core questions in each and every wave, for example questions with respect to employment
and demographic variables like marital status.
The SOEP item concerning attitudes towards private or public provision of day care for school children
belongs to the large set of additional questions that are not asked in every wave and is worded as follows:
At present a multitude of social services are provided not only by the state but also by private free-market
enterprises, organizations, associations, or private citizens. What is your opinion on this?. A list of several
social services, including day care for school children, then follows. Possible answers range from 1 to 5,
where 1 means that only the state should be responsible for the provision, 3 means that private forces
48
Immigration and Attitudes towards Day Care
and the state should be equally responsible, and 5 means that only private forces should be responsible.
This question was only asked in the 1997 and 2002 waves.
The SOEP dataset provides diﬀerent regional indicators for each household and year. We ﬁrst use a
variable indicating the state (Bundesland), where a particular household resides in a given year and match
register data covering the share of foreign pupils in the respective state to each individual in the household.
Second, we use the county-indicator to match the respective register data from the GENESIS database
on the county-level to every person in the sample of households. The GENESIS database collects data
from the various German federal and state statistical bureaus. A sub-dataset, called Regionaldatenbank
Deutschland (regional database Germany), oﬀers yearly municipal, county, state and federal information
on topics such as the structure of the population, education and employment.
The share of foreign pupils varies widely across Germany. In 1997, the average (unweighted) share of
foreign pupils was 8.72% across German states, with a standard deviation of 5.6. All West German states
except for Hamburg, Bremen and Hesse (which had shares of 15.59 % and more) lay within one standard
deviation from the mean, while all Eastern German states except for Berlin lay outside one standard
deviation from the mean. Eastern German states only had an average foreign pupil share of 2.36%, while
Western German states had an average share of 11.42%. The upper end of the distribution of foreign
pupils is given by the Western city states of Hamburg with a share of 19.5% and Bremen with a share of
16.15 %, while the lower end consists of all Eastern states except for Berlin (14.13 %) with a share of 0.6%
or lower. Therefore, foreigners are mainly concentrated in the states which did not belong to the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR). This phenomenon mainly stems from political decisions made in
the GDR and the FRG in the decades before the reuniﬁcation of 1990, and from poor economic conditions
in the East after 1990 which deterred foreign immigration.
Between 1997 and 2002, the average share of foreign pupils in the East went up by one percentage point
(2.36 % in 1997 vs. 3.36% in 2002). In the same period, Western German states reduced their foreign
pupil share by about 0.4% (11.42 % in 1997 vs. 11.01% in 2002). However, it is not clear whether this
reduction is due to an actual decrease of the migrant population share, or whether non-German pupils
acquired German passports and thus fell out of the foreigners category. Nevertheless, one can see that
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there is still a huge gap between Eastern and Western German shares of foreign pupils, which will motivate
a later robustness check in which we consider the Eastern and Western German samples separately. It
is also noteworthy that most of the variation in the sample stems from diﬀerences between states, as the
foreign pupil share within most states stays fairly the same between 1997 and 2002. See Table 2.6 in the
appendix for the share of foreign pupils and population ﬁgures of the German states.
Regarding the variation on the county level, the pooled share of foreign pupils for 1997 and 2002 reaches
from 0.12% to 37.1%, with a mean of 9.42 % and a standard deviation of 8.04. The range of foreign pupil
shares is thus even greater on the county level than on the state level. But still, most of the variation
comes from diﬀerences between counties, as the share of foreign pupils within most counties stays fairly
constant over the observed period.
Note that individuals do not participate in each wave of the SOEP survey, and that the share of foreign
pupils is not available for all counties for every year; hence the samples are unbalanced. The main
sample used for the state-level estimations comprises roughly 31, 000 observations stemming from 23, 600
individuals, while the respective sample for the county-level estimations covers about 28, 400 observations
from 21, 532 individuals.
The main speciﬁcation is a mixed eﬀects model that takes both the diﬀerent levels of variation and the
unbalanced structure of the panel dataset into account.11 The regression equation reads
yijt = β0 + β1sharejt +X
′
ijtΞ + θt + αi + uj + ηijt (1)
where the response variable yijt is individual i's attitude towards public or private provision of day care.
The subscripts j and t indicate the jurisdiction (state or county) and time respectively. The central variable
of interest is the share of foreign pupils in jurisdiction j in year t. The impact of this share on individual
attitudes is picked up by the slope β1. Heterogeneity across jurisdictions is modeled by a random intercept
11The term mixed eﬀects model or mixed model refers to the fact that both ﬁxed and random eﬀects are introduced.
In our context, ﬁxed eﬀects are covariates like the demographic control variables , while the random components model the
unobserved heterogeneity on the diﬀerent levels, i.e. individual and state. See, for example, Davis (2002) and Gelman and
Hill (2006) for textbooks covering mixed models. Mixed models, also called multi-level models, are commonly used to
account for systematic diﬀerences between units of observation and regions, e.g. student performances in diﬀerent schools in
diﬀerent regions.
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uj . Individual heterogeneity is modeled by entering a series of control variables Xijt and additionally a
random intercept αi. Summary statistics for the items in X (which are standard socio-economic controls
commonly used in the related literature) can be found in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.12 The remaining random
factors are captured by the usual error term ηijt. While the main speciﬁcation enters a time ﬁxed eﬀect
θt, we also report results omitting the time dummy, and estimates obtained from a ﬁxed eﬀect model.
Given that the dataset covers only two periods of time, jurisdiction ﬁxed eﬀects will pick up most of the
available variation in the share of foreign pupils, since the variation over time for a given jurisdiction is low.
Similarly, individual ﬁxed eﬀects will soak up most of the available variation, because there are not many
movers across jurisdictions during this short time frame. Hence, individual ﬁxed eﬀects and jurisdiction
ﬁxed eﬀects would be highly collinear.
To check the robustness of the results, we consider a series of additional speciﬁcations. First, we consider
diﬀerent variants of the mixed model. One estimation enters only a random intercept for each individual,
thereby ignoring the variability on the jurisdiction level, while another speciﬁcation omits the individual
random intercept and introduces a jurisdiction-speciﬁc one.
We further consider diﬀerent sets of covariates, i.e. we vary the set of variables collected in Xijt. These
regressions will highlight the importance of correcting for intervening factors, e.g. educational background
or income and employment. We also run logistic models to check whether the results of the main speciﬁca-
tion might be driven by treating the response variable as a continuous variable. Furthermore, we examine
several subsamples, e.g. Eastern and Western German states separately, to determine whether only certain
groups of individuals are responsible for the correlations observed in the whole sample. The regression
tables of the robustness checks are relegated to the appendix.
As noted in the introduction, one should be wary about the interpretation of our results as causal eﬀects
due to possible endogeneity issues. For example, it is possible that foreigners with children may self-select
into regions where day care options are readily available, and that in these regions the general attitude
leans towards public provision of day care. Other factors such as unemployment rates, incomes and the
12As some control variables are categorical, their summary statistics are not included in the appendix, and one of their
categories is taken as base category and omitted in the estimations in the following section. These base categories aremarried,
living together for the marital status and Hauptschulabschluss (secondary school degree) for the type of school degree.
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presence of an ex-pat community are arguably more important in determining where foreigners settle
within a country, but these factors themselves may of course give rise to an endogeneity problem.
To tackle endogeneity issues, one can utilize the fact that ﬁxed eﬀects estimates might be interpreted as
causal under the strong assumption that all unobserved variables that are correlated with the regressors are
time invariant and therefore removed by the ﬁxed eﬀects; see also the discussion by Stichnoth (2012). As
the next section shows, the estimated coeﬃcient β1 is negative regardless of whether αi is treated as random
or ﬁxed on the state-level. Although we prefer to focus on mixed models and a correlative interpretation,
one could, given the aforementioned strong assumption, infer causality from the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
2.3 Results
In this section, we discuss our empirical ﬁndings concerning the relationship between opinions about day
care funding and the share of foreign pupils. We consider various empirical speciﬁcations and utilize data
at both the state and county level. Our main results are collected in Table 2.1 for reference.
Note that we are not restricting our sample to respondents of German nationality. As can be seen in
Tables 2.7 and 2.8, about 85% of the county-level and roughly 90% of the state-level respondents have a
German passport. Foreigners which have already been living in Germany for some time arguably share the
native attitude towards further immigration, especially when immigration aﬀects the provision of welfare
state services. Most of the non-German respondents in our dataset have been living in Germany for 18
years, which makes the aforementioned assumption applicable to the foreign share of the sample. 13 We
furthermore include a dummy for German nationality to control for a potentially diﬀerent basic level
of public day care support between Germans and non-Germans. As Table 2.11 in the appendix shows,
restricting our sample to German nationals does not aﬀect the results of the following subsections to a
signiﬁcant degree.
A further caveat is that our variable of main interest measures the share of pupils without a German
13Of the 2, 051 non-Germans in the 1997 SOEP dataset, 1, 790 were already part of the ﬁrst wave in 1984. Of the 1, 921
non-German respondents in 2002, only 533 have been part of the SOEP survey for 4 years or less. See a cross-tabulation of
sample and wave composition by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (2012), the publisher of the SOEP.
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Table 2.1  Main results - coefficients (standard errors) for share of foreign pupils in
state/county, full set of controls
Estimation Method
Mixed Eﬀects RE FE OLOGIT OLS
Individual State/
County
State/
County
and
Individual
J
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
State -0.006***
(0.002)
-0.079***
(0.014)
-0.085***
(0.014)
-0.006***
(0.002)
-0.016
(0.010)
-0.014***
(0.004)
-0.006***
(0.002)
County 0.000
(0.001)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.000
(0.002)
0.000
(0.001)
State
w/o θt
-0.029***
(0.002)
-0.075***
(0.010)
-0.075***
(0.010)
County
w/o θt
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.003)
*** p < 0.01
passport, not the share of pupils with a migration background which is much larger.14 Unfortunately, data
on the migration background of school children is not available for our relevant years. We also cannot
distinguish between foreign pupils from culturally similar countries such as the UK and France, and pupils
from countries with strongly diﬀering cultures such as Turkey and the successor states of Yugoslavia. Our
estimates are therefore likely to be too small. This is because the exclusion of ethnically and culturally
diﬀering pupils with a German passport and the inclusion of foreign pupils who are unlikely to be perceived
as ethnically diﬀerent in appearance and school achievement might make a possible association between
the share of foreign pupils and welfare state attitudes look weaker than it actually is.
14The share of pupils with a migration background (at least one non-German parent) is vastly larger. For instance, the
PISA-E study for 2003 shows that 16% of the pupils in Bremen do not possess a German passport, but that the share of pupils
who are classiﬁed as having a migration background is 35.8%. This holds also in Eastern German states, e.g. Brandenburg
has a share of foreign pupils of 1.7 %, but a share of pupils with a migration background of 6% (Prenzel et al., 2005).
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2.3.1 State-level
Table 2.2 collects the results for the main speciﬁcation obtained from the mixed model, where the aggre-
gation level for jurisdictions (j) is the state. The ﬁrst column enters only a random intercept for each
Table 2.2  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, mixed
effects model, state-level
(1) (2) (3)
Random eﬀect: Individual State State and Individual
b se b se b se
German 0.012 (0.025) 0.018 (0.024) 0.022 (0.025)
is employed 0.013 (0.014) 0.009 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014)
sex 0.031∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.032∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.005∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.020∗ (0.011) 0.020∗ (0.011) 0.020∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income 0.334∗∗∗ (0.107) -2.056∗∗∗ (0.429) -2.248∗∗∗ (0.414)
married but separated -0.067 (0.043) -0.063 (0.043) -0.058 (0.043)
single 0.009 (0.020) 0.013 (0.019) 0.013 (0.020)
divorced -0.092∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.080∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.083∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed 0.003 (0.026) 0.004 (0.025) 0.006 (0.025)
civil servant -0.098∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.096∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.028)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.052∗∗ (0.022) -0.051∗∗ (0.022) -0.054∗∗ (0.022)
owns residence -0.046∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.052∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.050∗∗∗ (0.010)
born in Germany 0.026 (0.024) 0.023 (0.023) 0.021 (0.024)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.249∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.289∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.291∗∗∗ (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.034∗∗ (0.016) 0.032∗∗ (0.016) 0.032∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.024 (0.032) -0.032 (0.031) -0.033 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.089∗∗ (0.037) 0.089∗∗ (0.036) 0.084∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur 0.090∗∗ (0.044) 0.085∗∗ (0.043) 0.077∗ (0.044)
other degree 0.053∗ (0.027) 0.061∗∗ (0.027) 0.059∗∗ (0.027)
no degree -0.008 (0.037) 0.009 (0.037) 0.010 (0.037)
no degree yet 0.061 (0.114) 0.087 (0.114) 0.062 (0.114)
years of education -0.002 (0.009) -0.000 (0.008) 0.001 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.068∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.062∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.034∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.158∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.006 (0.011) -0.008 (0.011) -0.005 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in state -0.006∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.079∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.085∗∗∗ (0.014)
year=2002 0.467∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.743∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.765∗∗∗ (0.048)
β0 -1.007 (1.031) 22.476∗∗∗ (4.121) 24.367∗∗∗ (3.984)
lnσu -0.323 (0.284) -0.250 (0.257)
lnσα -1.001∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.998∗∗∗ (0.036)
N 31277 31277 31277
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
individual and is therefore comparable to a standard random eﬀects model. This speciﬁcation is compara-
ble to a standard random eﬀects model (for individuals) and allows to check whether the two estimation
methods (REML for the mixed model and the usual GLS estimator for RE models) generate similar results.
Column (2) enters a random intercept uj for each state, while omitting the individual random component.
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Finally, column (3) additionally enters the subject-speciﬁc intercept and therefore corresponds to the full
speciﬁcation outlined in equation (1) of the previous section.
Starting the discussion with the results of the regressor of main interest, the three speciﬁcations indicate
that individuals who live in states with larger shares of foreign pupils report on average a stronger preference
for public provision of day care. For example, the point estimate in column (3) suggests that a one-unit
increase in the share of foreign pupils is associated with a decrease of 0.085 points of the 5-point attitude
scale (remember that a lower number indicates more support for public provision). This decrease is a
meaningful association which is, for instance, of almost the same size as the shift towards state provision
reported by civil servants (point estimate 0.094).
The speciﬁcations are also informative with respect to the heterogeneity across individuals and states. The
parameter modeling the subject-speciﬁc intercepts is precisely estimated across all speciﬁcations. The point
estimate for the standard deviation of exp(−1) = 0.3679 indicates that the random intercepts roughly cover
a range between −2 ∗ 0.3679 ≈ −0.74 and 0.74. The large standard error for the jurisdiction-parameter
(σu) indicates that this parameter might be removed from the model. The imprecise estimate is likely to
be driven by the inclusion of the variable measuring state average yearly income that apparently picks up
most of the variation on the jurisdiction-level. We investigate this issue further below (see Table 2.3).
It is informative with respect to the size of coeﬃcients to calculate how the dependent variable is aﬀected
by a change of one standard deviation in the share of foreign pupils. Using the full speciﬁcation of column
(3), it turns out that an increase of one standard deviation in the share of foreign pupils, which is roughly
the diﬀerence between Baden-Wurttemberg (13.58 %) and Bavaria (8.16%) in 1997, decreases provision of
day care for schoolchildren by about 44 % of its standard deviation. This translates into about 0.42 points
on the 1− 5 attitude scale. This reduction of support for private provision is of meaningful size given that
an Eastern German background is connected with a decrease of provision of day care for schoolchildren of
only about 29 % of its standard deviation, or 0.29 points.
Table 2.3 sequentially introduces diﬀerent sets of covariates into the mixed model with random intercepts
on the state- and the subject-level. All speciﬁcations indicate a strong and positive relationship between
the share of foreign pupils and attitudes towards public provision of day care. Therefore, this positive
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Table 2.3  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, mixed
effects model with differing controls, state-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se b se b se b se b se
share of foreign pupils in state -0.069∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.049∗∗∗ (0.012) -0.020∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.085∗∗∗ (0.014)
German 0.061∗∗ (0.025) 0.072∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.020 (0.025) 0.022 (0.025)
sex 0.029∗∗ (0.011) 0.038∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.031∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.001 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.007∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
married but separated -0.056 (0.044) -0.045 (0.044) -0.063 (0.043) -0.058 (0.043)
single 0.046∗∗ (0.020) 0.040∗∗ (0.020) 0.017 (0.020) 0.013 (0.020)
divorced -0.074∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.074∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.086∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.083∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed -0.023 (0.026) -0.025 (0.026) 0.011 (0.025) 0.006 (0.025)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.052∗∗ (0.023) -0.051∗∗ (0.023) -0.057∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.054∗∗ (0.022)
born in Germany 0.040 (0.024) 0.048∗ (0.024) 0.023 (0.024) 0.021 (0.024)
has vocational degree 0.026 (0.017) 0.037∗∗ (0.017) 0.031∗ (0.016) 0.032∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.068∗∗ (0.033) -0.040 (0.033) -0.033 (0.032) -0.033 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.079∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.095∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.055∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.161∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.160∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.089∗∗ (0.037) 0.084∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur 0.120∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.141∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.086∗∗ (0.044) 0.077∗ (0.044)
other degree 0.076∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.081∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.063∗∗ (0.027) 0.059∗∗ (0.027)
no degree -0.020 (0.038) -0.022 (0.038) 0.018 (0.037) 0.010 (0.037)
no degree yet -0.154 (0.118) -0.165 (0.118) 0.078 (0.114) 0.062 (0.114)
years of education 0.012 (0.009) 0.007 (0.009) 0.001 (0.009) 0.001 (0.009)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.002 (0.011) -0.007 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011) -0.005 (0.011)
is employed 0.016 (0.014) 0.011 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014)
civil servant -0.077∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.081∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.028)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.341∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.298∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.291∗∗∗ (0.028)
self-employed 0.170∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.151∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.024)
log monthly hh net income 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.020∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income -2.363∗∗∗ (0.418) -2.248∗∗∗ (0.414)
owns residence -0.051∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.050∗∗∗ (0.010)
year=2002 0.790∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.765∗∗∗ (0.048)
worried about the economy 0.058∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009)
β0 3.268∗∗∗ (0.172) 2.741∗∗∗ (0.176) 2.673∗∗∗ (0.121) 25.651∗∗∗ (4.021) 24.367∗∗∗ (3.984)
lnσu -0.632∗∗ (0.297) -0.861∗∗ (0.360) -1.883∗∗∗ (0.282) -0.160 (0.243) -0.250 (0.257)
lnσα -1.284∗∗∗ (0.069) -1.269∗∗∗ (0.066) -1.300∗∗∗ (0.070) -0.993∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.998∗∗∗ (0.036)
N 31277 31277 31277 31277 31277
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
relationship is robust to the inclusion of control variables such as age and employment. The results are
also informative regarding the level of variation of these controls. In the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations, the
estimates for the random eﬀects pick up heterogeneity on both the individual- and the state-level. For
example, the coeﬃcients in column (3) indicate that the state-level-intercepts uj roughly cover the range
[−0.16, 0.16], while the corresponding range for the subject-level-intercepts is [−0.27, 0.27]. Once the
average yearly income per capita of the state is introduced into the model (columns (4) and (5)), there is
virtually no variation on the state-level left that could be picked up by the intercepts uj . Consequently,
columns (4) and (5) indicate a very imprecise estimate for σu.
Table 2.4 checks the robustness of the results with respect to the estimation method by comparing linear
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Table 2.4  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, linear
and logistic models, state-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method: RE FE OLOGIT OLS
b se b se b se b se
German 0.012 (0.025) 0.276∗∗ (0.116) 0.046 (0.049) 0.008 (0.024)
is employed 0.013 (0.014) 0.002 (0.032) 0.028 (0.028) 0.014 (0.014)
sex 0.031∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.073∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.033∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.005∗∗ (0.002) 0.123∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.009∗ (0.005) -0.004∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.000∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.020∗ (0.011) 0.024 (0.032) 0.037 (0.023) 0.020∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income 0.330∗∗∗ (0.108) -1.301∗∗∗ (0.424) 0.790∗∗∗ (0.211) 0.356∗∗∗ (0.105)
married but separated -0.066 (0.043) -0.082 (0.092) -0.161∗ (0.086) -0.073∗ (0.043)
single 0.010 (0.020) -0.013 (0.065) 0.027 (0.040) 0.009 (0.020)
divorced -0.092∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.182∗∗ (0.075) -0.171∗∗∗ (0.046) -0.089∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed 0.003 (0.026) 0.054 (0.094) -0.002 (0.051) 0.001 (0.025)
civil servant -0.098∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.072 (0.116) -0.195∗∗∗ (0.055) -0.100∗∗∗ (0.027)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.052∗∗ (0.022) -0.057 (0.050) -0.100∗∗ (0.045) -0.049∗∗ (0.022)
owns residence -0.046∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.039∗∗∗ (0.015) -0.103∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.047∗∗∗ (0.011)
born in Germany 0.025 (0.024) 0.052 (0.048) 0.028 (0.023)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.250∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.475∗∗∗ (0.044) -0.243∗∗∗ (0.022)
has vocational degree 0.034∗∗ (0.016) -0.008 (0.042) 0.079∗∗ (0.033) 0.035∗∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.024 (0.032) -0.091 (0.099) -0.038 (0.063) -0.025 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017) -0.075 (0.055) 0.119∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.088∗∗ (0.037) -0.105 (0.107) 0.184∗∗ (0.074) 0.094∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur 0.090∗∗ (0.044) -0.264∗∗ (0.128) 0.189∗∗ (0.088) 0.096∗∗ (0.044)
other degree 0.053∗ (0.027) -0.058 (0.063) 0.118∗∗ (0.056) 0.054∗∗ (0.027)
no degree -0.008 (0.037) -0.056 (0.083) -0.022 (0.076) -0.008 (0.037)
no degree yet 0.056 (0.114) -0.361∗ (0.202) 0.123 (0.231) 0.094 (0.115)
years of education -0.002 (0.009) 0.036 (0.024) -0.005 (0.017) -0.002 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.068∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.030 (0.020) 0.138∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.071∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.077∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.064∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.033∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.158∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.093 (0.072) 0.323∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.160∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.006 (0.011) 0.055∗ (0.028) -0.019 (0.023) -0.010 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in state -0.006∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.016 (0.010) -0.014∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.006∗∗∗ (0.002)
year=2002 0.467∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.935∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.464∗∗∗ (0.016)
β0 -0.972 (1.034) 8.523∗∗ (3.619) -1.224 (1.008)
N 31277 31277 31277 31277
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
and logistic models. The ﬁrst column shows the estimation results obtained from a standard linear model
including random intercepts for individuals ﬁtted by GLS. The results are almost identical to the results
obtained from the mixed eﬀects including only individual-speciﬁc intercepts (column 1, Table 2.2) and
lends support to the REML method employed for the mixed models in Table 2.2. Column (2) considers
a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation for the individual heterogeneity. It shows the expected result that these ﬁxed
eﬀects pick up most of the available variation, thereby driving up the standard error of the shares-variable.
Column (3) provides coeﬃcients from an ordered logit model (the cutoﬀ points are omitted). As the ratio of
marginal eﬀects in the model is equal to the ratio of coeﬃcients, it is possible to use this proportionality for
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a comparison to other models. For example, in both the RE (column (1)) and the ordered logit model the
coeﬃcient picking up the eﬀect regarding worries with respect to the economic situation is roughly ten times
larger than the shares coeﬃcient. Summarizing the robustness checks so far, the additional regressions
support the results from the linear mixed model. Treating the response variable as a continuous variable
(as in the mixed models) does not lead to qualitatively diﬀerent results compared to an ordered logit model.
Furthermore, the standard random-eﬀects model ﬁtted by GLS (which can model only a single random
intercept) leads to very similar results as the mixed model involving only a single random intercept. Note
that the standard errors obtained in the robustness regressions should be treated with caution, as they
ignore the variability on the state-level.
With respect to related empirical work, it is also interesting to discuss some of the control variables.
The three estimations in Table 2.2 conﬁrm patterns found in previous studies. For example, individuals
who lived in East Germany in 1989 report a very strong preference for the public provision of day care
compared to subjects who lived in West Germany. The corresponding coeﬃcient ranges from −0.249 in
column (1) to roughly −0.29 in columns (2) and (3). These estimates conﬁrm the ﬁndings by Alesina and
Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007).
Further, worries about one's own ﬁnances and the general economic situation are associated with an
increase in the support for the welfare state in the form of day care.15 The association is particular strong
for the variable capturing worries about the general economic situation; the coeﬃcient is roughly equal to
one fourth to one ﬁfth of the lived in GDR in 1989 coeﬃcient.
Moreover, individuals living in a household with a higher monthly net income report reduced levels for
the support for the welfare state. As citizens with a high income and a positive economic outlook are
generally net-contributors of any redistributive system, these results are expected and consequently in line
with previous literature (Stichnoth, 2012; Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2007). Note, however, that the
income coeﬃcient is small and imprecisely estimated.
At ﬁrst glance, support for private provision of day care increases with the average yearly net income per
household of a state (see column (1)). However, given that the average income in a certain state and
15Note that the variables worried about the economy and worried about own ﬁnances are coded as 1: very concerned, 2:
somewhat concerned and 3: not concerned at all.
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the income of a particular household are correlated, this variable masks to some extent the relationship
between household income and welfare state attitudes. This coeﬃcient is therefore diﬃcult to interpret.
Once random intercepts for states and/or individuals are introduced (columns (2) and (3)), the coeﬃcient
becomes negative and larger in absolute terms.
Finally, the relationship between the presence of children in the household and the preference towards
the provision of day care is checked by two variables. The ﬁrst variable is a dummy indicating whether
children under the age of 16 live in the household and the second variable is the number of children under
the age of 16 in the household. In terms of magnitude, both coeﬃcients are quite robust across the three
speciﬁcations. The nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh coeﬃcient is imprecisely estimated across the three
models, while the standard error for the variable indicating the presence of children is smaller. Note that
both variables are correlated with each other. Even when we regard the (negative) nr. of kids younger
than 16 in hh coeﬃcient as sampling error, the (negative) kids younger than 16 in hh-coeﬃcient indicates a
strong positive relationship between the presence of children and the preference for public provision of day
care. The point estimate of −0.052 indicates that the shift towards public provision of day care amounts
to roughly one third of the corresponding shift towards private provision by self-employed individuals.
The strong relationship between the presence of children in the household and attitudes towards public
provision of day care is consistent with the idea that these households are more likely to be net-beneﬁciaries
of this particular good provided by the welfare state.
2.3.2 County-level
We now turn to the results on the county-level which are summarized in Table 2.5. The ﬁrst column intro-
duces only a subject-speciﬁc intercept, while column (2) additionally enters a county-level intercept. Both
columns omit the time dummy. Columns (3) and (4) sequentially introduce the two random parameters
and also enter a time dummy.
Overall, with respect to control variables, the results are similar to the previous state-level results. For
example, once again, the coeﬃcient for an East German background is large and precisely estimated across
the four speciﬁcations. The point estimate of −2.93 in column (4) is very close to the corresponding state-
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Table 2.5  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, mixed
effects model, county-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random eﬀect: Individual County and Individual Individual County and Individual
b se b se b se b se
German 0.097*** (0.026) 0.106*** (0.026) 0.084*** (0.026) 0.102*** (0.026)
is employed -0.024 (0.015) -0.028** (0.014) -0.024 (0.015) -0.028* (0.014)
sex 0.027** (0.012) 0.025** (0.011) 0.024** (0.012) 0.023** (0.011)
age -0.007*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002)
age squared 0.000* (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.046*** (0.012) 0.039*** (0.012) 0.031** (0.012) 0.031*** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income 0.481*** (0.054) 1.089*** (0.084) 0.051 (0.062) -0.067 (0.135)
married but separated -0.050 (0.047) -0.039 (0.045) -0.061 (0.046) -0.042 (0.045)
single -0.046** (0.021) -0.039* (0.020) -0.070*** (0.021) -0.052** (0.020)
divorced -0.061** (0.025) -0.059** (0.025) -0.070*** (0.025) -0.063** (0.025)
widowed 0.022 (0.027) 0.028 (0.026) 0.026 (0.027) 0.030 (0.026)
civil servant -0.089*** (0.030) -0.085*** (0.029) -0.093*** (0.030) -0.086*** (0.029)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.036 (0.024) -0.025 (0.023) -0.040* (0.024) -0.028 (0.023)
owns residence -0.026** (0.011) -0.023** (0.011) -0.030*** (0.011) -0.025** (0.011)
born in Germany 0.048* (0.026) 0.029 (0.025) 0.041 (0.025) 0.026 (0.025)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.195*** (0.019) -0.224*** (0.028) -0.249*** (0.019) -0.293*** (0.029)
has vocational degree 0.033* (0.018) 0.025 (0.018) 0.028 (0.018) 0.024 (0.017)
has college degree -0.052 (0.036) -0.053 (0.035) -0.048 (0.035) -0.053 (0.034)
mittlere Reife 0.039** (0.018) 0.035** (0.018) 0.036* (0.018) 0.033* (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.075* (0.040) 0.064* (0.039) 0.065 (0.040) 0.057 (0.039)
Abitur 0.040 (0.048) 0.016 (0.047) 0.033 (0.048) 0.011 (0.047)
other degree 0.065** (0.029) 0.047 (0.028) 0.062** (0.029) 0.046 (0.028)
no degree 0.024 (0.040) 0.057 (0.039) 0.038 (0.040) 0.065* (0.039)
no degree yet 0.078 (0.125) 0.108 (0.122) 0.165 (0.125) 0.148 (0.122)
years of education 0.011 (0.009) 0.014 (0.009) 0.011 (0.009) 0.014 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.129*** (0.010) 0.095*** (0.010) 0.119*** (0.010) 0.091*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.043*** (0.010) 0.047*** (0.009) 0.048*** (0.010) 0.050*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.188*** (0.026) 0.183*** (0.025) 0.191*** (0.026) 0.182*** (0.025)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.024** (0.012) -0.027** (0.012) -0.024** (0.012) -0.026** (0.012)
share of foreign pupils in county -0.003*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003)
year=2002 0.195*** (0.014) 0.205*** (0.020)
β0 -1.404*** (0.395) -5.624*** (0.600) 1.761*** (0.453) 2.588*** (0.961)
lnσu -1.939*** (0.253) -2.095*** (0.345)
lnσα -1.297*** (0.072) -1.346*** (0.049) -1.390*** (0.086) -1.443*** (0.048)
N 28423 28423 28423 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
level coeﬃcient. As before, a further variable with a large coeﬃcient is the type of employment. The
estimate for the self-employed-coeﬃcient ranges between 0.182 and 0.189 which is close to the estimate in
the state-level-model.
Turning to our central explanatory variable, the association between attitudes towards public provision
of day care and the shares-variables is weaker compared to the state-level results. The point estimate for
the shares-coeﬃcient is equal to −0.009 in column (2) which indicates the same direction as on the state-
level, but is smaller in terms of magnitude. This is also the case in Stichnoth's (2012) work in which the
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coeﬃcients for the share of the foreign unemployed are smaller on the county-level throughout. One could
argue that, as the primary and secondary educational system is mainly ﬁnanced by the states (see footnote
3), individual attitudes should be more inﬂuenced by state-wide conditions which mainly determine the
funding of day care programs, instead of county conditions which may vary greatly within a state and do
not strongly aﬀect funding.
Once the time dummy is entered (columns (3) and (4)), the shares-coeﬃcient is practically equal to zero.
This ﬁnding obviously raises the question which of the speciﬁcations is more appropriate. On the one
hand, exploiting time-variation of the explanatory variable (columns (1) and (2)) is more in line with the
idea that individual attitudes vary after observing changes of the share of foreign pupils within their home
jurisdiction. On the other hand, one may argue that the publication of the PISA study in 2001 has caused
a shock to variables capturing attitudes towards the education system that should be controlled for. 16 In
any case, it is conceivable that the pattern of changes in the share of foreign pupils is less clear on the
county- than on the state-level. Some (especially small) counties exhibit almost no time variation in the
share of foreign pupils, while others exhibit a large amount of time variation. Thus, the association on the
county-level should be reassessed, once more data is available. We have also considered logistic models
and regressions with diﬀerent sets of covariates. These checks indicate that the qualitative ﬁndings are
unchanged and are therefore presented in the appendix.
2.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct further checks to test the robustness of the results obtained in the previous
section. We will reestimate our main speciﬁcation in (1) using diﬀerent sample compositions. We also
replace the share of foreign pupils with the total share of foreigners within a jurisdiction, and substitute
attitudes towards the provision of day care for preschool children for the attitude variable used so far. It
turns out that some of the robustness checks conducted in this section challenge the ﬁnding of a positive
association between the share of foreign pupils and a preference for public provision of day care to a serious
16The OECD-run Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) studies measure student abilities in the core
competencies reading comprehension, maths and natural sciences. In 2001, Germany was ranked at a dire twentieth place in
maths and natural sciences and came twenty-ﬁrst in reading comprehension.
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degree. However, the regression tables, which can be found in the appendix, provide no evidence that the
two variables may be negatively connected.
The robustness checks on the county-level are not discussed as they do not contradict the ﬁndings from
the previous section, but the regression tables can be found in the appendix.
2.4.1 Waves 1997 and 2002 separately
As argued in the previous section, the publication of the PISA study in late 2001 may have caused a
shock to attitudinal variables regarding the education system between 1997 and 2002. The mean of the
dependent variable provision of day care for school children rose from 2.37 in 1997 to 2.92 in 2002, which
indicates a signiﬁcantly reduced propensity to support the public provision of day care (t-test for equal
means p < 0.01). This shift in means provides an argument to examine both waves separately. Separating
the sample in this manner, as will be shown below, qualitatively produces the same results as a full sample
regression with a year ﬁxed eﬀect, but the estimates are no longer signiﬁcant at common conﬁdence levels.
On the state level, the coeﬃcient for the share of foreign pupils is negative in both waves. The coeﬃcient is
reduced to −0.004 (1997) and −0.012 (2002), values which are much smaller than if both waves are pooled
and a time dummy is utilized (coeﬃcient −0.085). It thereby loses statistical signiﬁcance on conventional
levels. As argued above, splitting the dataset by wave removes whatever within-individuals variation exists
in the sample. Including this variation is more in line with the idea that individuals adjust their attitudes
after observing changes in the fraction of foreign pupils. Hence, the less precise estimates for the share
coeﬃcient are not surprising.
There are similar considerations with respect to entering a time ﬁxed eﬀect. On the one hand, entering
a time ﬁxed eﬀect removes some of the important within-individuals variation. On the other hand, it
seems desirable to account for a possible shock between 1997 and 2002 that caused a shift of the attitudes
towards day care which is unrelated to changes in the population composition.
If the year ﬁxed eﬀect is omitted, a slightly smaller coeﬃcient of −0.75 is found for the full sample. Hence,
with respect to the direction of the association, all speciﬁcations indicate a positive relationship between
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public provision of day care and the share of foreign pupils (see Table 2.13). However, the estimates are
imprecise and should be reassessed, once more data is available.
2.4.2 East and West Germany separately
As there are big diﬀerences in income, living conditions and attitudes between the states of the former
GDR and the rest of Germany, it could be the case that the ﬁndings of subsection 2.3.1 are driven by only
a part of the country. Thus, we split the sample into Western and Eastern German subsamples (see Table
2.15).
The positive association between the share of foreign pupils and the preference for public provision of day
care observed in the main regressions is hard to discern in the split sample. The East German sample is
only about one third as big (8, 561 observations) as the West German one (22, 716 observations) which
leads to less precise estimates in the ﬁrst column. Although the coeﬃcients for share of foreign pupils is
still negative in both subsamples, their magnitude and precision is greatly reduced. The share coeﬃcient
becomes virtually zero for the Eastern sample and −0.004 for the Western sample in contrast to −0.085
for the full sample. It appears that the combined variation of both subsamples is needed to produce the
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient found in the main speciﬁcations. Splitting the sample into an Eastern
and Western subsample leads to similar puzzling results in the related study of Stichnoth (2010), and
thus recommends caution with regard to the validity of the signiﬁcant association between the share and
attitudes variables found in the full sample.
The ﬁndings of the split-sample appear not to be driven by issues of multicollinearity between the share of
foreign pupils, the average household income and the random intercepts for states in the full speciﬁcation
which are highly correlated with each other. Re-estimating the model with a random intercept only for
the individuals and omitting the average household income yields qualitatively the same results as the
estimations in Table 2.15. Hence, this sample split should be reconsidered once more data is available.
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2.4.3 Households with children separately
One may argue that the central explanatory variable the share of foreign pupils in the jurisdiction is
likely to be perceived more correctly or to be perceived at all by parents. Further, parents could be more
concerned about the potential eﬀects of immigration on the quality of children care as their oﬀspring is
likely to be directly aﬀected. We therefore divide the sample into a group with and a group without
children under the age of 16 in the household.
On the state level (see Table 2.17), the association between the share of foreign pupils and the preference
towards public provision of day care is similar for the sample excluding households with children and the
full sample. Moreover, the estimates for the random components are also very similar. The share coeﬃcient
for the sample consisting only of households with children is reduced to −0.014 in contrast to −0.085 in the
full sample, thereby becoming insigniﬁcant. It is unclear, however, whether this reduction in importance
is due to the smaller sample which provides only one third of total observations, or whether individuals
living in households with children are less aﬀected by the share of foreign pupils in their opinions about
the provision of day care.
2.4.4 Share of foreigners as explanatory variable
It is possible that it is not the share of foreign pupils that is observed when people think of immigration,
but the total share of foreigners within the population. We therefore reestimate equation (1) using the
share of foreigners as the main explanatory variable in Table 2.19. As the correlation between the share
of foreign pupils and the total share of foreigners is 0.97, it is not surprising that the results of Table 2.2
are mostly replicated. What is interesting is that the coeﬃcients for the share of foreigners are smaller
in value if state-level random eﬀects (−0.016 vs. −0.079) and state and individual speciﬁc random eﬀects
(−0.051 vs. −0.085) are used. In the ﬁrst case, the share-variable even becomes insigniﬁcant at common
signiﬁcance levels. This lends support to using the share of foreign pupils in our main speciﬁcation as it
indeed seems to be more important in shaping attitudes towards day care provision than the mere share
of foreigners in a population.
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2.4.5 Attitudes towards preschool day care as dependent variable
If attitudes towards school children day care are in some way connected with the share of foreign pupils,
then one should also be able to see a relationship between attitudes towards preschool day care and a
measure of the share of foreigners. Thus, we replace the attitude variable on the left hand side used so far
with a variable, coded in the same way, measuring attitudes towards preschool day care. The results of
this speciﬁcation are given in Table 2.21.
As expected, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between the share of foreign pupils and the preference for the
public provision of preschool day care. Although this correlation is weaker than the one found between
the share of foreign pupils and school children day care, this check also supports the view that diﬀerent
aspects of the welfare state are aﬀected diﬀerently by immigration. The relationships with the other
covariates are also mostly similar to the ones found in the main speciﬁcation. One diﬀerence compared to
the main speciﬁcation is that the estimate for the time ﬁxed eﬀect is smaller, thereby becoming statistically
insigniﬁcant in most of the regressions. A possible explanation is that the 2001 PISA shock mostly aﬀected
attitudes towards the German schooling system and school children day care, while leaving sentiments
about preschool care untouched.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter exploits the 1997 and 2002 waves of the SOEP dataset to examine the correlation between
the share of foreign pupils and attitudes towards the funding of day care programs. In contrast to a large
literature that analyses the link between immigration and attitudes towards the welfare state, our study
does not provide evidence for a negative association between the share of foreign pupils on the state- and
county-level and preferences for the public provision of day care.17 We ﬁnd indications on the state-level
for the existence of a link in the opposite direction. In comparison with other explanatory variables, the
magnitude of this association is meaningful. An increase of one standard deviation in the share of foreign
pupils results in an increase of the dependent variable of 44% of the standard deviation of the preference
17See, for example, Stichnoth (2012), Dahlberg et al. (2012) and Senik et al. (2009).
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for public provision of day care. However, the signiﬁcance and magnitude of this association is not robust
to the division of the full sample by region and time, and it cannot be discerned on the county-level once
time is controlled for.
The contradictory evidence to other studies we ﬁnd in this chapter suggests that diﬀerent aspects of the
welfare state such as unemployment assistance and public day care options are connected diﬀerently with
immigration. If there is an obvious beneﬁt from the provision of public goods to foreigners for natives
themselves, natives seem to put back potential issues with increasing ethnic heterogeneity. One should
therefore be careful to deduct general conclusions about the eﬀects of immigration from examining only
particular welfare state components.
The regressions in this chapter further replicate the commonly found eﬀects of control variables such as
income on preferences for public provision of welfare services. Wealthier individuals and the self-employed
tend to be more in favour of a private day care system. In contrast, civil servants, respondents socialized
in the former GDR, and individuals who are worried about their own ﬁnancial situation and the economy
as a whole are more supportive of a publicly funded day care system.
Our analysis also highlights the beneﬁts of using mixed eﬀects models to take the multi-level structure of
the dataset into account and to provide information about the extent of variation on the diﬀerent levels.
Similar to most of the previous studies, the data limitations recommend that one should be careful when
interpreting the estimates as causal eﬀects, unless one is willing to make strong assumptions. Although
the usage of an individual-level panel dataset somewhat ameliorates the endogeneity problem stemming
from a possible reverse causality between attitudes and the share of foreign pupils, this relationship should
be reassessed, once more waves of the panel data and/or exogenous variation in the share of foreign pupils
is available.18 This has to be left for future research.
18Dahlberg et al. (2012) use an instrumental variables approach building on a refugee-placement-program in Sweden that
generated exogenous variation. As the share of immigrants subject to a refugee placement program is small in Germany, and
particularly so between 1997 and 2002, such an approach cannot be applied to our data.
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Appendix to section 2.2
Table 2.6  Foreign pupil share and population of German states, 1997 and 2002
Share of foreign pupils in % Total population
State Year Year
1997 2002 1997 2002
Schleswig-Holstein 5.45 5.35 2,756,473 2,816,507
Hamburg 19.50 18.17 1,704,731 1,728,806
Lower Saxony 7.41 7.54 7,845,398 7,980,472
Bremen 16.15 15.60 673,883 662,098
North Rhine-Westphalia 13.59 13.29 17,974,487 18,076,355
Hesse 15.59 14.73 6,031,705 6,091,618
Rhineland-Palatinate 7.35 7.66 4,017,828 4,057,727
Baden-Wurttemberg 13.58 12.71 10,396,610 10,661,320
Bavaria 8.16 8.01 12,066,375 12,387,351
Saarland 7.35 8.48 1,080,790 1,064,988
West Germany 11.42 11.01 64,548,280 65,527,242
Berlin 14.13 16.07 3,425,759 3,392,425
Brandenburg 0.60 1.25 2,573,291 2,582,379
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.48 1.16 1,807,799 1,744,624
Saxony 0.52 1.34 4,522,412 4,349,059
Saxony-Anhalt 0.60 1.41 2,701,690 2,548,911
Thuringia 0.51 0.94 2,478,148 2,392,040
East Germany 2.36 3.36 17,509,099 17,009,438
Germany 8.72 9.08 82,057,379 82,536,680
Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder - GENESIS (2012)
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Table 2.7  Summary statistics state-level
mean sd min max
age 46.845 16.608 17.000 99.000
born in Germany 0.856 0.352 0.000 1.000
provision of day care fore preschool children 2.641 0.912 1.000 5.000
provision of day care for school children 2.726 0.961 1.000 5.000
civil servant 0.043 0.202 0.000 1.000
has college degree 0.178 0.382 0.000 1.000
has vocational degree 0.645 0.479 0.000 1.000
is employed 0.599 0.490 0.000 1.000
German 0.896 0.306 0.000 1.000
kids younger than 16 in hh 0.337 0.473 0.000 1.000
lived in GDR in 1989 0.273 0.446 0.000 1.000
log monthly hh net income 7.773 0.565 3.912 11.531
log average yearly hh net income 9.670 0.124 9.371 9.937
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh 0.558 0.917 0.000 9.000
owns residence 0.450 0.497 0.000 1.000
sex 1.515 0.500 1.000 2.000
self-employed 0.055 0.228 0.000 1.000
share of foreign population in state 8.382 3.953 1.472 15.245
share of foreign pupils in state 8.906 5.258 0.476 19.501
worried about the economy 1.684 0.603 1.000 3.000
worried about own ﬁnances 2.085 0.688 1.000 3.000
years of education 11.764 2.621 7.000 18.000
Table 2.8  Summary statistics county-level
mean sd min max
age 45.116 16.550 17.000 98.000
born in Germany 0.809 0.393 0.000 1.000
provision of day care for preschool children 2.633 0.906 1.000 5.000
provision of day care for school children 2.570 0.947 1.000 5.000
civil servant 0.033 0.178 0.000 1.000
has college degree 0.136 0.342 0.000 1.000
has vocational degree 0.621 0.485 0.000 1.000
is employed 0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000
German 0.851 0.356 0.000 1.000
kids younger than 16 in hh 0.368 0.482 0.000 1.000
lived in GDR in 1989 0.271 0.444 0.000 1.000
log monthly hh net income 7.665 0.484 4.625 9.926
log average yearly hh net income 7.111 0.142 6.804 7.624
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh 0.621 0.966 0.000 9.000
owns residence 0.444 0.497 0.000 1.000
sex 1.512 0.500 1.000 2.000
self-employed 0.048 0.213 0.000 1.000
share of foreign population in county 8.652 5.940 0.700 26.000
share of foreign pupils in county 9.421 8.035 0.120 37.097
worried about the economy 1.626 0.588 1.000 3.000
worried about own ﬁnances 2.033 0.672 1.000 3.000
years of education 11.286 2.458 7.000 18.000
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Appendix to section 2.3
Table 2.9  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, mixed
effects model with differing controls, county-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se b se b se b se b se
share of foreign pupils in county 0.008*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
German 0.108*** (0.026) 0.114*** (0.026) 0.103*** (0.026) 0.102*** (0.026)
sex 0.023** (0.011) 0.030** (0.012) 0.025** (0.011) 0.023** (0.011)
age -0.006** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002)
age squared 0.000** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
married but separated -0.077* (0.046) -0.059 (0.045) -0.050 (0.045) -0.042 (0.045)
single -0.028 (0.020) -0.030 (0.020) -0.048** (0.020) -0.052** (0.020)
divorced -0.082*** (0.024) -0.080*** (0.024) -0.068*** (0.025) -0.063** (0.025)
widowed 0.006 (0.026) 0.007 (0.026) 0.038 (0.026) 0.030 (0.026)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.027 (0.023) -0.025 (0.023) -0.031 (0.023) -0.028 (0.023)
born in Germany 0.039 (0.025) 0.046* (0.025) 0.029 (0.025) 0.026 (0.025)
has vocational degree 0.010 (0.018) 0.022 (0.018) 0.023 (0.018) 0.024 (0.017)
has college degree -0.089** (0.035) -0.058* (0.035) -0.054 (0.035) -0.053 (0.034)
mittlere Reife 0.029 (0.018) 0.051*** (0.018) 0.035* (0.018) 0.033* (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.086** (0.039) 0.089** (0.039) 0.060 (0.039) 0.057 (0.039)
Abitur 0.013 (0.047) 0.037 (0.047) 0.020 (0.047) 0.011 (0.047)
other degree 0.051* (0.029) 0.058** (0.029) 0.051* (0.028) 0.046 (0.028)
no degree 0.072* (0.039) 0.070* (0.039) 0.079** (0.039) 0.065* (0.039)
no degree yet 0.094 (0.123) 0.087 (0.123) 0.160 (0.123) 0.148 (0.122)
years of education 0.025*** (0.009) 0.019** (0.009) 0.015 (0.009) 0.014 (0.009)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.018 (0.012) -0.025** (0.012) -0.026** (0.012) -0.026** (0.012)
is employed -0.006 (0.014) -0.025* (0.014) -0.028* (0.014)
civil servant -0.063** (0.029) -0.068** (0.029) -0.086*** (0.029)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.330*** (0.027) -0.307*** (0.029) -0.293*** (0.029)
self-employed 0.180*** (0.025) 0.173*** (0.025) 0.182*** (0.025)
log monthly hh net income 0.044*** (0.012) 0.031*** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income -0.048 (0.137) -0.067 (0.135)
owns residence -0.026** (0.011) -0.025** (0.011)
year=2002 0.211*** (0.020) 0.205*** (0.020)
worried about the economy 0.091*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.050*** (0.009)
β0 2.679*** (0.024) 2.381*** (0.106) 2.592*** (0.107) 2.621*** (0.975) 2.588*** (0.961)
lnσu -1.325*** (0.046) -1.325*** (0.046) -1.405*** (0.048) -1.421*** (0.048) -1.443*** (0.048)
lnσα -1.775*** (0.188) -1.809*** (0.200) -1.867*** (0.223) -2.316*** (0.537) -2.095*** (0.345)
N 28423 28423 28423 28423 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.10  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, linear
and logistic models, county-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method: RE FE OLOGIT OLS
b se b se b se b se
German 0.083*** (0.026) 0.670*** (0.131) 0.174*** (0.050) 0.078*** (0.025)
is employed -0.024 (0.015) -0.114*** (0.035) -0.042 (0.029) -0.021 (0.015)
sex 0.024** (0.012) 0.054** (0.023) 0.025** (0.012)
age -0.008*** (0.002) 0.010 (0.013) -0.016*** (0.005) -0.008*** (0.002)
age squared 0.000** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.031** (0.012) -0.019 (0.035) 0.056** (0.024) 0.031** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income 0.051 (0.062) -0.488 (0.340) 0.135 (0.120) 0.053 (0.061)
married but separated -0.061 (0.046) 0.024 (0.106) -0.126 (0.090) -0.064 (0.046)
single -0.069*** (0.021) -0.444*** (0.069) -0.119*** (0.040) -0.066*** (0.021)
divorced -0.070*** (0.025) -0.009 (0.084) -0.133*** (0.049) -0.070*** (0.025)
widowed 0.026 (0.027) 0.459*** (0.105) 0.038 (0.053) 0.022 (0.027)
civil servant -0.093*** (0.029) -0.163 (0.129) -0.166*** (0.057) -0.094*** (0.029)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.040* (0.024) 0.003 (0.056) -0.080* (0.046) -0.039* (0.024)
owns residence -0.030*** (0.011) 0.019 (0.017) -0.067*** (0.022) -0.032*** (0.011)
born in Germany 0.041 (0.025) 0.074 (0.050) 0.041* (0.025)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.249*** (0.019) -0.459*** (0.037) -0.247*** (0.019)
has vocational degree 0.028 (0.018) -0.007 (0.049) 0.063* (0.035) 0.028 (0.018)
has college degree -0.048 (0.035) -0.133 (0.115) -0.086 (0.067) -0.050 (0.035)
mittlere Reife 0.036** (0.018) -0.064 (0.063) 0.071** (0.035) 0.036** (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.065 (0.040) -0.124 (0.124) 0.112 (0.077) 0.067* (0.040)
Abitur 0.033 (0.048) -0.305** (0.148) 0.048 (0.093) 0.036 (0.048)
other degree 0.062** (0.029) -0.061 (0.072) 0.122** (0.058) 0.062** (0.029)
no degree 0.038 (0.040) 0.054 (0.095) 0.079 (0.079) 0.036 (0.040)
no degree yet 0.165 (0.125) 0.036 (0.235) 0.306 (0.255) 0.172 (0.125)
years of education 0.011 (0.009) 0.039 (0.028) 0.022 (0.018) 0.011 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.119*** (0.010) 0.169*** (0.023) 0.229*** (0.020) 0.118*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.048*** (0.010) 0.134*** (0.023) 0.083*** (0.019) 0.046*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.191*** (0.026) 0.176** (0.082) 0.371*** (0.050) 0.190*** (0.026)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.024** (0.012) -0.006 (0.032) -0.047** (0.023) -0.024** (0.012)
share of foreign pupils in county 0.000 (0.001) -0.004 (0.006) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001)
year=2002 0.195*** (0.014) 0.394*** (0.028) 0.203*** (0.014)
β0 1.760*** (0.453) 4.437** (2.087) 1.742*** (0.447)
N 28423 28423 28423 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix to section 2.4
Table 2.11  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, Germans
and non-Germans separately, state-level
(1) (2) (3)
Germans Non-Germans Full sample
b se b se b se
is employed 0.006 (0.015) 0.008 (0.043) 0.008 (0.014)
sex 0.030∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.019 (0.039) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.006∗∗ (0.002) 0.001 (0.010) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.016 (0.012) 0.045 (0.038) 0.020∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income -2.268∗∗∗ (0.424) 0.298 (0.883) -2.248∗∗∗ (0.414)
married but separated -0.049 (0.045) -0.125 (0.143) -0.058 (0.043)
single 0.007 (0.021) 0.121∗ (0.067) 0.013 (0.020)
divorced -0.087∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.034 (0.094) -0.083∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed -0.002 (0.026) 0.155 (0.134) 0.006 (0.025)
civil servant -0.100∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.319 (0.357) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.028)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.062∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.013 (0.064) -0.054∗∗ (0.022)
owns residence -0.050∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.004 (0.043) -0.050∗∗∗ (0.010)
born in Germany 0.048∗ (0.027) -0.078 (0.065) 0.021 (0.024)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.295∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.078 (0.331) -0.291∗∗∗ (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.034∗∗ (0.017) -0.013 (0.076) 0.032∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.033 (0.032) -0.119 (0.189) -0.033 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.058∗∗∗ (0.017) -0.106 (0.086) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.083∗∗ (0.039) 0.034 (0.160) 0.084∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur 0.080∗ (0.047) -0.063 (0.176) 0.077∗ (0.044)
other degree 0.073∗∗ (0.036) 0.039 (0.054) 0.059∗∗ (0.027)
no degree -0.045 (0.049) 0.030 (0.096) 0.010 (0.037)
no degree yet 0.053 (0.120) 0.207 (0.364) 0.062 (0.114)
years of education 0.002 (0.009) 0.007 (0.038) 0.001 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.054∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.108∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.044∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.035 (0.029) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.158∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.141 (0.095) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.002 (0.012) -0.029 (0.029) -0.005 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in state -0.097∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.008 (0.018) -0.085∗∗∗ (0.014)
year=2002 0.773∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.478∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.765∗∗∗ (0.048)
German 0.022 (0.025)
β0 24.692∗∗∗ (4.077) -1.115 (8.421) 24.367∗∗∗ (3.984)
lnσu -0.157 (0.248) -1.506∗∗∗ (0.342) -0.250 (0.257)
lnσα -1.030∗∗∗ (0.040) -0.880∗∗∗ (0.101) -0.998∗∗∗ (0.036)
N 28053 3224 31277
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.12  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, Germans
and non-Germans separately, county-level
(1) (2) (3)
Germans Non-Germans Full Sample
b se b se b se
is employed -0.034** (0.015) -0.005 (0.043) -0.033** (0.015)
sex 0.018 (0.012) 0.042 (0.040) 0.021* (0.012)
age -0.008*** (0.003) -0.006 (0.010) -0.008*** (0.002)
age squared 0.000** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.029** (0.013) 0.025 (0.040) 0.032*** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income -0.091 (0.137) 0.118 (0.351) -0.074 (0.135)
married but separated -0.019 (0.048) -0.209 (0.148) -0.037 (0.046)
single -0.065*** (0.022) 0.013 (0.069) -0.060*** (0.021)
divorced -0.076*** (0.026) 0.080 (0.098) -0.065*** (0.025)
widowed 0.027 (0.027) 0.237* (0.135) 0.036 (0.027)
civil servant -0.095*** (0.029) 0.209 (0.360) -0.086*** (0.029)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.042* (0.025) 0.055 (0.067) -0.028 (0.023)
owns residence -0.024** (0.011) 0.047 (0.044) -0.022** (0.011)
born in Germany 0.068** (0.029) -0.105 (0.068) 0.024 (0.026)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.301*** (0.029) -0.371 (0.337) -0.293*** (0.029)
has vocational degree 0.025 (0.018) 0.022 (0.078) 0.024 (0.018)
has college degree -0.047 (0.036) -0.004 (0.196) -0.052 (0.035)
mittlere Reife 0.041** (0.019) -0.052 (0.088) 0.031* (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.069* (0.041) -0.022 (0.163) 0.052 (0.039)
Abitur 0.028 (0.051) -0.105 (0.182) 0.005 (0.047)
other degree 0.067* (0.038) 0.038 (0.056) 0.045 (0.029)
no degree -0.010 (0.052) 0.129 (0.100) 0.065* (0.039)
no degree yet 0.183 (0.126) -0.283 (0.458) 0.134 (0.122)
years of education 0.011 (0.010) 0.025 (0.040) 0.015 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.094*** (0.011) 0.122*** (0.034) 0.095*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.059*** (0.010) -0.002 (0.031) 0.053*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.185*** (0.026) 0.194* (0.101) 0.185*** (0.026)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.026** (0.013) -0.040 (0.030) -0.027** (0.012)
share of foreign pupils in county 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.003)
year=2002 0.196*** (0.020) 0.093 (0.059) 0.188*** (0.019)
German 0.114*** (0.026)
β0 2.907*** (0.975) 1.240 (2.543) 2.640*** (0.961)
lnσu -1.447 (0.000) -1.023 (0.000) -1.448 (0.000)
lnσα -0.991 (0.000) -0.969 (0.000) -0.982 (0.000)
N 25377 3046 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, no random component standard error due to expectation-maximization estimation
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Table 2.13  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, waves
1997 and 2002 separately, state-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1997 2002 Full Sample Full Sample
b se b se b se b se
German -0.053 (0.037) 0.056∗ (0.031) 0.022 (0.025) 0.026 (0.025)
is employed 0.013 (0.023) 0.007 (0.017) 0.008 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014)
sex 0.083∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.005 (0.013) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.031∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.004 (0.004) -0.005∗ (0.003) -0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.019 (0.022) 0.015 (0.014) 0.020∗ (0.011) 0.028∗∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income 0.188 (0.430) 0.265 (0.577) -2.248∗∗∗ (0.414) 4.158∗∗∗ (0.094)
married but separated 0.016 (0.079) -0.089∗ (0.051) -0.058 (0.043) -0.053 (0.043)
single 0.035 (0.033) 0.004 (0.024) 0.013 (0.020) 0.017 (0.020)
divorced 0.039 (0.042) -0.125∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.083∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.078∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed -0.008 (0.042) 0.013 (0.031) 0.006 (0.025) 0.003 (0.025)
civil servant -0.126∗∗ (0.051) -0.078∗∗ (0.032) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.028)
kids younger than 16 in hh 0.003 (0.036) -0.084∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.054∗∗ (0.022) -0.051∗∗ (0.022)
owns residence 0.003 (0.020) -0.050∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.050∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.039∗∗∗ (0.010)
born in Germany -0.017 (0.038) 0.041 (0.030) 0.021 (0.024) 0.021 (0.024)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.089∗ (0.047) -0.367∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.291∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.280∗∗∗ (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.002 (0.031) 0.042∗∗ (0.019) 0.032∗ (0.016) 0.034∗∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.076 (0.061) -0.025 (0.037) -0.033 (0.032) -0.032 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.016 (0.029) 0.070∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.057∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.065 (0.071) 0.097∗∗ (0.043) 0.084∗∗ (0.037) 0.096∗∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur -0.010 (0.082) 0.113∗∗ (0.051) 0.077∗ (0.044) 0.091∗∗ (0.044)
other degree -0.036 (0.044) 0.114∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.059∗∗ (0.027) 0.055∗∗ (0.027)
no degree -0.015 (0.057) 0.028 (0.050) 0.010 (0.037) 0.001 (0.037)
no degree yet 0.075 (0.121) 0.945 (0.911) 0.062 (0.114) 0.013 (0.114)
years of education 0.016 (0.016) -0.005 (0.010) 0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.078∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.023 (0.015) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.035∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.116∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.173∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.158∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.036∗∗ (0.017) 0.008 (0.014) -0.005 (0.011) -0.007 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in state -0.004 (0.008) -0.012 (0.012) -0.085∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.075∗∗∗ (0.010)
year=2002 0.765∗∗∗ (0.048)
β0 0.170 (4.078) 0.295 (5.513) 24.367∗∗∗ (3.984) -37.109∗∗∗ (0.894)
lnσα -0.171 (0.000) -0.161 (0.000) -0.998∗∗∗ (0.036) -1.033∗∗∗ (0.038)
lnσu -2.472 (0.000) -1.756 (0.000) -0.250 (0.257) -1.160∗∗∗ (0.191)
N 10714 20563 31277 31277
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, no random component standard error due to expectation-maximization estimation
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Table 2.14  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, waves
1997 and 2002 separately, county-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1997 2002 Full Sample Full Sample
b se b se b se b se
German 0.032 (0.040) 0.130*** (0.033) 0.114*** (0.026) 0.117*** (0.026)
is employed -0.033 (0.024) -0.019 (0.018) -0.033** (0.015) -0.033** (0.015)
sex 0.039** (0.019) 0.017 (0.014) 0.021* (0.012) 0.022* (0.012)
age 0.001 (0.004) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002)
age squared -0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.036 (0.023) 0.018 (0.015) 0.032*** (0.012) 0.039*** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income -0.123 (0.183) 0.009 (0.158) -0.074 (0.135) 1.009*** (0.082)
married but separated -0.066 (0.080) -0.030 (0.055) -0.037 (0.046) -0.035 (0.046)
single -0.047 (0.034) -0.055** (0.025) -0.060*** (0.021) -0.047** (0.021)
divorced 0.007 (0.044) -0.084*** (0.030) -0.065*** (0.025) -0.061** (0.025)
widowed 0.104** (0.043) -0.006 (0.033) 0.036 (0.027) 0.034 (0.027)
civil servant -0.113** (0.055) -0.077** (0.033) -0.086*** (0.029) -0.085*** (0.029)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.019 (0.038) -0.038 (0.029) -0.028 (0.023) -0.025 (0.023)
owns residence 0.024 (0.022) -0.043*** (0.016) -0.022** (0.011) -0.020* (0.011)
born in Germany 0.019 (0.040) 0.026 (0.031) 0.024 (0.026) 0.027 (0.026)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.218*** (0.047) -0.309*** (0.034) -0.293*** (0.029) -0.225*** (0.029)
has vocational degree -0.026 (0.034) 0.040* (0.021) 0.024 (0.018) 0.025 (0.018)
has college degree -0.115* (0.068) -0.042 (0.040) -0.052 (0.035) -0.053 (0.035)
mittlere Reife 0.004 (0.031) 0.045** (0.022) 0.031* (0.018) 0.034* (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.005 (0.076) 0.069 (0.045) 0.052 (0.039) 0.059 (0.039)
Abitur -0.061 (0.089) 0.025 (0.055) 0.005 (0.047) 0.010 (0.048)
other degree 0.006 (0.046) 0.071** (0.036) 0.045 (0.029) 0.046 (0.029)
no degree 0.090 (0.061) 0.049 (0.053) 0.065* (0.039) 0.058 (0.039)
no degree yet 0.191 (0.130) 0.957 (0.917) 0.134 (0.122) 0.098 (0.122)
years of education 0.031* (0.018) 0.011 (0.011) 0.015 (0.009) 0.015 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.120*** (0.017) 0.081*** (0.012) 0.095*** (0.010) 0.099*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.053*** (0.016) 0.042*** (0.012) 0.053*** (0.009) 0.050*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.139*** (0.045) 0.197*** (0.030) 0.185*** (0.026) 0.185*** (0.026)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.039** (0.018) -0.018 (0.015) -0.027** (0.012) -0.027** (0.012)
share of foreign pupils in county 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003)
year=2002 0.188*** (0.019)
β0 2.590** (1.318) 2.483** (1.145) 2.640*** (0.961) -5.058*** (0.585)
lnσu -1.390 (0.000) -1.371 (0.000) -1.448 (0.000) -1.364 (0.000)
lnσα -0.166 (0.000) -0.158 (0.000) -0.982 (0.000) -0.973 (0.000)
N 9694 18729 28423 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, no random component standard error due to expectation-maximization estimation
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Table 2.15  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, East and
West Germany separately, state-level
(1) (2) (3)
East West Full Sample
b se b se b se
German 0.046 (0.113) 0.013 (0.026) 0.022 (0.025)
is employed 0.003 (0.023) 0.004 (0.017) 0.008 (0.014)
sex 0.089∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.009 (0.014) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.006 (0.004) -0.004 (0.003) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.068∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.006 (0.013) 0.020∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income -0.790∗ (0.412) -1.014 (0.764) -2.248∗∗∗ (0.414)
married but separated 0.137∗ (0.072) -0.127∗∗ (0.052) -0.058 (0.043)
single 0.069∗ (0.036) -0.012 (0.024) 0.013 (0.020)
divorced -0.055 (0.037) -0.095∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.083∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed -0.033 (0.042) 0.027 (0.031) 0.006 (0.025)
civil servant 0.006 (0.060) -0.109∗∗∗ (0.032) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.028)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.006 (0.041) -0.090∗∗∗ (0.026) -0.054∗∗ (0.022)
owns residence -0.023 (0.017) -0.052∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.050∗∗∗ (0.010)
born in Germany -0.003 (0.077) 0.025 (0.026) 0.021 (0.024)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.237∗∗∗ (0.043) -0.299∗∗∗ (0.037) -0.291∗∗∗ (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.022 (0.026) 0.038∗ (0.021) 0.032∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.059 (0.044) -0.018 (0.045) -0.033 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.042 (0.030) 0.047∗∗ (0.021) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.043 (0.077) 0.084∗ (0.043) 0.084∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur 0.103 (0.076) 0.059 (0.055) 0.077∗ (0.044)
other degree -0.044 (0.068) 0.065∗∗ (0.030) 0.059∗∗ (0.027)
no degree 0.128 (0.094) -0.008 (0.042) 0.010 (0.037)
no degree yet -0.111 (0.193) 0.119 (0.138) 0.062 (0.114)
years of education 0.004 (0.014) -0.000 (0.011) 0.001 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.024 (0.016) 0.069∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.014 (0.015) 0.045∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.104∗∗ (0.042) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh 0.014 (0.024) -0.004 (0.013) -0.005 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in state -0.000 (0.008) -0.004 (0.016) -0.085∗∗∗ (0.014)
year=2002 0.471∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.675∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.765∗∗∗ (0.048)
β0 9.242∗∗ (3.895) 12.035∗ (7.302) 24.367∗∗∗ (3.984)
lnσα -0.990∗∗∗ (0.050) -1.018∗∗∗ (0.047) -0.998∗∗∗ (0.036)
lnσu -2.276∗∗∗ (0.372) -1.613∗∗∗ (0.308) -0.250 (0.257)
N 8561 22716 31277
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.16  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, East and
West Germany separately, county-level
(1) (2) (3)
East West Full Sample
b se b se b se
German 0.706*** (0.244) 0.103*** (0.027) 0.114*** (0.026)
is employed -0.037 (0.027) -0.033* (0.017) -0.033** (0.015)
sex 0.074*** (0.022) 0.008 (0.014) 0.021* (0.012)
age -0.008* (0.005) -0.007** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.002)
age squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.021 (0.025) 0.033** (0.014) 0.032*** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income -0.118 (0.443) 0.068 (0.164) -0.074 (0.135)
married but separated 0.117 (0.089) -0.072 (0.053) -0.037 (0.046)
single 0.028 (0.041) -0.093*** (0.024) -0.060*** (0.021)
divorced -0.028 (0.044) -0.082*** (0.030) -0.065*** (0.025)
widowed -0.044 (0.047) 0.066** (0.032) 0.036 (0.027)
civil servant 0.117 (0.072) -0.115*** (0.033) -0.086*** (0.029)
kids younger than 16 in hh 0.046 (0.047) -0.069** (0.027) -0.028 (0.023)
owns residence -0.035* (0.020) -0.014 (0.013) -0.022** (0.011)
born in Germany 0.070 (0.115) 0.020 (0.027) 0.024 (0.026)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.244*** (0.079) -0.312*** (0.039) -0.293*** (0.029)
has vocational degree -0.009 (0.030) 0.044** (0.022) 0.024 (0.018)
has college degree -0.132*** (0.051) 0.005 (0.047) -0.052 (0.035)
mittlere Reife 0.017 (0.035) 0.029 (0.022) 0.031* (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.068 (0.093) 0.057 (0.045) 0.052 (0.039)
Abitur 0.022 (0.090) 0.013 (0.057) 0.005 (0.047)
other degree 0.042 (0.084) 0.039 (0.031) 0.045 (0.029)
no degree 0.108 (0.118) 0.039 (0.044) 0.065* (0.039)
no degree yet 0.117 (0.236) 0.141 (0.142) 0.134 (0.122)
years of education 0.029* (0.017) 0.006 (0.012) 0.015 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.045** (0.019) 0.107*** (0.012) 0.095*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.022 (0.018) 0.062*** (0.011) 0.053*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.154*** (0.049) 0.191*** (0.030) 0.185*** (0.026)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh 0.008 (0.028) -0.026** (0.013) -0.027** (0.012)
share of foreign pupils in county 0.025 (0.028) 0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
year=2002 0.119* (0.064) 0.193*** (0.023) 0.188*** (0.019)
β0 2.275 (3.081) 1.665 (1.176) 2.640*** (0.961)
lnσu -1.569 (0.000) -1.423 (0.000) -1.448 (0.000)
lnσα -1.027 (0.000) -0.972 (0.000) -0.982 (0.000)
N 6434 21989 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, no random component standard error due to expectation-maximization estimation
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Table 2.17  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, house-
holds with children under the age of 16 separately, state-level
(1) (2) (3)
Kids in hh No Kids in hh Full Sample
b se b se b se
German 0.031 (0.037) 0.019 (0.033) 0.022 (0.025)
is employed -0.008 (0.023) 0.015 (0.017) 0.008 (0.014)
sex 0.041∗∗ (0.020) 0.028∗∗ (0.014) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.013∗∗ (0.006) -0.006∗∗ (0.003) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.031 (0.024) 0.010 (0.013) 0.020∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income -0.201 (0.403) -2.102∗∗∗ (0.498) -2.248∗∗∗ (0.414)
married but separated -0.065 (0.073) -0.068 (0.053) -0.058 (0.043)
single -0.039 (0.037) 0.004 (0.025) 0.013 (0.020)
divorced -0.114∗∗∗ (0.044) -0.084∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.083∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed -0.231∗∗ (0.095) 0.017 (0.026) 0.006 (0.025)
civil servant -0.098∗∗ (0.044) -0.091∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.094∗∗∗ (0.028)
owns residence -0.035∗∗ (0.018) -0.056∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.050∗∗∗ (0.010)
born in Germany -0.015 (0.038) 0.041 (0.031) 0.021 (0.024)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.257∗∗∗ (0.046) -0.301∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.291∗∗∗ (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.023 (0.029) 0.042∗∗ (0.020) 0.032∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.001 (0.056) -0.037 (0.039) -0.033 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.033 (0.029) 0.055∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.104∗ (0.062) 0.082∗ (0.046) 0.084∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur 0.081 (0.075) 0.083 (0.054) 0.077∗ (0.044)
other degree 0.046 (0.043) 0.064∗ (0.035) 0.059∗∗ (0.027)
no degree 0.085 (0.062) -0.050 (0.046) 0.010 (0.037)
no degree yet 0.205 (0.199) -0.004 (0.139) 0.062 (0.114)
years of education -0.006 (0.015) 0.001 (0.011) 0.001 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.044∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.056∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.199∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.001 (0.011) -0.005 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in state -0.014 (0.009) -0.084∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.085∗∗∗ (0.014)
year=2002 0.539∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.747∗∗∗ (0.058) 0.765∗∗∗ (0.048)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.054∗∗ (0.022)
β0 4.232 (3.818) 23.041∗∗∗ (4.781) 24.367∗∗∗ (3.984)
lnσα -1.014∗∗∗ (0.070) -0.981∗∗∗ (0.045) -0.998∗∗∗ (0.036)
lnσu -2.077∗∗∗ (0.244) -0.249 (0.312) -0.250 (0.257)
N 10572 20705 31277
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.18  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, house-
holds with children under the age of 16 separately, county-level
(1) (2) (3)
Kids in hh No Kids in hh Full Sample
b se b se b se
German 0.092** (0.040) 0.143*** (0.035) 0.114*** (0.026)
is employed -0.037 (0.025) -0.032* (0.018) -0.033** (0.015)
sex 0.015 (0.021) 0.027* (0.014) 0.021* (0.012)
age -0.017*** (0.006) -0.007** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.002)
age squared 0.000** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.035 (0.025) 0.021 (0.014) 0.032*** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income -0.094 (0.170) -0.045 (0.162) -0.074 (0.135)
married but separated -0.023 (0.073) -0.066 (0.058) -0.037 (0.046)
single -0.098*** (0.038) -0.071*** (0.026) -0.060*** (0.021)
divorced -0.040 (0.047) -0.083*** (0.030) -0.065*** (0.025)
widowed -0.163 (0.100) 0.041 (0.028) 0.036 (0.027)
civil servant -0.120** (0.047) -0.064* (0.037) -0.086*** (0.029)
owns residence -0.031 (0.019) -0.018 (0.013) -0.022** (0.011)
born in Germany -0.029 (0.040) 0.070** (0.033) 0.024 (0.026)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.211*** (0.045) -0.317*** (0.036) -0.293*** (0.029)
has vocational degree -0.002 (0.031) 0.035 (0.022) 0.024 (0.018)
has college degree -0.063 (0.061) -0.046 (0.043) -0.052 (0.035)
mittlere Reife -0.020 (0.032) 0.051** (0.022) 0.031* (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.045 (0.066) 0.067 (0.049) 0.052 (0.039)
Abitur -0.041 (0.081) 0.034 (0.059) 0.005 (0.047)
other degree 0.014 (0.045) 0.072* (0.037) 0.045 (0.029)
no degree 0.061 (0.067) 0.063 (0.049) 0.065* (0.039)
no degree yet 0.148 (0.212) 0.136 (0.149) 0.134 (0.122)
years of education 0.016 (0.016) 0.012 (0.011) 0.015 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.085*** (0.018) 0.102*** (0.012) 0.095*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.069*** (0.016) 0.048*** (0.012) 0.053*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.232*** (0.039) 0.158*** (0.034) 0.185*** (0.026)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.018 (0.012) -0.027** (0.012)
share of foreign pupils in county -0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
year=2002 0.201*** (0.028) 0.184*** (0.024) 0.188*** (0.019)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.028 (0.023)
β0 2.960** (1.223) 2.441** (1.153) 2.640*** (0.961)
lnσu -1.447 (0.000) -1.294 (0.000) -1.448 (0.000)
lnσα -0.920 (0.000) -0.950 (0.000) -0.982 (0.000)
N 9732 18691 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, no random component standard error due to expectation-maximization estimation
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Table 2.19  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, share of
foreigners as independent variable, state-level
(1) (2) (3)
Random eﬀect: Individual State State Individual
b se b se b se
German 0.012 (0.025) 0.022 (0.024) 0.025 (0.025)
is employed 0.012 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014)
sex 0.031∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.032∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.004∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.000∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.020∗ (0.011) 0.020∗ (0.011) 0.020∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income 0.341∗∗∗ (0.121) -0.893∗∗ (0.390) -1.406∗∗∗ (0.412)
married but separated -0.068 (0.043) -0.065 (0.043) -0.060 (0.043)
single 0.011 (0.020) 0.013 (0.019) 0.013 (0.020)
divorced -0.094∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.084∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.086∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed 0.000 (0.026) 0.000 (0.025) 0.003 (0.025)
civil servant -0.098∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.095∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.093∗∗∗ (0.028)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.050∗∗ (0.022) -0.048∗∗ (0.022) -0.051∗∗ (0.022)
owns residence -0.046∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.052∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.052∗∗∗ (0.010)
born in Germany 0.025 (0.024) 0.023 (0.023) 0.020 (0.024)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.246∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.296∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.294∗∗∗ (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.034∗∗ (0.016) 0.035∗∗ (0.016) 0.034∗∗ (0.016)
has college degree -0.025 (0.032) -0.027 (0.031) -0.030 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.051∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.057∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.054∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.086∗∗ (0.037) 0.089∗∗ (0.036) 0.084∗∗ (0.037)
Abitur 0.088∗∗ (0.044) 0.090∗∗ (0.043) 0.082∗ (0.044)
other degree 0.051∗ (0.027) 0.060∗∗ (0.027) 0.059∗∗ (0.027)
no degree -0.010 (0.037) 0.002 (0.037) 0.005 (0.037)
no degree yet 0.058 (0.114) 0.081 (0.115) 0.059 (0.114)
years of education -0.002 (0.009) -0.001 (0.008) -0.000 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.068∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.064∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.061∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.034∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.159∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.160∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.157∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.007 (0.011) -0.010 (0.011) -0.006 (0.011)
share of foreign population in state -0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.016 (0.014) -0.051∗∗∗ (0.018)
year=2002 0.465∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.611∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.665∗∗∗ (0.049)
β0 -1.067 (1.155) 10.801∗∗∗ (3.668) 15.990∗∗∗ (3.893)
lnσu -1.550∗∗∗ (0.376) -0.912 (0.637)
lnσα -0.996∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.997∗∗∗ (0.036)
N 31188 31188 31188
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.20  Dependent variable: provision of day care for school children, share of
foreigners as independent variable, county-level
(1) (2) (3)
Random eﬀect: Individual County County and Individual
b se b se b se
German 0.099*** (0.026) 0.101*** (0.025) 0.115*** (0.026)
is employed -0.028* (0.015) -0.027* (0.014) -0.034** (0.015)
sex 0.022* (0.012) 0.024** (0.011) 0.021* (0.012)
age -0.009*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002)
age squared 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.032** (0.012) 0.031*** (0.012) 0.031*** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income -0.009 (0.065) -0.137 (0.139) -0.142 (0.139)
married but separated -0.057 (0.047) -0.043 (0.045) -0.038 (0.046)
single -0.078*** (0.021) -0.051** (0.020) -0.060*** (0.021)
divorced -0.071*** (0.026) -0.063*** (0.024) -0.065*** (0.025)
widowed 0.032 (0.028) 0.030 (0.026) 0.036 (0.027)
civil servant -0.092*** (0.030) -0.086*** (0.029) -0.086*** (0.029)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.042* (0.024) -0.028 (0.023) -0.028 (0.023)
owns residence -0.029*** (0.011) -0.026** (0.011) -0.022** (0.011)
born in Germany 0.041 (0.026) 0.026 (0.025) 0.025 (0.026)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.243*** (0.020) -0.289*** (0.029) -0.289*** (0.029)
has vocational degree 0.029 (0.018) 0.024 (0.017) 0.024 (0.018)
has college degree -0.046 (0.036) -0.053 (0.034) -0.052 (0.035)
mittlere Reife 0.034* (0.019) 0.033* (0.018) 0.031* (0.018)
Fachabitur 0.062 (0.040) 0.058 (0.039) 0.052 (0.039)
Abitur 0.027 (0.049) 0.012 (0.047) 0.005 (0.047)
other degree 0.060** (0.029) 0.046 (0.028) 0.045 (0.029)
no degree 0.039 (0.040) 0.065* (0.039) 0.065* (0.039)
no degree yet 0.151 (0.125) 0.150 (0.122) 0.134 (0.122)
years of education 0.011 (0.010) 0.014 (0.009) 0.015 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.121*** (0.010) 0.091*** (0.010) 0.095*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.052*** (0.010) 0.049*** (0.009) 0.053*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.192*** (0.026) 0.182*** (0.025) 0.185*** (0.026)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.023* (0.012) -0.026** (0.012) -0.027** (0.012)
share of foreign population in county 0.313** (0.141) 0.496 (0.354) 0.509 (0.353)
year=2002 0.188*** (0.014) 0.215*** (0.020) 0.197*** (0.020)
β0 2.172*** (0.477) 3.054*** (0.987) 3.094*** (0.986)
lnσu -1.445 (0.000) -1.451 (0.000)
lnσα -0.915 (0.000) -0.982 (0.000)
N 28423 28423 28423
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, no random component standard error due to expectation-maximization estimation
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Table 2.21  Dependent variable: provision of day care for preschool children, state-
level
(1) (2) (3)
Random eﬀect: Individual State State and Individual
b se b se b se
German -0.019 (0.024) -0.011 (0.023) -0.006 (0.024)
is employed 0.004 (0.014) 0.001 (0.013) 0.001 (0.014)
sex 0.039∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.039∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.038∗∗∗ (0.011)
age -0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.005∗∗ (0.002)
age squared 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.025∗∗ (0.011) 0.027∗∗ (0.011) 0.025∗∗ (0.011)
log average yearly hh net income 0.744∗∗∗ (0.106) 0.266 (0.307) 0.226 (0.296)
married but separated -0.042 (0.042) -0.046 (0.042) -0.040 (0.042)
single 0.031 (0.020) 0.032∗ (0.019) 0.031 (0.020)
divorced -0.065∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.061∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.059∗∗∗ (0.023)
widowed -0.024 (0.025) -0.021 (0.024) -0.023 (0.025)
civil servant -0.074∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.069∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.071∗∗∗ (0.027)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.051∗∗ (0.022) -0.052∗∗ (0.022) -0.055∗∗ (0.022)
owns residence -0.002 (0.010) -0.006 (0.010) -0.006 (0.010)
born in Germany 0.032 (0.024) 0.029 (0.023) 0.027 (0.024)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.188∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.224∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.226∗∗∗ (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.036∗∗ (0.016) 0.038∗∗ (0.016) 0.036∗∗ (0.016)
has college degree 0.033 (0.032) 0.032 (0.031) 0.032 (0.032)
mittlere Reife 0.068∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.071∗∗∗ (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.079∗∗ (0.037) 0.088∗∗ (0.036) 0.079∗∗ (0.036)
Abitur 0.118∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.130∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.117∗∗∗ (0.043)
other degree 0.049∗ (0.027) 0.055∗∗ (0.026) 0.056∗∗ (0.027)
no degree 0.017 (0.037) 0.029 (0.036) 0.027 (0.036)
no degree yet 0.152 (0.112) 0.178 (0.114) 0.150 (0.112)
years of education -0.003 (0.009) -0.004 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008)
worried about the economy 0.063∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.064∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.009)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.040∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.009)
self-employed 0.146∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.142∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.024)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.012 (0.011) -0.013 (0.011) -0.011 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in state -0.014∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.015∗∗ (0.007) -0.015∗∗ (0.007)
year=2002 -0.061∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.006 (0.036) 0.002 (0.035)
β0 -4.757∗∗∗ (1.021) -0.188 (2.905) 0.233 (2.808)
lnσu -1.948∗∗∗ (0.210) -1.933∗∗∗ (0.214)
lnσα -0.863∗∗∗ (0.026) -0.876∗∗∗ (0.027)
N 31278 31278 31278
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.22  Dependent variable: provision of day care for preschool children,
county-level
(1) (2) (3)
Random eﬀect: Individual County County and Individual
b se b se b se
German 0.016 (0.025) 0.028 (0.024) 0.035 (0.025)
is employed 0.012 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 0.009 (0.014)
sex 0.041*** (0.012) 0.042*** (0.011) 0.041*** (0.011)
age -0.005* (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) -0.004* (0.002)
age squared 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
log monthly hh net income 0.023* (0.012) 0.024** (0.011) 0.024** (0.012)
log average monthly p.c. net income 0.245*** (0.061) 0.192 (0.132) 0.197 (0.131)
married but separated -0.058 (0.044) -0.050 (0.043) -0.043 (0.043)
single 0.030 (0.020) 0.040** (0.019) 0.039** (0.020)
divorced -0.060** (0.025) -0.048** (0.023) -0.046* (0.024)
widowed -0.028 (0.027) -0.027 (0.025) -0.027 (0.026)
civil servant -0.070** (0.029) -0.051* (0.027) -0.056** (0.028)
kids younger than 16 in hh -0.032 (0.023) -0.025 (0.022) -0.024 (0.022)
owns residence 0.000 (0.010) -0.001 (0.011) 0.002 (0.010)
born in Germany 0.033 (0.025) 0.023 (0.024) 0.020 (0.025)
lived in GDR in 1989 -0.157*** (0.019) -0.201*** (0.028) -0.194*** (0.028)
has vocational degree 0.030* (0.017) 0.033** (0.017) 0.031* (0.017)
has college degree 0.013 (0.035) 0.012 (0.033) 0.012 (0.034)
mittlere Reife 0.056*** (0.018) 0.060*** (0.017) 0.056*** (0.017)
Fachabitur 0.056 (0.039) 0.066* (0.037) 0.057 (0.038)
Abitur 0.093** (0.047) 0.092** (0.045) 0.083* (0.045)
other degree 0.045 (0.028) 0.041 (0.027) 0.042 (0.027)
no degree 0.052 (0.038) 0.090** (0.037) 0.079** (0.037)
no degree yet 0.287** (0.119) 0.301** (0.118) 0.274** (0.116)
years of education 0.001 (0.009) 0.002 (0.009) 0.002 (0.009)
worried about the economy 0.070*** (0.010) 0.046*** (0.010) 0.044*** (0.010)
worried about own ﬁnances 0.046*** (0.009) 0.047*** (0.009) 0.050*** (0.009)
self-employed 0.160*** (0.025) 0.140*** (0.024) 0.147*** (0.025)
nr. of kids younger than 16 in hh -0.008 (0.012) -0.012 (0.011) -0.011 (0.011)
share of foreign pupils in county 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003)
year=2002 -0.036*** (0.013) -0.035* (0.019) -0.037** (0.019)
β0 0.442 (0.448) 0.831 (0.939) 0.799 (0.932)
lnσu -1.452 (0.000) -1.466 (0.000)
lnσα -0.762 (0.000) -0.837 (0.000)
N 28354 28354 28354
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, no random component standard error due to expectation-maximization estimation
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Chapter 3
Look like the innocent ﬂower but be the
serpent under it: Mimicking behaviour of
growth-oriented terrorist organizations
3.1 Introduction
Terrorism is one of the big challenges of the 21st century to be overcome by developed Western democracies,
emerging nations and developing countries alike.1 In 2009, about 11, 000 terror attacks took place world-
wide, resulting in the death or injury of almost 58, 000 people (US Department of State, 2010). In the same
year, Europe alone was hit by about 300 terror attacks (Europol, 2010). Apart from very salient attacks
in large and developed countries such as 9/11, the bombings in the public transport systems of Madrid
and London in 2004 and 2005 and the 2011 attack on the Domodedowo airport in Moscow, most acts of
terrorism are perpetrated in developing regions and go largely unreported in Western media. Their direct
and indirect eﬀects on the lives and happiness of aﬀected people and on political and economic outcomes
are immense, nevertheless.2,3,4,5 Terrorism in countries as diverse as Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan
and Iraq proves to be a severe danger to the stability of the political system and can seriously hamper
economic growth.6 Terrorism also harms individual ﬁrms, distorts trade and forces governments to divert
1As Frey and Luechinger (2003) point out, there is no universally accepted deﬁnition of terrorism. In this chapter
terrorism is thus considered to be any obviously illegal action taken by an organization classiﬁed as terrorist which harms
the country in which the action is perpetrated.
2For an extensive overview over terrorism-related economic research, see Schneider et al. (2010).
3The impact of terrorism on individual happiness has been the subject of research by Frey et al. (2007). Terrorism-induced
fear is the topic of recent work by Becker and Rubinstein (2011), while the socioeconomic determinants of this fear have been
examined by Brück and Müller (2009).
4Terrorism in Israel has led to a signiﬁcant shift of parties' political stances towards accommodation of Palestinian
interests and left policies (Gould and Klor, 2010).
5The immediate and short-run impact of terrorism, i.e. the destruction of physical and human capital, may be minor in
comparison to long-run eﬀects like additional transactions costs and changes in behaviour and factor prices. See, for instance,
Krugman (2004) and cost calculations of the 9/11 aftermath by Penm et al. (2004).
6Macroeconomic consequences of terrorism have been examined by, for instance, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003, 2008),
Enders et al. (2006), Blomberg and Mody (2005), Gupta et al. (2004) and Blomberg et al. (2004), with the general result
that high levels of terrorism hamper growth, deter investment and have the worst eﬀects in developing countries.
83
Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations
public spending to prevent acts of terror.7,8,9
Starting with the Al-Qaeda attacks against the USA in 2001, economic research into the economic causes
and consequences of terrorism has intensiﬁed. It is obvious that in order to develop optimal responses to
terrorism, one has to understand the structure of terrorist organizations and the nature of the decisions
they make. For this purpose game theory is particularly suited.10
The aim of this chapter is to characterize the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization
and a government that tries to protect itself from terrorism. To this end the two period signaling game
approaches as in Lapan and Sandler (1993), Overgaard (1994) and Arce and Sandler (2007) are combined
with an organizational growth framework as in Feinstein and Kaplan (2010).11 Terrorists choose their
attack strategies according to their initial manpower and expected government counter-terrorism response
in order to maximize their manpower at the end of period 2, while governments attempt to infer the size
of the terrorist group by its ﬁrst period actions and adjust their counter-terrorism spending accordingly.
The governments' counter-terrorism eﬀorts also depend on their ex-ante beliefs about the terrorist group
size and the damage governments suﬀer from attacks.
It turns out that in contrast to the common assumption that (bigger) terrorist attacks increase counter-
terrorism eﬀorts, the government response to an attack in the ﬁrst period is not necessarily higher than if
no attack occurs. This is because a government might take a small ﬁrst period attack as a sign that the
resources of the terrorists are not suﬃcient for a big second period attack. Also, while Lapan and Sandler
(1993) and Overgaard (1994) claim that terrorists want to appear as strong as possible, this chapter
ﬁnds that, given that they pursue a growth strategy or derive utility from other sources than government
concessions, terrorists may want to appear weaker than they are. This is due to the terrorists' strategic
7In a trade context, terrorism has been modeled as a strategic game played between rational and utility-maximizing
governments and terrorist organizations, in which governments decide on border controls and counter-terrorism measures
while terror organizations accordingly choose what and how to attack (Mirza and Verdier, 2008).
8As measured by market capitalization, Royal Dutch Shell, BP and Coca Cola alone have lost over $US 20 billion by
terror attacks between 1995 and 2002 (Karolyi and Martell, 2006).
9Between 2001 and 2011, the USA has spent $US 1.3 trillion on its self-proclaimed War on Terror (Belasco, 2010).
10For instance, Sandler and Arce (2003) present a variety of game theoretic applications to the issue of terrorism, including
choice of targets, deterrence vs. pre-emption and others. A diﬀerent game theoretic approach has been taken by Konrad
(2004) to determine the investment decisions of terrorist organizations and subsequent conﬂict outcomes. For an overview
over game theoretic developments in terrorism research, see Sandler and Siqueira (2009).
11The signaling games usually contain a third period in which actions are already determined by the two previous periods.
I will thus refer to these games as consisting of two periods.
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interest to provoke as little counter-terrorism eﬀort as possible so as not to endanger their operations
in period 2. This idea is also put forward by Arce and Sandler (2007), but the belief set and response
strength of the government are exogenously given. The behaviour of contemporary terrorist groups and
counter-terrorism spending trends suggest that the theoretical ﬁndings of this chapter may be at work
in the real world. For instance, German right-wing terrorists did not publicly claim responsibility for
assassinations of foreign shop owners in the past decade, and there is no obvious connection between terror
attacks and the budgets of the main German counter-terrorism agencies. Attacks like the Al-Qaeda parcel
bombs originating in Yemen in 2010 are exploited particularly for their propaganda value, and it is not
clear whether these relatively small attacks should be regarded as a sign of strength and an altered strategy
as Al-Qaeda claims, or of a lack of resources and weakness (Die Zeit, 2010, November 2).
As pointed out above, the contributions by Lapan and Sandler (1993), Overgaard (1994) and Arce and
Sandler (2007) which focus on military and political terrorists (these terms are discussed in section 3.2)
in two period signaling games with asymmetric information are directly related to this chapter. Lapan and
Sandler (1993) develop a model of military terrorism in which terrorists try to appear as strong as possible
to force concessions from a government. Terrorists do this by signaling their strength with an attack in the
ﬁrst period which is used by the government as an indicator whether standing ﬁrm and suﬀering further
attacks or giving in and suﬀering from concessions is the better strategy. Overgaard (1994) models a
similar game with political terrorists. Arce and Sandler (2007) present a model in which terrorists diﬀer
by type (military or political), and in which the government attempts to distinguish between terrorist types
by the size of a ﬁrst period attack. The authors mention the possibility that military terrorists hold back
in period 1 so government retaliation to their second period attack will be lower, but do not endogenously
determine the extent of the government response. Furthermore, they assume that the government response
will always be stronger if a spectacular attack took place in the ﬁrst period than if only a small attack
was perpetrated. In contrast, this chapter allows for an endogenous government response that can be less
severe even if an attack is observed in the ﬁrst period. The terrorists' attack decision in the ﬁrst period is
explicitly derived as a function of the endogenous government response.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the diﬀerent strategies a terrorist orga-
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nization may choose and gives examples of particular terrorist groups pursuing these strategies. Sections
3.3 and 3.4 develop a model of terrorist-government interaction, while section 3.5 discusses the results and
section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Terrorist strategies
One can distinguish between three diﬀerent general strategies of terrorist organizations: Inﬂuence through
violence with violence as an end in itself (military strategy), inﬂuence through violence with violence as
a mean (political strategy), and growth through violence with violence as a propaganda and advertising
tool (growth strategy).12
In the case of military terrorists, terrorists act nihilistic or vengeful in the sense that attacks are still
perpetrated even if there is no chance that the targeted entity will agree to the terrorists' demands.
Examples for this strategy are terrorist organizations without aﬃliated political parties, e.g. the RAF
(Rote Armee Fraktion) in Germany. The RAF carried out attacks even though it was clear that the
German government would not concede to their demands.13 Bernholz (2004) argues that the military type
of terrorism is inspired by supreme values which are non-negotiable fundamental beliefs. Terrorism is
used as a means to violently propagate demands a government would or could never agree to, such as the
expulsion of all Jews from the Near East.
In the political case, violence will only be used as long as it has a chance of inﬂuencing decisions. If violence
has no eﬀect, funds are used for political activities. Terrorists pursuing a political strategy are usually
connected with political parties, such as the IRA (Irish Republican Army) with its links to Sinn Fein and
the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) with its ties to Herri Batasuna.14 Organizations engaging in political
terrorism usually have limited and negotiable demands such as partial independence or stronger minority
rights.
Finally, growth strategies are utilized when a terrorist organization is just starting out, stands in compe-
12A further diﬀerentiation of these strategies and examples can be found in Kydd and Walter (2006).
13Amongst these demands were the abolition of capitalism and of the liberal democratic system.
14Herri Batasuna was banned by Spain in 2003 due to its terrorist aﬃliations.
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tition with other similar organizations or tries to acquire a certain manpower and fund level to enable a
particular operation. Epstein and Gang (2007) argue that terrorist groups beneﬁt from being larger in
a rent-seeking contest between terrorist groups where beneﬁts are not related to government concessions.
Pursuing a growth strategy which is aimed at becoming the largest terrorist group would also be sensible
in this context.
For an exogenous government response, terrorist organizations acting according to a growth strategy have
been examined by Feinstein and Kaplan (2010) who ﬁnd that the scale and type of attacks are determined
by the initial size of the organization and its natural growth rate, modeled as a kind of interest on
unused manpower. The goal of attacks under this strategy is not primarily to coerce the government into
concessions, but to advertise the organization's determination and capabilities to attract recruits and funds
by attacks with a high propaganda value.15 For instance, Wright (2006, p. 331) notes that after the 2000
attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan ﬁlled with new recruits, and
contributors from the Gulf States arrived carrying Samsonite suitcases ﬁlled with petrodollars. Further
examples of terrorist activities which are aimed at increasing the organization's manpower are the Schleyer
kidnapping by the RAF and the Landshut hijacking by the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine) in 1977 which were perpetrated to free the ﬁrst-generation RAF leadership from Stammheim
prison.
Amongst the terrorist organizations which found themselves in competition with other groups or had to
grow from humble beginnings are the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) in Algeria, the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka and various groups such as Hamas, Fatah, PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and PFLP (Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in Palestine.16 It can make sense for the terrorist organization to
lure governments into a false sense of security to prevent a heavy crackdown in its early stages or to
abstain from small attacks with low propaganda value in order not to jeopardize a major attack that is
being planned. When observing a terrorist organization pursuing a growth strategy, one would expect an
increasing number of attacks with rising intensity over time, as the terrorist group gathers more and more
15For a treatise on the interplay between terrorist attacks, propaganda and the media see Rohner and Frey (2007).
16The FLN initially tried to unite the various anti-colonial groups in Algeria and focussed on ﬁghting non-revolutionary
elements in the population, and the Tamil Tigers faced a plethora of similar Tamil groups during the 70's. Ideological and
political divisions have led to the creation of several competing Palestinian terrorist groups which vie for public support and
inﬂuence. See Hoﬀman and McCormick (2004), Bloom (2004) and Clauset et al. (2010).
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Figure 3.1  Number and casualties of Hamas attacks, 1989-2008
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2012)
manpower which can in turn be used for further attacks. As shown in Figure 3.1, this pattern exemplarily
becomes visible in the early activities of Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist group, from 1989 until around 1994.
For the years following 1994, a change in strategy becomes visible as Hamas focussed on fewer but more
lethal suicide attacks, which can be seen as a shift towards more expensive, but also more cost-eﬀective
large attacks (in comparison to the previous attacks by means of melee weapons and ﬁrearms) as predicted
by Feinstein and Kaplan (2010). Expensive in this context has to be seen in connection with more
sophisticated manpower, as particularly fanatical activists are necessary to perpetrate suicide attacks. 17
3.3 Model
Assume that the world is populated by two actors, a government and a terrorist organization. These
entities are only active in two periods. I ﬁrst turn to the characterization of the terrorist organization in
the absence of an endogenous government response. This basically constitutes a simpliﬁed version of the
17The eﬀectiveness of Israeli counter-terrorism measures such as the West Bank barrier during the Second Intifada becomes
visible in the drastic reduction of casualties per attack after 2002.
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model presented in Feinstein and Kaplan (2010). Feinstein and Kaplan additionally include a choice of
scale for terrorist attacks, but this element is not necessary for the analysis of the signaling aspect of the
game.18
3.3.1 Terrorist organization
The terrorist organization, by attacking the government and beneﬁting from a positive propaganda eﬀect,
maximizes its manpower at the end of the second period, given its available manpower M1 at the beginning
of the ﬁrst period.19 The focus on manpower is justiﬁed as it constitutes the main constraint on the extent
of terrorist activities (Feinstein and Kaplan, 2010).
Terrorists have two attack options: The ﬁrst is an attack that requires little planning and manpower eﬀort
Cs and yields low propaganda beneﬁts s. It is carried out at the end of the period in which its planning
costs are paid. This kind of attack is called small/type s. Given suﬃcient initial manpower, terrorists are
able to perpetrate one small attack in each period. Examples for this kind of terrorist activity are the
attacks by the Juba Sniper against targets of opportunity (i.e., unsuspecting US soldiers who happened
to be at the wrong place at the wrong time) and suicide bombings in public places as in Israel during the
Second Intifada.20 Hoﬀman and McCormick (2004) state that only a few days to a few weeks are necessary
to recruit, train and deploy a suicide bomber, with very low planning eﬀort and a material cost of around
$US 150.
The second attack option, called big/type b, requires a high manpower and planning eﬀort Cb and gen-
erates a propaganda beneﬁt of b, but also takes two periods to prepare. This means that if the terrorist
organization wants to initiate this kind of attack, it can only do so and has to employ the manpower at the
beginning of the ﬁrst period, while the actual attack will not take place until the end of the second period.
18If terrorists choose both attack type (big/small, see subsection 3.3.1) and scale (continuous function), the government's
counter-terrorism response will aﬀect the optimal scale, too. The optimization problem of the terrorists is thus not as
straightforward as in the simpliﬁed case presented in this chapter, but the ordering of attacks with regard to initial manpower
would still be the same.
19The increase in manpower after an attack does not have to come from its propaganda value alone. There are numerous
instances in which terrorist organizations attempted to free imprisoned fellow terrorists through their attacks which is an
even more direct way of raising the available human resources than propaganda.
20The Juba Sniper was an individual or a group of individuals who ambushed US soldiers in the Iraqi city of Baghdad
with a single sniper gunshot, usually inﬂicting a casualty.
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A prime example of this kind of terrorist attack is 9/11 which took several years to prepare, involved
dozens of operatives and required ﬂight lessons for the terrorist pilots. Manpower is completely used up
in an attack, e.g. because the involved operatives are killed or the planners and perpetrators of an attack
are subsequently discovered by anti-terror agencies.
In the ﬁrst period, attacks go through unhindered, but in the second period counter-terrorism eﬀorts are
in place which reduce the chance of successfully perpetrating attacks. The success probability of an attack,
given by θ, constitutes a negative function of government counter-terrorism spending, but is assumed to
be exogenous in this section.21 θ will be discussed in detail in subsection 3.3.2, and at this point it suﬃces
to say that θ = 1 means that the government does nothing at all to prevent terror attacks and that the
success probability of an attack is therefore 1. Similarly, θ = 0 implies that every attack attempt is doomed
to fail, i.e. the success probability is zero. In the case of a foiled attack attempt, the manpower costs of
initiating the attack are lost and no propaganda beneﬁt is generated.
Given suﬃcient manpower, a terrorist organization can plan both types of attacks in the same period, i.e.
it is possible to perpetrate a small attack in the ﬁrst period while also starting preparations for a big attack
in period 2. At the same time, terrorists can only plan one attack of each type in each period, so the set of
possible actions is given by {no attacks, s1, s2, s1s2, b2, s1b2, s1s2b2, s2b2}, where the subscripts denote
the period in which the attack takes place.
The expected value of the terrorists' utility function UT (similar to the expected amount of manpower
at the end of period 2) is given by the expected net beneﬁt of attacks. This net beneﬁt is an attack's
propaganda value times its success probability minus its manpower costs. At the same time, a terrorist
group is constrained by its available manpower in each period. Therefore, the terrorist organization's
expected utility function and its budget constraints look as follows:
21Introducing exogenous counter-terrorism in the ﬁrst period would just reduce the beneﬁts terrorists can reap in this
period. Thus, the θ-parameter for the ﬁrst period is omitted as it does not add to the dynamics of the model. It is also
possible to assume that the attack in period 1 is directed against another country and thus inﬂicts no damage upon the
government, but is observed nevertheless and thus conveys information about the terrorist group size.
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E(UT ) = (s− Cs)|s1 + (θs− Cs)|s2 + (θb− Cb)|b2
M1 ≥ (Cs)|s1 + (Cb)|b2
M2 = M1 + s|s1 − (Cs)|s1 − (Cb)|b2 ≥ (Cs)|s2 (1)
The subscripts |s1, |s2, |b2 indicate that the term only enters the budget constraint and utility function
if an attack of type s, b is planned in period 1, 2. In the ﬁrst period the terrorist organization can only
plan attacks if its initial manpower endowment is suﬃciently high to aﬀord at least a small attack. In the
second period, terrorists reap the manpower beneﬁt s if they perpetrated a small attack in period 1 and
can use this manpower and the manpower left over from period 1 to plan another small attack. The initial
manpower M1 is drawn from a distribution µ with support [0,∞[ and cumulative distribution function G.
To determine a terrorist organization's best course of action it will also be assumed that the manpower
gained through the propaganda value of an attack is higher than the manpower cost of this attack. Fur-
thermore, the cost-beneﬁt ratio of a big attack is suﬃciently high in relation to that of a small attack so
that given the choice, terrorists would rather perpetrate one big attack instead of two small ones. This is
another way of expressing the higher returns to scale of a big attack which are assumed in Feinstein and
Kaplan (2010). E.g., Al-Qaeda's costs of perpetrating the 9/11 attacks are estimated to be between $US
400, 000 and $US 500, 000 (9/11 Commission Report, 2003), while the resulting direct costs in capital and
human losses alone supposedly lie between $US 20 and $US 60 billion (Schneider et al., 2010). Including
further costs which are diﬃcult to measure such as distortions in consumption behaviour, additional un-
productive protection spending and expenditures for the War on Terror which, one could argue, served
partly as propaganda for terrorists, makes it clear that the 9/11 attacks had an unprecedented net beneﬁt
for the terrorists.22 The net beneﬁt of small attacks (which are also not inﬁnitely often repeatable) can be
assumed to be much lower. Formally, these conditions can be expressed as
s > Cs, b > Cb, b− Cb > 2(s− Cs) (2)
22The direct costs of the London tube bombings in 2005, for instance, are assumed to be less than ¿1 billion (GLA
Economics, 2006).
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Given this setup and an exogenous θ > Cs/s and M1, it is possible to determine a terrorist organization's
attack strategy.23 The strategy yielding the highest beneﬁt, i.e. the highest manpower at the end of period
2, is to plan both small attacks and also the big attack. If resources are not suﬃcient for this strategy, only
planning the big attack is optimal. And if resources at the beginning of period 1 do not allow the planning
of a big attack, perpetrating small attacks twice is optimal. Terrorist organizations can thus be classiﬁed
according to their initial size (see Table 3.1): A large-type organization can perpetrate all attacks, a
medium-type one has suﬃcient manpower for a big attack, a small-type organization can only aﬀord
to plan small attacks, and none-type terrorists do not have the resources for any kind of attack.
3.3.2 Government
I will now characterize the government's utility function and optimization problem. In the world presented
in this model the government faces a tradeoﬀ between investing an exogenously given budget B in an
anti-terror technology t which lowers the success probability θ of utility-reducing terrorist attacks, and
investing in a consumption technology χ with input x from which it derives immediate utility. It is not
necessary to be more speciﬁc about the exact nature of the anti-terror technology. For the purpose of this
chapter, protecting vulnerable sites works in the same way as inﬁltrating terrorist networks and uncovering
terrorist plots.24 The nature of the consumption technology can also be left fairly general. One could think
of non-security related government spending or even of security-related pork-barrel spending that does not
enhance protection from terrorist attacks. Coats et al. (2006), for instance, ﬁnd that funds from the 2004
US Homeland Security grant were allocated to states on a vote-per-capita base rather than in proportion
to a state's population, leading to an over-protection of small states with a low terrorism risk.
The utility of the government depends only on the second period. It is assumed that in the ﬁrst period,
the government is simply surprised by the emergence of a terrorist organization or has ﬁxed policies in
place which cannot be altered before the second period. In the second period, the government bases its
spending decisions on full knowledge about all parameters and the distribution of M1. I.e., it knows the
23θ > Cs/s ensures that the expected beneﬁt from a second period attack outweighs its costs.
24An extensive literature exists on the choice of counter-terrorism strategy and the allocation of security spending. See,
for instance, Powell (2007), Golany et al. (2009), Arce and Sandler (2005) and Enders and Sandler (1993).
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damage incurred from each attack type and probability of a particular terrorist organization to emerge,
but not which type is really active at the beginning of period 2 and which attacks are being planned.
It seems reasonable to assume that governments can infer a somewhat precise distribution and potential
damage assessment of the current terrorist threat through intelligence gathering activities, informers and
other sources.25
The government derives utility from consumption and disutility from the damage inﬂicted by terrorist
attacks which is equal to the propaganda beneﬁt for the terrorists.26 The expected value of its utility
function UG and its budget constraint thus take the form
E(UG) = χ(x)− θ(t)× ((αsmall + αlarge)s+ (αmedium + αlarge)b+ αnone × 0)
B = x+ t (3)
αsmall gives the probability (derived from the distribution of the initial manpower µ and the manpower
necessary to initiate an attack) that a small terrorist organization is present in the world and will launch
a small attack. Similarly, αmedium, αlarge and αnone denote the probabilities that a terrorist organization
of this type is present and will strike in period 2 according to its optimal strategy (see Table 3.1). The
alphas have to add up to one. The characteristics of χ and θ are as follows:
χ(0) = 0, χ′(0) =∞, χ′ > 0, χ′′ < 0 (4)
θ(0) = 1, θ(∞) > 0, θ′(0) = −∞, θ′ < 0, θ′′ > 0 (5)
These conditions ensure that the success probability of an attack is greater than 0 and equal or smaller
than 1 and that it is impossible to have full protection against terrorism. Furthermore, the government
25For instance, two months before the 9/11 attacks the CIA reported strong evidence of an imminent Al-Qaeda attack.
The US government chose not to act on this information, however (Washington Post, 2006, October 1).
26Making the government's damage and the terrorists' beneﬁt from an attack asymmetric would simply require the
introduction of a scaling parameter.
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Table 3.1  Optimal terrorist organization strategies based on M1 with exogenous
government response and corresponding stylized examples
Type of terror
organization
Initial size Optimal
strategy
Example
None M1 < Cs No attacks -
Small Cs ≤M1 < Cb s1, s2 NSU (Germany), nine assassinations of
foreign businessmen between 2000 and
2006 and two bomb attacks
Medium Cb ≤M1 <
Cs + Cb
b2 Al-Qaeda, simultaneous bombings of the
American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998
Large Cb + Cs ≤M1 s1, s2, b2 RAF (Germany), bank robberies,
assassinations/kidnappings of prominent
Germans, Stockholm embassy attack in
the '70s
will always expend its budget on both technologies. The α-probabilities are constructed as follows:
αnone = G(Cs), αsmall = G(Cb)−G(Cs)
αmedium = G(Cb + Cs)−G(Cb), αlarge = 1−G(Cb + Cs) (6)
See Figure 3.2 for a graphical representation.
By diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to x and t, setting these derivatives equal and utilizing the conditions
in (4) and (5) the optimal choices of t and x are implicitly given by
∂χ
∂x
= −∂θ
∂t
× ((αsmall + αlarge)s+ (αmedium + αlarge)b+ αnone × 0)) (7)
From (7), it is obvious that an increase in the damage from attacks and a decrease in the probability that
a terror organization of type none is present will increase the beneﬁt from spending the budget on t. The
α-probabilities are also linked to the costs of terror attacks (see Figure 3.2). As these costs decrease, the
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Figure 3.2  α given M1
probability of the emergence of a more powerful terror organization rises, and thus a higher t-spending
becomes optimal.
3.4 Terrorist attacks and government responses
Having described the autonomous decisions of the terrorist organization and the government I will now
turn to the interaction between the two actors. Here, as commonly assumed in game theoretic models
of terrorist-government interactions, terrorists are fully informed about the government's preferences and
can thus perfectly anticipate the government's reaction to their actions (cf. Lapan and Sandler (1993),
Overgaard (1994)). The information structure is thus asymmetric, with the government having an in-
formational disadvantage as it does not know which terrorist group size is drawn from the distribution
µ.
It will be necessary to determine the government's reaction in two possible cases: First, if a small attack
takes place in the ﬁrst period, and second, if no small attack is launched in the ﬁrst period. The government
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will be aware that terrorist organizations might try to hide their true strength, and terrorists will no
longer take θ as exogenous. This implies that terrorists in period 1 might want to avoid provoking a
severe government response which hampers attacks in period 2 and therefore abstain from attacking in
period 1. I call this pattern of behaviour in which a terror organization wants to appear smaller than it is
mimicking.
To restrict the number of possible scenarios assume that θ(B) × s − Cs > 0, so a small attack in period
2 would still be beneﬁcial for the terrorist organization even if the government were to spend its entire
budget on counter-terrorism measures.27 For example, the number of possible targets within a country
could be so large that it is not possible to protect all of them suﬃciently with a given counter-terrorism
budget. This assumption rules out cases in which terrorists abstain from attacking in the second period as
the success probability of attacks is too low to justify the planning costs. Under this assumption, the game
is solvable by backwards induction. The terrorists' attack decision in the second period which is contingent
on the government's counter-terrorism expenditure and the terrorists' ﬁrst period choice of attacks forms
the third stage of the game. The second stage consists of the government's counter-terrorism spending
decision which is driven by the terrorist behaviour observed in period 1. Finally, in the ﬁrst stage it is
determined whether the terrorists opt for a small ﬁrst period and a big second period attack or not. The
decision stages and timing of events are given in Figure 3.3.
3.4.1 Naive government
In this subsection, the government no longer bases its budget allocation decision on µ, s and b alone,
but also on the terrorists' behaviour it observes in period 1. This allows the government to rule out the
existence of particular organization types and thus optimize its spending on t by reducing uncertainty. It
does not yet, however, take into account the strategic aspect of its decision, i.e. that terrorist behaviour in
the ﬁrst period also depends on the expected counter-terrorism eﬀorts. The model with this kind of naive
government is more straightforward and will thus be presented ﬁrst, but qualitatively the same results are
achieved with a fully strategic government as shown in the next subsection.
27This implies that a large attack is also beneﬁcial as its beneﬁt-cost ratio is higher.
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Figure 3.3  Decision stages and timing of events
First, consider the case that the government is hit by a small attack in period 1. The government correctly
deduces that neither a terrorist organization of type none nor of type medium can be present as a none
type cannot aﬀord to start an attack at all, and a medium type saves its manpower for a big attack in
period 2.28 The government thus forms posterior beliefs β about the odds of facing a small or large terror
organization and has an expected utility function of the following form:
E(UG) = χ(x)− θ(t)× ((βsmall + βlarge)s+ (βlarge)b) (8)
The β-terms are constructed by utilizing Bayes' theorem. In this setup, this amounts to scaling up the
28The case in which a medium sized group acts like a small sized one will not be considered here. If the counter-terrorism
response in period 2 is suﬃciently stiﬀ, a medium sized group may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to perpetrate two small attacks (one
of them unopposed) instead of one big attack. However, this change of strategy cannot be properly described as mimicking
because the second period attack can then only be of the small type. The medium terrorist organization not only appears
to be a small one in the ﬁrst period, it also behaves like one in the second period. Also, for a portrayal of the interaction
between terrorists and government it is suﬃcient to show the mimicking behaviour of one type of terrorists and the subsequent
government response. To formally rule out the case in which a medium sized group changes its strategy to two small attacks,
it would be suﬃcient to assume that 2× (s− Cs) < θ(B)× b− Cb.
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prior probability of the emergence of a particular terrorist organization with the remaining probability
mass after subtracting the probabilities of terrorist types which cannot be present:
βlarge =
αlarge
αlarge + αsmall
βsmall =
αsmall
αlarge + αsmall
(9)
After having determined the government's belief if an attack takes place in the ﬁrst period, assume now
the opposite case in which the government is not attacked in period 1. The government infers that no small
terror organization can be active because terrorists of the small type cannot gain anything from abstaining
from a ﬁrst period attack; the beneﬁts from an unopposed small attack in period 1 and a subsequent risky
attack in period 2 are always greater than the beneﬁt from initiating just a risky small attack in period 2.
Terrorist types none and medium are following their optimal and possible strategies if they do not attack
in period 1, but large terror organizations could mimic a medium one to keep the government's response
in period 2 at a lower level. The government therefore updates its prior beliefs α to the new probabilities
γ in the same way as described above and arrives at an expected utility function of the form
E(UG) = χ(x)− θ(t)× ((γlarge)s+ (γlarge + γmedium)b+ γnone × 0) (10)
The γ-terms are derived in the same way as the β-terms in (9):
γlarge =
αlarge
αlarge + αmedium + αnone
γmedium =
αmedium
αlarge + αmedium + αnone
γnone =
αnone
αlarge + αmedium + αnone
(11)
It is now possible to predict in which case (small attack/no attack in period 1) the counter-terrorism
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reaction of the government will be stronger. This is done by calculating the optimal responses for (8) and
(10) as in (7) and comparing the terms attached to ∂θ/∂t. If the expected damage in period 2, calculated
from the updated beliefs about the terrorist group size, is higher if no attack is observed in period 1 than
if a small attack takes place, the government will react more strongly in the absence of an attack. Thus, t
will be higher when no ﬁrst period attack takes place if
(γlarge)s+ (γlarge + γmedium)b > (βlarge)b+ (βlarge + βsmall)s (12)
On the left hand side is the damage from a particular attack times the probability of this attack taking
place for the no attack case, and on the right hand side the equivalent expression for the attack case. This
can be rewritten as
(βsmall + βlarge − γlarge)s+ (βlarge − γlarge − γmedium)b < 0 (13)
For a non-degenerate µ (that is, a distribution that does not attach probability 1 to a single type), the ﬁrst
term in brackets is always positive. Thus, a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for (13) to hold is that
γlarge+γmedium > βlarge, i.e. that the probability of either a large or medium terrorist organization being
present in the no attack case has to be higher than the probability of a large terrorist organization being
present in the attack case. Furthermore, the damage the government suﬀers from a big attack has to be
large relative to the damage from a small attack for (13) to hold. A higher s will decrease the likelihood
that the counter-terrorism reaction in the case of no attack in period 1 is larger. This probability is also
decreasing in βlarge and increasing in γlarge. This can be summarized in:
Proposition 1: A naive government will engage in higher counter-terrorism spending if no ﬁrst period
attack takes place, if the expected second period damage given the updated government beliefs is higher in
the no attack case.
Figure 3.4 gives a graphical example for Proposition 1. Intuitively, the government might reason that
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Figure 3.4  Optimal government response t for varying s
the terrorist organization does not have suﬃcient resources to mount a larger attack in the next period if
it observes a small attack in period 1. This is particularly the case when the government draws the conclu-
sion from the assumed distribution of terrorist organization sizes that the existence of a large organization
is very unlikely. An observed attack will thus strengthen the belief that a small terrorist organization is
active which will only perpetrate a small attack in the next period. Similarly, the absence of an attack
may lead the government to believe that a medium terrorist organization or a large terrorist organization
mimicking a medium one is plotting against it. It will therefore employ heavier security measures than if
an attack in the ﬁrst period were to take place.
The terrorists will take the aforementioned government decision into account when deciding on their
optimal strategy at the onset of period 1, as it is assumed that they can perfectly anticipate the counter-
terrorism response. The mimicking strategy I will focus on here is when a large terrorist organization
mimics a medium one by not attacking in period 1. The case in which a medium terrorist organization
acts like a small one will not be considered. A large terrorist organization will ﬁnd it optimal to abstain
from launching a small attack in period 1 if the beneﬁt from a lower counter-terrorism response in period
2 outweighs the loss from foregoing the small attack in period one. Denote by t|γ (t|β) the t resulting from
the government's belief set γ (β). Then, suppressing variables which appear in the same form on both
100
Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations
sides, large terrorists will display mimicking behaviour if
θ(t|γ)× (b+ s) ≥ θ(t|β)× (b+ s) + (s− Cs) (14)
While possibly lowering the government's vigilance in period 2, foregoing a small attack in period 1 means
giving up the beneﬁt (s − Cs). From (13), s lowers θ(t|β) relative to θ(t|γ) and thus it is indeterminate
whether mimicking behaviour becomes less or more attractive in s as s enters the right-hand side of (14)
both positively and negatively. From (14), it is obvious that a large terror organization will never mimic
a medium one if (13) holds, that is, if the government's reaction in the absence of an attack is stronger
than to an attack. Also, from (13), the more probability the government attaches to βlarge and the less to
γlarge, the higher is the incentive for a large terrorist group to mimic a medium sized one. I.e., the more
the government expects a large group to be present in the case of a ﬁrst period attack and the less in the
absence of an attack, the more large groups beneﬁt from hiding their true strength. The extensive-form
game of the government-terrorist interaction is shown in Figure 3.5. The mimicking behaviour of large
terrorist organizations is summarized in:
Proposition 2: Large terrorist organizations facing a naive government will mimic medium ones and ab-
stain from launching a small attack in period 1 if the additional expected damage from an increased attack
success probability in period 2 is larger than the foregone beneﬁt from a small ﬁrst period attack.
See Figure 3.6 for an illustration of Proposition 2. As pointed out in the introduction, terrorists with
the goal of exacting concessions from a government, such as the ones in the models by Overgaard (1994)
and Lapan and Sandler (1993) will want to appear as serious a threat as possible. But this no longer holds
if terrorists pursue a growth strategy as in this chapter. More generally, if terrorist attacks generate a
beneﬁt for the perpetrator apart from the possibility of government concessions, terrorists may want to
lure governments into a false sense of security to strike unopposed on a greater scale.
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Figure 3.5  Extensive-form game for a naive government
Figure 3.6  Expected manpower for a large terrorist organization for varying s
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3.4.2 Fully rational government
In the previous subsection, the government considered that large terrorist groups can mimic medium-
sized ones, and can thus be present regardless of whether an attack is observed in the ﬁrst period or
not. However, the government did not take into account that its counter-terrorism spending may not be
optimal in the sense that large terrorist groups may have an incentive to always or never mimic, if the
government reacts to events in the ﬁrst period according to the β and γ probabilities. The updating of the
government's beliefs is therefore not fully rational in the previous subsection, as it ignores the strategic
implications of the government's actions for the terrorists.
For example, a naive government does not rule out the possibility of a large terrorist group being present
when it observes no attack in the ﬁrst period, and chooses t according to the γ probabilities. It could
now be the case that, given this t which is anticipated by the terrorists, a large terrorist group would have
no incentive to mimic as (14) does not hold. The government's counter-terrorism spending level, which is
based on updated beliefs erroneously factoring in the possible presence of a large terrorist group, would
thus be too high.
This subsection examines the case in which the government acts fully rational, so it takes into account that
the mimicking decision of a large terrorist organization in period 1 depends on the expected reaction of the
government in period 2: terrorists anticipate the government's reaction to their ﬁrst period actions and
choose their strategy accordingly. The incidents in the ﬁrst period are still exogenous for the government
as it has no possibility to credibly commit to a counter-terrorism strategy before the terrorists choose their
actions. This means that the government's counter-terrorism spending decision does not have to consider
the damage that could be averted if the government's strategy encourages large terrorist organizations to
abstain from attacking in the ﬁrst period.
Any strategy a fully rational government would choose has to be consistent with its beliefs about the
behaviour of the terrorist organizations. Equilibrium strategies of the government and the terrorists
therefore have to constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which the terrorists' and government's
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beliefs about each other's strategy are consistent with their own strategies and vice versa.29
A large terrorist organization is indiﬀerent between mimicking and not mimicking a medium-sized one if
the gain in expected utility from a lower level of counter-terrorism in the second period is equal to the loss
in utility from foregoing a small attack in the ﬁrst period. This is the case if (14) holds with equality.
Let tA (tNA) be the counter-terrorism spending level the government chooses if an attack (no attack) takes
place in period 1. Furthermore, denote by t|γ¯ the counter-terrorism spending if no ﬁrst period attack takes
place that, given t|β , would make (14) an equality. Similarly, denote by t|β¯ the value of t|β that, given t|γ ,
would make (14) an equality if an attack takes place. Thus, by rearranging (14),
t|γ¯ = θ−1(θ(t|β) +
(s− Cs)
(b+ s)
) (15)
t|β¯ = θ
−1(θ(t|γ)− (s− Cs)
(b+ s)
) (16)
First, I examine the case t|γ¯ < t|γ , so (14) does not hold. If a ﬁrst period attack takes place, choosing
tA = t|β is optimal for the government as it correctly anticipates the presence of either a small or large
terrorist group. But the government knows that if t|γ¯ < t|γ , a large terrorist organization will never mimic
a medium one if it sets tNA = t|γ as by doing so it loses the beneﬁts from the ﬁrst period attack and is not
suﬃciently compensated by a reduction in counter-terrorism measures. Thus, t|γ is an higher-than-optimal
level of counter-terrorism as it incorrectly assumes the presence of a large terrorist organization and thus
too severe a threat.
Ruling out tNA = t|γ as optimal response leads to two further cases: If the probability of the presence
of a medium-sized group is suﬃciently high, the government will still engage in higher counter-terrorism
spending than t|γ¯ as it faces a high risk of a big attack by a group of type medium. Denote the optimal level
of counter-terrorism spending if the government expects a none- or medium-type terrorist organization to
be present by t|m, and assume that t|γ¯ < t|m.30 The government's strategy tA = t|β , tNA = t|m then
29I also require that beliefs are structurally consistent (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, section 9C). I.e., if the government
knows that terrorists are indiﬀerent between two options, it cannot possibly assume that one option is chosen with a higher
probability than the other.
30t|m is implicitly given by
∂χ
∂x
= − ∂θ
∂t
(
αmedium
αmedium+αnone
× b
)
.
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constitutes a PBE: If no attack takes place in the ﬁrst period and the government chooses tNA = t|m,
large terrorist groups will never opt for a mimicking strategy and tNA = t|m is optimal for the expected
presence of either a terrorist organization of medium or none type. Similarly, if an attack takes place,
tA = t|β is optimal given the possibility that either a small or large group is active, and large groups
always perpetrate a small attack in the ﬁrst period.
In the aforementioned equilibrium, the government chooses a higher level of counter-terrorism spending if
it is not attacked in the ﬁrst period if t|β < t|m. From the construction of t|β and t|m this condition is
given as
αlarge
αlarge + αsmall
+
s
b
<
αmedium
αmedium + αnone
(17)
(17) holds if the ratio sb is small and if the probability of the emergence of a small or medium group is
high in comparison to the emergence of a group of type none or large. The behaviour of the government
can therefore be summarized in:
Proposition 3: If t|γ¯ < t|m < t|γ , a fully rational government will engage in higher counter-terrorism
spending if no ﬁrst period attack takes place
 if the damage from a big attack is large in comparison to the damage from a small attack and
 if the probability of either a small or medium group being active is large in comparison to the proba-
bility of the emergence of a group of type none or large.
However, if the probability of the emergence of a medium-sized group is low, t|m < t|γ¯ and t|m cannot
be the optimal level of counter-terrorism spending as at this spending level, mimicking again becomes the
strategy of choice for large terrorist organizations. tNA = t|m would therefore be lower than optimal as it
omits the possible presence of a large terrorist group. It turns out that a pure strategy PBE generally does
not exist if t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ . The best the government can do if it does not have a belief-consistent optimal
strategy that induces large groups to always or never mimic is to make large groups indiﬀerent. However,
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a strategy that makes large groups indiﬀerent is belief-consistent only in special cases. The reasoning for
these two results is presented in the appendix.
Now assume that t|γ¯ > t|γ , so (14) holds. If no attack is observed the government sets tNA = t|γ as it
correctly expects the presence of either a none-, medium- or large-type terrorist-organization. But if an
attack occurs in the ﬁrst period, tA = t|β is no longer optimal as the government knows that at this counter-
terrorism spending level large terrorist groups will pursue a mimicking strategy. So only a small terrorist
group can be the perpetrator. Denote by t|s the optimal counter-terrorism spending if the government
expects a small terrorist group to be active.31 If t|s > t|β¯ , the government will set tA = t|s as the possible
existence of a small terrorist group warrants higher spending than t|β¯ . The government's belief that large
terrorist organizations will never attack in the ﬁrst period, in combination with the strategy tA = t|s,
tNA = t|γ , therefore constitutes a PBE as large terrorist groups will indeed never choose to initiate a ﬁrst
period attack given these tA and tNA.
If t|s < t|β¯ , tA = t|s cannot be optimal as at this counter-terrorism level large terrorist groups would
abandon the mimicking strategy and always attack in the ﬁrst period. So tA < t|β¯ would be too low, and
the government would want to increase its spending. Again, as in the case of t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ , if t|γ¯ > t|γ
and t|s < t|β¯ a pure strategy PBE generally will not exist (see the appendix). The mimicking behaviour
of large terrorist organizations if they face a fully rational government is summarized in:
Proposition 4: If t|γ < t|γ¯ and tβ¯ < t|s, large terrorist organizations facing a fully rational govern-
ment will mimic medium ones and abstain from launching a small attack in period 1 .
The assumption of a fully rational government thus changes the results of the model in the following
ways: There are three mutually exclusive PBE for an appropriate choice of parameter values. In two of
these the government will be able to tell which strategy a large terrorist organization will pursue as its
choice of counter-terrorism spending uniquely determines the terrorists' optimal strategy. In the third, the
government chooses its reaction so as to make large terrorist groups indiﬀerent with regard to attacking
31t|s is implicitly given by
∂χ
∂x
= − ∂θ
∂t
(αsmall × s).
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or not in the ﬁrst period. There also exists a range of parameter values for which the model has no pure
strategy PBE. Note that there are no fully separating equilibria in which the government can uniquely
identify the type of terrorist organization by the observed attack strategy in period 1, as there are two
types of terrorist organizations (none and medium) which never attack in the ﬁrst period, and one type
(small) which always attacks in the ﬁrst period.
It is still possible that in the absence of an attack counter-terrorism eﬀorts will be higher than if an attack
took place. If t|γ¯ < t|m < t|γ and t|β < t|m a fully rational government will react stronger if no ﬁrst period
attack takes place. In contrast, a naive government as shown in subsection 3.4.1 requires that t|β < t|γ to
have higher counter-terrorism spending in the absence of an attack.
A mimicking strategy is still viable for terrorists given appropriate parameter values, but it occurs under
diﬀerent conditions than in subsection 3.4.1 where (14) was required to hold. A large terrorist organization
will now pursue a mimicking strategy if t|γ < t|γ¯ and tβ¯ < t|s.
3.5 Discussion
The previous section has developed a framework to analyse the attack decisions of terrorists and the
subsequent counter-terrorism expenditures of governments. This section will discuss the results with
attention to real-world observations.
Propositions 1 and 3 state that a terrorist organization's choice to attack does not necessarily evoke a
heavier government counter-terrorism response than the choice not to attack. Evidence from Germany
shows no clear connection between (attempted) terrorist attacks and expenditures on counter-terrorism
measures, i.e. the commonly assumed positive response of counter-terrorism eﬀorts to recent attacks is
hard to discern in reality. Figure 3.7 illustrates that attempted and successful terror attacks (description
in Table 3.2) in Europe and Germany did not systematically drive up German counter-terrorism spending.
Total government expenditures increased faster than security-related spending from 2005 to 2007 regardless
of several attacks. In 2008 and 2009, the opposite was the case during a lull of terrorist activity, although
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Figure 3.7  (Attempted) terror attacks in Europe, year-to-year change of total
government spending and the budgets of main counter-terrorism agen-
cies in Germany in %, 2005-2012
Federal Criminal Agency (BKA), German Federal Police (Bundespolizei), Federal Oﬃce for the Protection of the
Constitution (Verfassungsschutz), total government spending without investments and debt service.
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004-2012)
one could argue that the 2007 attacks triggered the security spending increases. The Verfassungsschutz,
however, one of the main German agencies to combat terrorism, slightly reduced its budget in 2009 and
increased it again in 2010 by 20 %. From 2010 to 2012, three attacks took place and counter-terrorism
spending was fairly stable while total government spending varied wildly due to the ﬁnancial crisis. 32 The
absence of a discernible positive relationship between terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism budgets is
supportive of the notion laid down in Propositions 1 and 3; governments may take an attack as an indicator
that a terrorist organization has very limited resources or is not of a particularly dangerous size.
Propositions 2 and 4 claim that terrorist organizations may want to appear weaker than they are to avoid a
strong government counter-terrorism response which could endanger future operations. While non-growth
oriented terrorists are known to threaten attacks if countries do or do not take a particular course of action
32German counter-terrorism eﬀorts are divided between the BKA, the Bundespolizei and the Verfassungsschutz. Further
involved agencies are the federal secret service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) and the military intelligence service (Militärischer
Abschirmdienst). It is diﬃcult to determine the funds which are speciﬁcally used to combat terrorism within these organiza-
tions.
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Table 3.2  Description of terror attacks plotted in Figure 3.7
Name Date Description Outcome Casualties
London attack July 2005 Suicide attacks on
London's public
transport system.
4 suicide terrorists
successfully detonated
their bombs during the
morning rush-hour.
52 dead, over 700
injured
Koﬀerbomber July 2006 Attempt to blow up two
German suburban
trains.
Bombs did not explode
and were discovered, 2
terrorists arrested.
-
Heathrow plot August
2006
Attempt to detonate
bombs on at least 10
transatlantic ﬂights.
Plot discovered before
the attack could be
carried out, several
terrorists arrested.
-
Sauerlandgruppe September
2007
Preparations for
assassinations and bomb
attacks.
No attacks perpetrated,
4 alleged terrorists
arrested.
-
Glasgow attack June 2007 Car loaded with propane
gas canisters driven into
Glasgow International
Airport.
No serious ﬁre ensued,
both terrorists were
apprehended.
5 injured
Stockholm attack December
2010
Car bomb and a
backpack with pipe
bombs detonated in
Stockholm.
Car bomb went oﬀ,
terrorist killed by his
own pipe bomb.
2 injured
Frankfurt attack March 2011 Islamist gunman
attacking a USAF bus
at Frankfurt airport.
Gunman shot several
soldiers and was then
apprehended by the
police.
2 dead, 2 injured
Oslo attack July 2011 Car bomb detonated in
Oslo, gunman attacks
youth summer camp.
Car bomb went oﬀ,
gunman was
apprehended after a
shooting spree.
77 dead, 151
injured
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(e.g., Al-Qaeda threatened to attack Germany if chancellor Merkel were to be reelected in 2009), terrorists
with a focus on manpower building should keep quiet so as not to alert the authorities. For instance,
the NSU (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund), a German neo-nazi terror group, did not publicly claim
responsibility for its attacks, but circulated propaganda videos of their deeds within the neo-nazi milieu.
German authorities did not even attribute most of the attacks to a terrorist organization, but considered
them to be part of a turf war between non-native criminals. As current investigations begin to uncover,
the three active members of the NSU were supported by a considerable network of sympathizers they
had built over a decade.
Assessing the real strength of terrorist organizations is a particularly diﬃcult undertaking due to their
clandestine nature, loosely aﬃliated groups and global networks. While terrorist groups often boast about
their capabilities, communiques in which they claim to be on the wane or weak are rare. But terrorism
has been found to follow a cyclical pattern which is indicative of strategic behaviour, i.e. terrorists
who engage in inter-temporal substitution to catch governments unprepared (Enders and Sandler, 2002).
The intelligence-based updating of beliefs about the magnitude of the terrorist threat in the absence of
speciﬁc attack announcements shows that some terrorists attempt to appear weak or non-existent prior
to attacking. E.g., in late 2010 the German Ministry of the Interior announced an increased threat level
based on new intelligence and the discovery of several parcel bombs. The terror organizations responsible
for this increased threat obviously did not announce their demands or attack plans in advance. Without
any attacks taking place, the level of alertness was lowered again in early 2011 (Bundesministerium des
Inneren, 2011).
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has integrated the signaling game structure of terrorist attacks as in Lapan and Sandler (1993)
into a framework of organizational growth of terrorist groups as in Feinstein and Kaplan (2010). The main
ﬁndings are that terrorists act rational if they try to hide their true strength and appear weaker than they
are, and that governments do not necessarily increase counter-terrorism measures more strongly if they
observe a terrorist attack than if no attack takes place. In contrast to the Arce and Sandler (2007) model
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in which a mechanical government response to a spectacular attack can encourage the inter-temporal
substitution of attacks by carrying forward resources between periods, this chapter shows that ﬁrst period
restraint on part of the terrorists can be aimed at raising the level of uncertainty the government faces.
The driving factor behind these results is that terrorists are interested in organizational growth, not in
concessions from the government. Furthermore, their attacks are assumed to have a propaganda value
which attracts new recruits. Governments therefore need to be aware that it not only matters whether
their terrorist opponents are political or military, but also whether they are currently pursuing a growth
strategy. For the prediction and interpretation of terrorist behaviour the diﬀering motivations play an
important role, which, as in Arce and Sandler (2007), emphasizes the role of intelligence in the ﬁght
against terrorism.
The model could be expanded to include a commitment device such as long-term counter-terrorism in-
vestments on the part of the government. This would allow to examine costs and beneﬁts of commitment
to a particular counter-terrorism strategy, and shed light on the value of real-world policies which create
long-term commitments for governments in the struggle against terrorism.
As this chapter, in contrast to the discussed literature, argues that terrorists may have an incentive to
appear weaker than they are, a further fruitful avenue of research lies in developing a model in which ter-
rorists can signal both weakness and strength. This would allow to examine the interaction of governments
and terrorists if the world is populated by small terrorist groups who may want to appear stronger than
they are, and large groups who prefer to appear weak.
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Appendix to section 3.4
Absence of PBE if t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ or t|γ < t|γ¯, t|s < t|β¯
With a non-indiﬀerent large terrorist group
There are two belief-consistent strategies for the government with non-indiﬀerent large terrorist groups:
One in which the government chooses its spending so as to make large terrorist groups always attack
in the ﬁrst period, and one in which the counter-terrorist spending makes a large terrorist group always
mimic a medium one. However, neither of these strategies is optimal if the chance of the appearance of
a medium-sized terrorist group is low (t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ) or if it is unlikely that a small group is active
(t|γ < t|γ¯ , t|s < t|β¯). The government is either over- or underspending and always wants to readjust its
counter-terrorism eﬀorts to the point where the strategies are no longer belief-consistent.
Assume ﬁrst that t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ . If the government sets t|m < t|γ¯ < tNA, tA = t|β and expects large
groups to always attack, large terrorist groups indeed always attack in the ﬁrst period, but the government
is overspending if no ﬁrst period attack occurs. It thus wants to reduce tNA to t|m. But once the spending
(if no attack occurs) makes large terrorist groups indiﬀerent with regard to mimicking (at tNA = t|γ¯) , the
government's belief that large terrorist groups always attack is no longer correct.
Alternatively, the government expects large groups to always mimic and sets tA = t|s and tNA so low that
large groups prefer not to attack, the strategy is belief-consistent, but the government is underspending
if no ﬁrst period attack occurs. It therefore wants to increase tNA to t|γ , but once the spending (if no
attack occurs) makes large terrorist groups indiﬀerent with regard to mimicking, the government's belief
that large terrorist groups never attack is no longer correct.
Now assume that t|γ < t|γ¯ , t|s < t|β¯ . If the government sets tNA = t|m and tA so low that large groups
always want to attack, the government's beliefs are consistent with the terrorist group's behaviour, but it
is underspending if a ﬁrst period attack occurs. Therefore, the government wants to increase tA to t|β , but
once the spending if an attack occurs becomes high enough to make large terrorist groups indiﬀerent with
regard to mimicking, the government's belief that large terrorist groups always attack is no longer correct.
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If the government sets tNA = t|γ , t|s < t|β¯ < tA and expects large groups to mimic medium ones, large
terrorist groups indeed never attack in the ﬁrst period, but the government is overspending if a ﬁrst period
attack occurs. It thus wants to reduce tA to t|s, but once the spending if no attack occurs makes large
terrorist groups indiﬀerent with regard to mimicking (at tA = t|β¯) , the government's belief that large
terrorist groups never attack is no longer correct.
It follows from this discussion that the only belief-consistent and optimal strategy the government can
pick in all cases is to choose tA and tNA so as to make large groups indiﬀerent with regard to mimicking,
while taking into account that tA and tNA have to maximize its utility under the belief that large groups
choose to attack half of the time. But, as shown below, such a combination of tA and tNA does generally
not exist.
With an indiﬀerent large terrorist group
Assume that t|m < t|γ¯ and t|s < t|β¯ . The government wants to optimize its counter-terrorism spending
when large terrorist groups are indiﬀerent between attacking and not attacking in the ﬁrst period, and
thus choose each strategy with the same probability.
The government knows that the chance of a large group being active in both the attack and no attack
case is half the conditional probability of a large group being active. If it is attacked in the ﬁrst period
the government hence forms the following belief set, denoted by δ:
δlarge =
0.5× αlarge
0.5× αlarge + αsmall
δsmall =
αsmall
0.5× αlarge + αsmall (A.1)
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If the government is not attacked it forms the belief set ϕ:
ϕlarge =
0.5× αlarge
0.5× αlarge + αmedium + αnone
ϕmedium =
αmedium
0.5× αlarge + αmedium + αnone
ϕnone =
αnone
0.5× αlarge + αmedium + αnone (A.2)
From these probabilities, the counter-terrorism levels tA = t|δ and tNA = t|ϕ are constructed according to
(7). These spending levels are only optimal and consistent with the government's belief that large terrorist
groups are indiﬀerent if large groups obtain the same utility regardless of whether they attack or not. This,
from (14), is the case if
θ(t|ϕ)× (b+ s) = θ(t|δ)× (b+ s) + (s− Cs) (A.3)
or, equivalently,
θ(t|ϕ) = θ(t|δ) +
s− Cs
b+ s
(A.4)
Here, it becomes visible that (A.4) only holds for particular value combinations of α, s, b and Cs. It is
therefore only in special cases that the government's strategy to set tA = t|δ, tNA = t|ϕ under the belief
that large terrorist groups are indiﬀerent constitutes a PBE.
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This thesis has dealt with the impact the mobility of individuals has on the possibility of redistributive
taxation and the welfare state. I ﬁnd in the ﬁrst chapter that tax competition in the face of mobile
taxpayers will be less ﬁerce if these taxpayers are altruistic towards the recipients of income transfers.
Furthermore, the empirical second chapter shows that the public funding of day care, a particular aspect
of the welfare state, is unlikely to be negatively aﬀected by an increase of ethnic heterogeneity caused
by immigration. Taken together, these two chapters thus draw an optimistic picture of the future of
redistributive welfare states in a world of open borders.
The ﬁnal chapter of this dissertation has examined the likely behaviour of terrorist groups which put the
expansion of their organizations at least temporarily before other goals. It has been found that counter-
intuitive behaviour on the parts of terrorists and governments, such as foregoing possible attacks and
increasing counter-terrorism eﬀorts if no terrorist attacks have taken place, can be perfectly rational.
This outlook will brieﬂy illustrate the enduring socio-economic importance of migration and terrorism
issues and thus justify their treatment by various economic disciplines.
As the current crisis of the EU unfolds, it becomes clear that public ﬁnances and social protection systems
will be exposed to severe strains for years to come. As the example of Greece shows, cutbacks in the
social sector are usually the ﬁrst remedy of choice to put government ﬁnances on an even keel. Rising
unemployment ﬁgures in countries such as Ireland and Spain, which are currently hit hard by recessions,
are putting additional pressure on welfare systems as the number of recipients increases while the number
of contributors falls. For instance, almost half the Irish population was receiving social welfare payments
in 2011, and a third of Irish government expenditures went into social protection (Dervan, 2011).
Tax competition between countries for ﬁrms and individuals will certainly not lessen if government budgets
are strained by poor lending conditions, diminishing tax revenues and an increased need for welfare services.
Economic research can thus contribute to policy making by predicting the outcomes of tax competition and
by showing optimal strategies for governments in diﬀering tax competition situations. As the ﬁrst chapter
of this dissertation illustrates, economic reasoning based on experimentally found human behaviour can
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help to alleviate fears about the outcome of income tax competition, although the chapter also implies
that worsening economic conditions, such as an increase in the number of income transfer recipients, may
reduce the scope of redistribution.
A further current development is that the demographic structure in most developed countries is undergoing
a fundamental change. In addition to the aging of populations which is accompanied by serious challenges
itself, the share of citizens with non-native roots is bound to increase. This is due to a combination of im-
migration and higher reproduction rates. Even though fertility rates tend to converge quickly, immigrants
from most emerging or developing countries have a higher fertility rate than Western natives for quite some
time. In the case of Germany, the fertility rate per woman of German nationals was 1.34 in 2008, but that
of non-nationals was 1.61 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). Even though there is no separate statistic for
German citizens with a migration background, it can be safely assumed that naturalized Germans from
countries such as Turkey (which has a fertility rate of 3.0 amongst ﬁrst-generation immigrants (Schmid
and Kohls, 2008)) which are included in the ﬁgure for German nationals reproduce at a higher rate for at
least one or two generations.
While this will of course not change the domestic majority autochthonous natives currently possess, it is
important to examine which eﬀects this increase of ethnic heterogeneity will have on the provision of public
goods and welfare services from which non-EU immigrants, once naturalized, cannot be excluded. 1 This
issue has been approached in both theoretical and empirical ways by sociologists and economists. This
dissertation contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence that particular aspects
of the welfare state may not be as threatened by this development as one might expect from theoretical
considerations.
The ﬁnal contemporary issue which is treated in this thesis is the ﬁght against terrorism which will
continue to be a serious concern of governments for the foreseeable future. Terrorist groups show a
remarkable capability for regenerating themselves even after their funding, manpower and leadership has
been severely diminished by counter-terrorism eﬀorts. Al-Qaeda, for instance, has been likened to a hydra-
headed monster by the Economist (2008), and continues to be globally active even after key ﬁgures such
1EU citizens are currently eligible for unemployment beneﬁts not only in their home country, but in most other EU
countries as well.
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as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Osama bin Laden have been put out of action.
The examples of Mali, of which the Northern part was recently conquered by Tuareg separatists and
Islamist terrorists, and Nigeria, in which some Northern areas are virtually controlled by Boko Haram,
an Islamist terrorist organization, show that currently the territorial integrity and sheer existence of some
states is threatened by terrorism. The Gaza strip, which, since 2006, has been under the rule of Hamas,
an organization classiﬁed as terrorist by the EU and the US, gives a cautionary tale of what can happen
if whole countries are run by terrorists. The neighbouring state of Israel is under constant threat from
rocket and suicide attacks as the Hamas' charta calls for the eradication of Israel and the expulsion of all
Jews from the region.
Further economic research on the internal structure and goals of terrorist organizations, on the economic
impact of terrorism and on terrorist-government interactions can help governments and their agencies to
devise optimal strategies to tackle the problem of terrorism and to determine the optimal trade-oﬀ between
security, economic performance and openness. As this thesis illuminates, with the use of economic tools
the actions of terrorist organizations can be predicted dependent upon their type, e.g. whether they are
political, militant or interested in organizational growth. This matters for governments to correctly
interpret observed terrorist behaviour and act accordingly.
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